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Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

D. Richard Little

Robert M. Slusser

Hans H. Baerwald

Vlad Georgescu

Dennis Reinhartz

Jonathan D. Pollack

JULY-AUGUST 1980

LEFTIST FORCES IN IRAN — Shahram Chubin

The Left in Turkey — George S. Harris

Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas — William S. Turley

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Problems of Communism

4

JULY–AUG 1980 VOL XXIX

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1 Leftist Forces in Iran
by Shahram Chubin

26 The Left in Turkey
by George S. Harris

42 Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas
by William S. Turley

BOOKS

62 Political Participation and the Soviet System
by D. Richard Little

68 The USSR and Western Europe
by Robert M. Slusser

72 Soviet-Japanese Relations
by Hans H. Baerwald

76 Dissident Images of Eastern Europe
by Vlad Georgescu

80 Dissent In Yugoslavia
by Dennis Reinhartz

84 Interpreting China's Foreign Policy
by Jonathan D. Pollack

Cover: Young members of the Mojahedin learn to handle weapons and explosives in April 1979 at a training ground near Tehran taken over from the police. Photo by Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

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SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT) David E. Albright
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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Leftist Forces in Iran

Shahram Chubin

Despite its numerical weakness and fragmentation, the Iranian Left has had an important radicalizing effect on the Iranian revolution. The major leftist groups—the Tudeh, Feda'iyin, and Mojahedin—have achieved an informal cooperation among themselves and have made common cause with the religious Right on a variety of fundamental issues. The result has been an erosion of the moderate Center, a strengthening of the Left, and a "leftward drift" of the revolution. If current trends continue, the Left could be a serious contender in any future power struggle.

The Left in Turkey

George S. Harris

The Left in Turkey claims only a minute portion of the popular vote, yet leftist ideas enjoy wide acceptance among students and intellectuals and also contribute to the political violence that currently accounts for some eight deaths a day in that country.

Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas

William S. Turley

A combination of domestic factors, subsequently exacerbated by international events, has forced the leaders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to revise their expectations of the speed at which they can transform their formerly divided nation into a united, modern, socialist state based on adaptation of the post-1960 Soviet and East European models. As a consequence, they have now given priority to the improvement of production over socialist reorganization. But the commitment to the latter goal remains and creates dilemmas for the future—especially in light of continued social and political impediments to its realization.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Political Participation and the Soviet System

D. Richard Little

Although the Soviet population is highly involved in governmental activities in the USSR, this "participation" differs greatly from that in the West. It does not entail any role for the citizenry in selecting leaders, defining major policy objectives, or publicly opposing those objectives. The populace has inputs into the policymaking process only through private, individual actions which, in aggregate, affect decision-makers' views of the likely success or failure of a contemplated policy.

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The USSR and Western Europe

Robert M. Slusser

Although not overtly directed westward, the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan has serious implications for Western Europe, for this intervention has introduced a new and unpredictable element into the calculus of Soviet foreign policy behavior. Thus, while analysis of Soviet–West European relations in the 1970's can help shed light on the opportunities and dangers of the new phase now emerging, it can no longer claim to define them within reasonably precise limits.

Soviet-Japanese Relations

Hans H. Baerwald

Despite considerable similarities in modernization patterns in the pre-World War II period and complementary economic requirements, the Soviet Union and Japan continue to operate at arm's length politically. Part of the reason is the sharp postwar shift in Japan's approach to modernization, with an emphasis on consumer satisfaction and democracy.

Dissident Images of Eastern Europe

Vlad Georgescu

Most East European dissidents are not anti-Marxist, but rather are critical of today's Communist regimes for betraying "true Marxism." The dissidents' historical explanation for this betrayal provides few ideas of what socialist society should look like, however, and no dissident writer has yet succeeded in offering a realistic method of reforming "the system." Still, dissidence in the face of increasing repression deserves respect and may promote future change.

Dissent in Yugoslavia

Dennis Reinhartz

Recent events point to the emergence of a community of dissent in post-Tito Yugoslavia, a community united by a common belief in democratic socialism, pluralism, true nonalignment, and existential humanism. This development need not portend major instability, as long as the government continues to show restraint and the dissidents continue to emphasize caution and moderation.

Interpreting China's Foreign Policy

Jonathan D. Pollack

A recent study of Chinese behavior in the United Nations suggests that China has adapted to international structures in which it finds itself and disproves contentions that absence of data prevents serious research on Chinese foreign policy. It transcends the problems characteristic of much existing scholarship about the subject. All too often, writers on Chinese foreign policy display ignorance of the world beyond China, while students of world politics who attempt to include China within their purview demonstrate an inadequate sense of what can be learned from the Chinese case.

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Leftist Forces in Iran

By Shahram Chubin

The enduring reality of Iran's politics in 1980 is a persistent, three-sided struggle for power. The Left and Right have allied to squeeze out the Center, which is small and shrinking rapidly. The Center and Right have joined together to push back the challenge from the Left. Only the Center and Left have failed to make common cause, although elements of the Center have made some overtures toward dialogue. The consequence of this struggle for power has been increased opportunity for the Left, which has grown rapidly, has had an important radicalizing effect on the revolution, and may be a serious contender for power in any future power struggle.

In the meanwhile, the USSR, with its long history of interest in Iran, stands by in close proximity to events in the country. Soviet policy toward the Iranian revolution has been consistent. The USSR has sought to assist in the consolidation of the revolution, lending its support for all "revolutionary" measures and insisting that the steps so far taken in Iran constitute "only a first step" on the path toward a total revolution. It has also tried to assure the participation of all "progressive forces" in the revolutionary government, its primary interest in Iran being a government that is compliant, sensitive to its interests, and deferential to its concerns. Finally, it has sought to deepen and make irreversible the rift with the United States, in so doing attempting to underscore its own role as "protector" of the revolution and to focus hostility on the West's alleged sins in the past.[1]

At the same time, the USSR has evinced a degree of skepticism about the long-range stability of the Khomeini regime. There is evidence of considerable Soviet covert activity across the porous 1,000-mile frontier. The USSR has been sending into Iran's Azerbaijan provinces radical exiles to whom it had earlier granted refuge. It is helping to revive the Azerbaijani Democratic Party, which has links with the Tudeh party (the Iranian Communist party). It has also provided arms to dissident groups within these provinces, which, along with the other northern provinces of Iran, are in practical terms now outside the control of the central government.[2] The availability to the USSR of peoples of similar ethnic origin makes it remarkably difficult for an Iran targeted for infiltration to detect "foreigners" or "agents." Moreover, the USSR has other assets in Iran, including its relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[3] The Soviet

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Mr. Chubin is an Iranian national who has been at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London) since 1977. He is currently supervising a project on regional security, the first phase of which deals with the Persian Gulf. Mr. Chubin studied at Columbia University (New York, NY) and has worked in the United States and in Iran. He is the author of Iran's Foreign Relations, *1975,* Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf, *1980, and numerous articles on international politics in this and other journals.* *The author acknowledges the assistance of Andrew Whitley, who helped provide the author with a sense of the differences among the Left, and of a number of other individuals who cannot be identified publicly.*

[1] See the author's *Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf,* Adelphi Papers, No. 157, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980.

[2] Report to the author from private sources; see also *The Economist* (London), May 24, 1980, p. 50.

[3] The Soviet relationship with the PLO is ambiguous, but that it constitutes an avenue of influence into Iran is undoubted. It is particularly revealing in this respect to note Soviet comments about the PLO's role in the Iranian revolution. In November 1978, Moscow denied any PLO activity in Iran and claimed that "events in Iran are of a purely internal nature" and that "the issues they raise should be dealt with by the Iranians themselves." See Radio Moscow in Arabic, Nov. 22, 1978, translated in *Summary of World Broadcasts* (London—hereafter *SWB*), SU/5977/A4/2, Nov. 24, 1978. A year later, in contrast, Moscow commented, "Everyone knows that the PLO exerted great influence over the Iranian revolution and rendered effective and memorable assistance to the revolutionary forces in Iran . . . ." Radio Moscow in Persian, Oct. 30, 1979, in *SWB,* SU/6262/A4/1, Nov. 3, 1979.

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occupation of Afghanistan provides a further avenue of influence.

If a power struggle should develop after the demise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the USSR with its propinquity would be in an advantageous position to provide covert assistance and to influence the outcome of such a struggle. Were the authority of the central government (and particularly its military capability) to continue to decline and were the country to edge further toward disintegration, Soviet preclusive action in the northern provinces might be forthcoming on "defensive" grounds.[4]

But the Khomeini regime does not seem worried. It is convinced that it can, if it wishes, suppress the Left overnight. This may be the case today. But what are the trends? And how will they affect the prospects of the Left?

The Political Context

Ever since the departure of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in January 1979, it has been extraordinarily difficult to capture the dynamics of politics and change in Iran. Formally, the reins of government passed initially to Shahpour Bakhtiar and, in March 1979, to Mehdi Bazargan. But much of the government's authority was illusory. In November 1979, after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, Bazargan had to resign in protest of actions over which his government had no control. It quickly became apparent that the Ayatollah Khomeini would not relinquish the political power seemingly conferred upon him by popular consent throughout Iran. Even the Khomeini regime, though, has not been what it seems. Formally, the powers of government have rested with the moderate Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, elected president of the republic in January 1980, and with his ministers, such as Foreign Minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh. Unofficially, however, they have until recently rested with the 13-member Revolutionary Council, a self-appointed body dominated by the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). Iran's parliament, the Majlis—elected in two rounds of voting in March and May 1980—has done little to resolve the ambiguities of power, so far being unable even to decide on the procedures by which it will conduct its business. Perhaps as never before, Iran's politics remains the domain of myth and charade.

[4] The USSR might justify any such action by invoking the terms of the Iran-USSR Treaty of 1921—specifically Art. VI, which gives the USSR the right to intervene in Iran to secure its own defense. Both the Shah and Iran's revolutionary regime denounced the treaty, but the USSR still considers it valid.

Supporters of the Feda'iyin demonstrate at Tehran University in February 1980, before Islamic groups drove them from the campus.

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

In this context, names and labels do not always mean what they do in the West. For example, the Right and the Left are often extremely difficult to disentangle. There are a host of cross-cutting cleavages in the country, such as age, rural-urban, literate-illiterate, domestic- or foreign-educated, as well as the more traditional divisions—and on some issues the Left and the Right have often made common cause. The Left in Iran is split into a dozen splinter groups without any one dominant force around which the others can coalesce. It includes a variety of small groups espousing loyalty to China (the Tufan, or Typhoon, group), Albania, or others, and even a Socialist Workers' Party of Trotskyist orientation. It includes underground organizations professing adherence to Marxism and demanding autonomy for the peoples of the Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi areas, where these organizations are active. It even includes secular socialist groupings, such as the National Democratic Front (an offshoot of the centrist National Front, a secular grouping that opposed the Shah in the late

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1950's and early 1960's). Perhaps the most interesting groups on the left, however, are the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin-e Khalq, and the Mojahedin-e Khalq. Although these three are to varying degrees Marxist, attract primarily the literate sector of the populace, and have overlapping programs, they are quite different from each other in organization and appeal. On the right are the religious elements, who are not only Muslim but also anti-American and anti-Communist in outlook, headed by the mullahs and the IRP. The IRP has great popular appeal, dominates the Revolutionary Council, and is clearly moving the country toward a theocratic regime. In the center are the moderates, the liberal democrats, and the Westernized middle class. Once typified by Bazargan and former Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, the Center has now been inherited by Bani-Sadr.

The comparative strength of the Left is difficult to gauge. Early in 1979, one observer estimated that the Iranian Left could together mobilize some 50,000 people on the streets of Tehran and that the mullahs could rally 50 times that number.[5] A year later, the same source reported that the Left could (optimistically) claim 30,000–40,000 well-trained, well-armed, and dedicated fighters.[6] The difference between mere sympathizer and armed adherent is no small one, and the Left has increased its stock of both since the beginning of the revolution.

Nevertheless, the Left remains numerically inferior to the supporters of Khomeini. As Sharif Arani has noted, the Iranian industrial working class, some 700,000 strong, now accounts for only about 7 percent of the total active labor force and is unlikely to grow much more, as Iranian industry is now unlikely to match its annual growth rate of 15 percent over the period 1965–75. Furthermore, Khomeini can bid for labor support by wage increases. In contrast, Khomeini's constituency—the traditional sector of the economy—numbered some 2.5 million in 1977, or about 3.5 times the size of the industrial labor force.[7] And since the traditional sector of the economy and the bazaar have been untouched, and may in fact have benefited from the slowdown in industrial growth, Khomeini has little to fear from defection from these ranks. At least so argues Arani.

The argument is persuasive, but it assumes a static picture. The Left makes up for its numerical deficiencies by strong organization in the strategic sectors of the nation's economy. In 1979, for example, it claimed that 55 percent of the 60 members of the strike committee at the Abadan oil refinery were leftists (Tudeh, Feda'iyin and Mojahedin).[8] The Left also has a coherent doctrine for seizing power, it is armed, and it has at least the potential of active assistance from a proximate superpower. Above all, though, the Left benefits from the dynamics of current Iranian politics.

It has also been contended that the Iranian Left is divided by harsh and irreconcilable differences into many factions and that, as a result, its energies are dissipated and its opportunities lost. There is a certain merit to this position, as will be evident from a detailed examination of the three major parties of the Left—the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin, and the Mojahedin.

The Tudeh

Founded in 1941, the Tudeh (Masses) party is the oldest Communist party in the Middle East.[9] During the 1950's and 1960's, it was the major opposition movement to the Shah. Through much of its existence, it has also been the most organized political force in Iranian politics, often appearing in the guise of a protest movement that brought together individuals of diverse political views.

The prerevolutionary period. In the 1940's the Tudeh could boast 25,000 members, and perhaps half a million affiliates in the Iranian trade unions. Banned in 1949, it resurfaced in the fluid politics of the early 1950's, but it failed to bury its distaste for Muhammad Mosaddeq and to support him fully. With the fall of Mosaddeq and the restoration of the Shah in 1953, the Tudeh suffered considerable repression at the hands of the regime. Its leadership went into exile in East Germany, and its rank and file grew passive or converted to more acceptable political ideas. By the 1960's, the Tudeh's core membership had dwindled to perhaps 2,000, and by 1973, to some 500.[10] The Tudeh's support now came essentially from the urban areas, largely from among the professional and intellectual classes. The party appeared to have been over-

[5] *The Economist,* Feb. 3, 1979.
[6] Ibid., Apr. 26, 1980, p. 33.
[7] Sharif Arani, "Iran: From the Shah's Dictatorship to Khomeini's Demagogic Theocracy," *Dissent* (New York), Winter 1980, p. 21.

[8] *The Economist,* Feb. 3, 1979. This figure is probably an exaggeration. Since then, active recruitment has undoubtedly increased, and the figures quoted for 1979 may actually be correct in mid-1980.
[9] For history and background, see Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran,* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1966; and idem, "Communism in Iran," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1965, pp. 46–55.
[10] See US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* (Washington, DC), for 1973 and earlier.

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taken by history.

Only in the late 1970's, with the first glimmerings of active opposition within Iran, did the Tudeh bestir itself. While in Moscow in 1975, Tudeh leader Iraj Eskandari publicly acknowledged cooperation with Cuba. In the same year, the 15th Party Plenum of the Tudeh's Central Committee agreed to seek a coalition among the disparate opposition groups contesting the Shah's rule; doctrinal impurity would no longer stand in the way of cooperation. Eskandari, who was accused of failing to appreciate the surge of religious feeling and its tactical implications for Tudeh policy, was replaced as First Secretary of the party, a post he had held for eight years. His successor was Nureddin Kianuri, a sexagenarian who had been in exile in East Germany for more than two decades.

As the traditional Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh was throughout the prerevolutionary period the local agent of the USSR, with which it was joined in an unequal relationship by identical interests and mutually reinforcing policies. Almost all analysts of Iranian politics agree that the Tudeh's tie with the Soviet Union was both a liability and an asset. In the mid-1960's, for example, Moscow followed a policy of cooperation with the Shah and, accordingly, reduced its assistance to the Tudeh. The Tudeh thus found itself in the thankless position of having to defend and rationalize a policy that weakened it.

The Soviet tie was also a source of controversy within the Tudeh. In 1948, Khalil Maleki left the party in protest against its strong Soviet links and founded a "third force." In 1965, in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet rift, a Maoist group, the Tufan (Typhoon), also broke away.[11] In 1969, some 200 Tudeh members dissatisfied with the party's aversion to political violence formed the Revolutionary Organization of Iranian Communists (Sazman-e Enqalab-e Kommunistha-ye Iran), a group that advocated recourse to armed measures to finance its activities. On the eve of the 1979 revolution, a variety of groups pulled out of the Tudeh in order to minimize the liabilities associated with the Tudeh. Several splinter groups formed under the writer Mahmud Behazin in the "Democratic Union of the Iranian People," which was doctrinally close to the Tudeh but suffered few of its handicaps. This organization was able to mount demonstrations of as many as 10,000 in favor of an armed uprising.

Moreover, resentment of the Tudeh's association with the USSR undoubtedly limited its appeal among older intellectuals. Dr. Feraydun Keshavarz, for example, later accused Kianuri of being a "Stalinist" and criticized the USSR for its support of the Shah.[12]

But the association with the USSR brought advantages as well. It facilitated such mundane tasks as recruitment, infiltration of agents, the provision of sanctuary, and the exercise of diplomatic pressure. Soviet funds and access to Soviet printing presses, at the very least, eased the task of the Communist opposition. The Soviet-sponsored "clandestine" radio station in Baku, the "National Voice of Iran," which began transmitting in 1959 and broadcast in both Farsi and Azeri, was also an asset—an asset of the sort that no other leftist group in Iran could claim. (From the Soviet standpoint, of course, such a station had the advantage of being a channel for Soviet views without at the same time being fettered by diplomatic niceties. Because it was "unofficial," it could be disowned when the situation warranted.) Finally, the USSR's network of ties with Communist parties was also a plus for the Tudeh.[13] With Soviet encouragement, the Tudeh had been cooperating with the Khalq faction in Afghanistan since the early 1960's—perhaps even to the extent of conducting military and political training for Iranians in Afghanistan.[14]

The revolution of 1979. Despite a modest comeback in the years immediately preceding the revolution, the Tudeh was still virtually a spectator in the revolution itself. It had not had the time to absorb the host of ideological and tactical questions raised by the rapid fall of the old regime, the collapse of the imperial army, and the broad popular base of the opposition. Having been the principal target of the Shah's repression, it was sorely depleted in numbers—by 1976, it still had fewer than a thousand members—while, by comparison, other Marxist groups in Iran numbered

[11] The Tufan fell into the same trap as the Tudeh. By obediently following its master, China, it too was compromised—by China's rapport with the Shah's regime in the 1970's. The Tufan played a negligible role in the 1979 revolution.

Ironically, the persistence of Sino-Soviet rivalry is reflected in the daily positions of the Tudeh and the various Maoist factions within Iran. For example, Maoist groups and publications such as *Ranjbar* (Tehran) acclaim Bani-Sadr as "a champion of the struggle against the Soviet imperialism of the USSR." *Le Monde* (Paris), Feb. 2, 1980. The USSR in turn claims that China supported the Shah and that Tufan and *Ranjbar* are threatening the revolution by "vigorously attacking the Tudeh party of the Iranian working class as well as other progressive organizations." See Radio "Peace and Progress" (Moscow), Aug. 3, 1979, in SWB, SU/6186/A4/4, Aug. 6, 1979.

[12] See *Kayhan International* (Tehran, overseas edition), Jan. 31, 1979. Others, such as the leftist Iranian journalist Ahmad Faroughy, have observed that the Tudeh is discredited among an entire generation, who see it as a Soviet Trojan Horse in the heart of Iran. See Ahmad Faroughy and Jean Loup Reverier, *L'Iran contre le Chah* (Iran Against the Shah), Paris, Jean Claude Simeon, 1979, p. 160.

[13] The mobilization of the Communist party movements in Europe against the Shah was particularly striking in its orchestration.

[14] Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Superpowers and the Northern Tier," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1979–80, p. 21.

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A meeting of the Iranian Tudeh Party in Tehran in August 1979. The large banner to the rear reads: "In support of the Tudeh Party, which thinks only of the independence and democracy of your country." The banner to the left rear reads: "To guard the revolution of Iran, vote for the Tudeh Party." The candidate photo at the left on the front of the rostrum is of Ehsan Tabari; the photo on the right is of Tudeh Party Central Committee First Secretary Nureddin Kianuri.

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

15,000–20,000 adherents.[15] In early 1979, it was accorded but third or fourth place among the "leftist groups" in Iran.[16] Its "historic mission" was in the hands of the sexagenarian Kianuri—this in the face of a demographic shift that challenged the older generation's relevance as a source of inspiration. The party's connection with the USSR was a public relations liability—the more so in a nationalist era because of Soviet proximity and the Russian-Soviet record of imperialism in Iran as well as because the Soviet Union's atheism held no attraction for the masses in Iran, who are neither secular nor eager to give up their traditional ways.

With a keen appreciation of its own narrow base of social support and hence of its potential vulnerability to political pogroms, the Tudeh had a difficult choice in early 1979: Should it throw its support to the emerging clerical elements, or should it take advantage of the disorder to push for a socialist people's republic?

Hoping to buy time to consolidate its position and gain tacit official acceptance, the Tudeh quickly embraced Khomeini. Kianuri, for example, saw "no overwhelming differences between scientific socialism . . . and the social content of Islam." Indeed, he argued that "the programme of the Ayatollah coincides with that of the Tudeh."[17] The party issued the call for an

[15] Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1976*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. 542.

[16] Marshall Shulman, as reported in *The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1979.

[17] See his interviews in *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Jan. 23, 1979, and in *Le Figaro* (Paris), Jan. 28, 1979. For Iskandari's earlier views, see his "The Tudeh Party and the Muslim Movement," *Navid* (Tehran), as quoted by Joseph Kraft, "Letter from Iran," *The New Yorker* (New York, NY), Dec. 18, 1978, p. 150; and *Daily Telegraph* (London), Oct. 30, 1978. See also Robert Moss, *The Campaign to Destabilise Iran*, Conflict Studies, No. 101, London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, November 1978.

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armed struggle (belatedly, since the revolution was already in its final stages). It supported the Islamic Republic in the referendum of March 1979 (it was the only leftist grouping to do so), and its publications praised Khomeini and the religious movement as "revolutionary" and as "friends" of the oppressed. The decision to seek security and hug the cloak of the Imam, it claimed, was a "historical" rather than tactical decision; to Communist audiences, it justified its choice by specific reference to the threat of counter-revolution.[18]

Similarly, the Tudeh sought to minimize discord with other opposition groups. It called for unity of the "progressive" forces and contended that no group should be permitted to "monopolize the revolution," which consists of a "united front of popular forces."[19]

Apart from buying time, the Tudeh has from the outset of the revolution had other objectives. First, it has sought to intensify the revolution, radicalize the masses, and discredit the moderates. The Tudeh has consistently held that the revolution was "only the completion of the first step on the people's road to a final victory" (a view that Moscow has just as consistently echoed).[20] Second, the Tudeh has sought to focus Iranian hostility against the United States (and the West in general), and thereby to widen the US-Iranian rift and make it irreversible. As a part of this effort, the Tudeh has encouraged and made common cause with elements within Iran that are hostile to the United States. Concomitantly, the Tudeh has sought to increase Iran's dependence on the USSR.

Since January 1979, the Tudeh has not fundamentally departed from its objectives. To this date, it has consistently refused to give vent in public to any misgivings about the Imam's decisions. And, with Moscow's help, it has doggedly pursued its revolutionary and anti-American course, particularly in its natural constituencies. But its declarations have reflected greater self-confidence as it has consolidated its own position.

There have been decided frictions, however, in the Tudeh's relations with the revolutionary government. August 1979 brought the first test of strength between the two. Khomeini had by then found that his threat to crush the Left had not worked as a weapon to control it. The government therefore moved to ban all the leftist groups (including the Tudeh) from organizing or publishing and to subject them to official harassment.



Former Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi pictured on December 24, 1979, in Zahedan, capital of the province of Baluchistan, where he was attempting to mediate a clash between Baluchi and members of the Revolutionary Guards.

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

The fundamental conflict between the government's and the Tudeh's positions was all too clear. The Tudeh, as it had done consistently, was advocating the right of minorities (especially the Kurds) to self-government—at a time when the government's clashes with the Kurds were on the increase.[21] More generally, the Bazargan government was basically moderate and reformist, anxious not to exchange one dependency for another and convinced that the rees-

[18] See the Communist daily *The Morning Star* (London), Jan. 27, 1979. Moscow quickly reported the Tudeh's support for Khomeini and the Islamic Republic; see Radio Moscow, Feb. 13, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6043/A4/2, Feb. 15, 1979.

[19] National Voice of Iran (Baku—hereafter NVOI), May 7, 1979.

[20] Radio Moscow, Feb. 15, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6045/1, Feb. 17, 1979. See also TASS, Apr. 26, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6104/A4/1, Apr. 30, 1979.

[21] See, for example, NVOI, Mar. 25 and 27, Apr. 17, June 11, July 17, Aug. 2, Sept. 10, 15 and 17, and Oct. 1, 26 and 29, 1979.

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tablishment of order and consensus was the prerequisite for any progress. To the Tudeh, this outlook meant that Bazargan represented the bourgeoisie, not the oppressed poorer classes. Moreover, it implied the need for a "balanced" relationship between the two superpowers, not a complete severance with the United States. When Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi in August 1979 appeared to be reviving links with the United States in order to obtain spare parts and lubricating fuels, the Tudeh (and the other leftist parties) unleashed a barrage of criticism. It argued that practical issues were irrelevant, that the arms relationship would be antirevolutionary, and that the nation demanded a free, not a dependent, army.[22] In a related move, it exerted pressure to annul all existing treaties with the United States.[23]

Suppression produced a hardening of the Tudeh's tone throughout August and September 1979. While appealing for unity, the Tudeh charged that the repression was "despotic" and threatened the revolution; it also pointedly alluded to the Bazargan government's failure and "unnecessary delay" in initiating reforms or providing help to the workers. The Bazargan government, the Tudeh argued, had been slow to nationalize the banks and to move to genuine agrarian reform; it had tolerated cooperation between the "ultra-Leftists" and the Right at the expense of the progressive forces (i.e., the Tudeh); it had failed to fight imperialism while stirring up the people against the socialists, the Left, and the USSR. "The unholy alliance of Muslim reactionaries, 'new leftists,' and liberals," the Tudeh argued, "could divert the revolution from its original course." The Tudeh therefore demanded a united front of patriotic, progressive, and "truly revolutionary forces."[24]

Tudeh demands, together with explicit Soviet pressure (which we shall go into later in another context) and the threat implicit in Soviet proximity, apparently paid dividends. By October 2, 1979, the restrictions on the Tudeh had been lifted, and the party newspaper *Mardom* reappeared in Tehran (leading former Prime Minister Bakhtiar to speculate that Khomeini had made a deal with the Tudeh).[25]

Furthermore, the issue of the US hostages provided a basis for the Tudeh to exploit anti-Americanism and to press its own views on the government. It is often forgotten today that in February 1979 there had been a dry-run occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, which lasted only a few hours before the occupiers were ejected by the government. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Tudeh may have had a hand in instigating this undertaking. When questioned as to their motives, the individuals involved in the episode replied that they had been seeking SAVAK members and counterrevolutionaries. It may not have been merely a coincidence that the Tudeh broadcasts of February 14, two days earlier, had pinpointed the US embassy as the "focal point of conspiracy against the people of Iran."[26]

Whatever the case in this instance, there appears to have been no Tudeh involvement in the seizure of the embassy in November 1979. The seizure was in fact the work of the "Struggling Muslim Movement," a group ostensibly anti-Communist and devoutly Muslim. Nevertheless, the Tudeh welcomed the seizure, calling it a "decisive response to US conspiracies" and to the provisional government's failure to follow Khomeini's instructions.[27] And it used the seizure to give a focus to several of its persistent demands: the abrogation of all existing agreements with the United States and the renunciation of any new agreement, a thorough purging of the government, and a complete end to US "domination" in Iran.[28] Only after intense US pressure on the USSR did the Tudeh change its tone: the hostages should be released after all, the Tudeh radio argued, as it at the same time criticized the United States for exploiting the situation to carry out a military buildup in the region.[29]

The Tudeh was quite frank in its appreciation of the stakes involved in the hostage question. Kianuri told a French journalist that the issue was nothing less than the foreign policy orientation of the regime: "As long as we hold the hostages, we block the normalization of relations with the US which certain Iranian politicians want."[30] In short, the Tudeh saw the whole matter in the context of its aim of destroying all ties with the United States and the socioeconomic base of the "colonial" system, nationalizing all foreign trade, bringing anticommunism and anti-Sovietism to an end, and forming a large, anti-imperialist popular front.

Subsequent events have continued to provide openings for the Tudeh to press its case home. The

[22] E.g., ibid., Apr. 24, July 20, Aug. 6 and 29, Oct. 20, 1979.
[23] For example, ibid., Oct. 11, 1979.
[24] Ibid., Aug. 14, 16, 21 and 24, and Sept. 6, 1979.
[25] Interview on British Broadcasting Company (London) in October 1979.
[26] NVOI, Feb. 14, 1979, p. 56.
[27] For example, ibid., Nov. 10, 20, and 23, 1979.
[28] Ibid., Nov 5, 1979, quoting the Tudeh party's support for the seizure.
[29] Ibid., Nov. 20 and 23, 1979.
[30] Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde*, Apr. 18, 1980. See also Kianuri's interview with Radio Budapest, Mar. 12, 1980, as reported in *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey), Apr. 16, 1980, pp. 1-4. For the reason Kianuri articulated, some Tudeh officials called for a trial of the hostages. *The Washington Post*, Apr. 11, 1980.

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unsuccessful US attempt to free the hostages in April 1980 afforded an occasion for further reiteration of the Tudeh's themes, and the Tudeh Central Committee observed that the attack was but one link in a chain intended "to re-establish a regime of exploiters dependent on imperialism." The US rescue mission was therefore a warning to Iranians, the Tudeh argued, and to defend themselves, the Iranians must establish a "wider national and anti-imperialist front," purge the army, and utilize "all the patriotic military personnel committed to the revolution by mobilizing all the progressive forces."[31]

The Tudeh's base of support. In endeavoring to strengthen its hand domestically, the Tudeh has been quick to appreciate the most strategic factors in any future power struggle. It has persisted in its efforts among its traditional constituencies, such as the Westernized bourgeoisie and intellectuals, although both the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin have strong followings here, too. At the same time, it has recognized that the industrial proletariat constitutes a natural target for recruitment to its ranks. Indeed, as one of the few groups with support among factory workers, the Tudeh stands to benefit from unemployment and economic malaise. The party claims that Iran's working class has a "high degree of consciousness";[32] certainly, it has been active in raising working-class consciousness. In 1979, 30 party workers returned from abroad "to rebuild" the party. They enlisted older, more experienced factory workers as "guides" in this process.[33] Former Tudeh loyalists and sympathizers were actively sought out, apostates were reconverted, and attempts were made to rejuvenate the ranks of the party. Apparently, there has been some success, although the large floating and restless student population has embraced the party somewhat more easily than have the workers, who prefer the "immediate fruits of the revolution" to "building up trade unions for long-term economic and political benefits."[34]

Tudeh activity is particularly pronounced in the oil sector, especially in the Ahvaz oil fields and the Abadan refinery. Kianuri claimed in January 1979 that the oil workers "only obey Tudeh directives"[35]—an exaggeration but indicative of a lack of reticence on this question. Tudeh influence here, if consolidated, could be decisive in a future power struggle among the various groups. As events in Iran in 1978 demonstrated, there are few ways of forcing striking workers to return to work, and on a day-to-day basis, the industry could act as an interest group to veto appointments or policies or to demand specific government policies.

Although the Tudeh has traditionally drawn most of its support from the Persian areas (with the notable exception of its foothold in Tabriz, the center of the Azerbaijani movement), it has increasingly turned its attention to areas populated by national minorities, such as the Kurds, the Baluchi, the Azeri Turks, and the Arabs. In a population where 14 out of 35 million belong to national minority groups, it has considerable scope for progress in this regard. The party has consistently endorsed the right of the minorities to self-government and autonomy, as well as the peaceful resolution of differences on the issue. There is considerable evidence today of Tudeh activity and recruitment in northern Iran—along the Caspian Sea, in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces.[36]

Before the 1979 revolution, the Imperial Iranian armed forces, with some 12,000 officers trained by the United States in the postwar period, had been the symbol par excellence of Iran's dependent relationship with the United States, and the Tudeh, like the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin, sought to dismantle them immediately. Unlike the other two groups, though, the Tudeh had no (known) military arm of its own and thus devoted more effort to infiltrating and weakening the armed forces rather than actually to replacing them. In this context, a principal objective has been to assure that the armed forces are thoroughly purged, that their past relationship has been terminated, and that they are reconstituted on "national" and "progressive" lines. The Tudeh's energies have therefore been devoted to securing the dismissal of senior officers and to preventing any reconciliation with the United States.[37] Although it is difficult to judge with any precision, it appears to many observers in Tehran that the Tudeh is again organizing cells in the armed forces.[38]

Within these strategic sectors, the Tudeh has worked hard to increase its base of support. But it can also expect significant support from its traditional

[31] NVOI, Apr. 25, 1980, in *SWB*, ME/6407/A9, Apr. 29, 1980.
[32] Kianuri, in *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 23, 1979.
[33] Ibid., and *The Washington Star*, Dec. 2, 1979.
[34] Kianuri, in *The Washington Star*, Dec. 2, 1979.
[35] Kianuri, in *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 23, 1979.

[36] Personal sources. The Tudeh is also active in Kurdistan and has reportedly infiltrated the Kurdish Democratic Party. See Andrew Whitley, "The Kurds: Pressures and Prospects," *The Round Table* (London), July 1980, p. 251.
[37] NVOI, Apr. 24, June 30, and Nov. 19, 1979.
[38] Communications from private sources. If true, the Tudeh's effort in this regard would be consistent with its behavior in the 1950's. It has been confirmed recently—and strikingly—by President Bani-Sadr, who has admitted that information about a potential coup within the Iranian army has on at least one occasion come from the Tudeh. The implication is that the Tudeh (or the USSR's Committee on State

(continued on page 9)

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mentor, the USSR, which continues to cast a "giant political shadow" over Iran.

The Soviet connection. For the USSR, the stakes in Iran are enormous. A bastion of Western influence has crumbled. Iranian society is in disarray, and the populace is politically mobilized, radicalized, and suggestible.

The Tudeh has remained the USSR's local agent throughout the revolution. Soviet and Tudeh objectives have been indistinguishable—in sum, to keep Iran weak and divided and to increase its dependence on the USSR.[39] Moreover, Soviet policies and propaganda themes have been virtually identical to those of the Tudeh. As long as the Tudeh was tolerated (and, preferably, legalized), Moscow eschewed any public criticism of Khomeini's regime. It played down such difficulties as Iranian criticism of the Soviet role in Afghanistan and problems over negotiating gas prices—in the interests of improving the Soviet (and Tudeh) standing in the power struggle that lay ahead. It likewise called for revolutionary unity among Iran's progressive forces, characterized the current state of affairs in Iran as only the first step toward a total revolution, and castigated the US role in Iran.[40] Like the Tudeh, in short, the USSR adopted a conciliatory approach to the Iranian regime.

Nevertheless, a new basic principle of Soviet policy toward Iran emerged when the religious Right subjected the Tudeh (and the Left in general) to official harassment in August and September 1979. As soon as the Tudeh was banned, the Soviet dissatisfaction with the Khomeini regime spilled out. Moscow surfaced criticism of the Iranian government's repression of the Kurds and of its overtures to the United States for spare parts, and it gave wide circulation to the Tudeh's letter of protest to Iranian authorities over measures taken against the party.[41] The most striking instance of Moscow's disapprobation was the highly critical commentary by Aleksandr Bovin in the weekly newspaper *Nedelya*. Bovin called Khomeini's regime "a disaster," characterized by reactionary tendencies and a profoundly anti-Soviet bias.[42] Yet, a few days later, *Izvestiya*'s Tehran correspondent praised the Iranian revolution.[43] This last episode reflected careful Soviet policy rather than a double volte-face. The Bovin piece was a trial balloon—a warning to Tehran that Soviet support was not unconditional and Soviet patience not infinite. As noted above, it was not without effect.

As before, though, the USSR's first priority in Iran is to prevent the emergence of a strong government unfriendly to it. Ideally, it would even probably like to see a government sufficiently deferential to Soviet interests to serve as a launching pad for the expansion of Soviet influence farther afield in the Persian Gulf region. In this regard, the Tudeh would be an attractive partner. It defines Iran's security needs in terms of Soviet interests and has gone on record as supporting the Soviet Union's call for a collective security agreement in Asia, in which the USSR would participate.[44] It stands for a policy of nonalignment, Cuban style, and it would undoubtedly strengthen Iran's economic relations with the Soviet bloc, including the barter of oil and gas for machinery.

Under present conditions, with the long, porous frontier between the Soviet Union and Iran only partly secured, Moscow can provide substantial assistance to the Tudeh. Just what scale of assistance is at the moment impossible to determine, but Soviet covert activity is clearly thriving in Iran today. While the Soviet connection can often be a liability in peacetime, it may well be a formidable asset in any future power struggle in Iran.

Prospects. As of mid-1980, the Tudeh strategy is clear. The Tudeh identifies the present phase in Iran's revolution as the second stage, marked for "radicalization." At this stage, it argues, the Tudeh backs Khomeini because its aims coincide with those of the Imam. The next step would be the creation of a "broad popular front" of forces (still) supporting the Imam, which would lead into a "struggle between op-

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Security—the KGB) has infiltrated the armed forces and is in a position also to *withhold* such information. Bani-Sadr's comments are reinforced by Qotbzadeh's simultaneous insistence that the Tudeh is actively pursuing Soviet goals and that the USSR has too large an official presence in Iran. See *Le Monde*, July 2, 1980; and *International Herald Tribune*, July 4, 1980.

[39] At minimum, both the Tudeh and Moscow have wanted to prevent any Iranian moderation toward and reconciliation with the United States. On the Soviet attitude, see, for example, TASS, Feb. 16, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6046/A4/2, Feb. 19, 1979; and Radio Moscow, Mar. 8, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6064/A4/5, Mar. 12, 1979.

[40] See, for instance, Yuriy Zhukov, on Moscow television, June 2, 1979, text in *SWB*, SU/6142/A4/1, June 15, 1979.

[41] TASS (and Radio Moscow in Persian), Aug. 17, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6198/A4/1, Aug. 20, 1979. See also Persian Service, Home Service, and TASS, Aug. 28, 1979, in *SWB*, ME/6205/i, Aug. 29, 1979; and SU/6206/A4/9, Aug. 30, 1979. See also *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 26, 1979, for criticism of repression of the Kurds.

[42] See the reports in *Le Monde*, Sept. 9–10, 1979; and *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 14, 1979.

[43] A. Akhmedzhanov, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 13, 1979; and *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 14, 1979.

[44] The Tudeh Party Manifesto was published in *Horizont* (East Berlin) and is reproduced in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-MEA*), Apr. 19, 1979. See also *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 23, 1979.

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posing class forces." The central question of the revolution—who defeats whom?—would then be decided in favor of the people. The third stage would witness a "transformation of social conditions in the interests of the working people" (i.e., Communist party rule).[45]

What are the Tudeh's prospects for success? The Tudeh is politically realistic, experienced, and tightly disciplined. Its purposeful and consistent quest for power has set it apart from all other political parties in Iran. Its small numbers can be offset by good organization—especially amid social and political turmoil, radicalization, and heightened expectations among the populace. Indeed, by the end of 1979, Tudeh party leader Kianuri could boast that the Tudeh had "succeeded in becoming a political agent that is recognized by all political forces and has propagated its program in every part of the country."[46]

It is difficult to dispute this claim, although it is equally difficult to gauge the exact extent to which the Tudeh has made up for its long years of inactivity. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1979, for example, the first Tudeh candidate (Ehsan Tabari, a party founder) obtained 50,000 votes in Tehran. The victory of Bani-Sadr in the presidential elections of January 1980 was seen as a setback for the Tudeh, which rationalized its loss with reference to the fact that 3 million workers had abstained from voting.[47] In the parliamentary elections of March 1980, the Tudeh modestly improved its vote totals to 60,000, up from 40,000 in mid-1979. Nevertheless, this constituted only 3 percent of the

[45] Article published in a Communist periodical in Czechoslovakia by Tudeh Politburo member Ali Havari, as reported in *The Financial Times* (London), Apr. 16, 1980.

[46] Kianuri, in *The Washington Star*, Dec. 2, 1979.

[47] *Le Monde*, Feb. 2, 1980. The Tudeh had supported Hasan Habibi for president.

Headquarters of the Feda'iyin at Mahabad, in the Kurdistan region of Iran.

—Photoreporters.

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electorate.[48]

Other indicators, however, may be more revealing of the Tudeh's true strength. One observer has recently contended that the Tudeh could mobilize several hundred thousand people for its marches and demonstrations.[49] Perhaps more telling, the Tudeh newspaper *Mardom* has a readership of 40,000, and the IRP newspaper *Jomhuriyeh Islam,* a readership of only 20,000.[50] If these figures are correct, they aptly demonstrate the different constituencies of the parties—support of the Tudeh (and the Left in general) by the more literate, and support of the clerical party by the masses.

Whatever the precise figures, there is no question that by mid-1980 the Tudeh has made up a great deal of lost ground. Unlikely to be able to compete with the religious party in attracting sheer numbers, it has focused on specific sectors of the populace. Unable to challenge the clerics directly, it has sought to buy time by embracing their cause, all the while hammering away at its own key themes.

The Feda'iyin-e Khalq

The second major leftist group in Iran is the Feda'iyin-e Khalq (People's Fighters). The Feda'iyin is a secular, Marxist group, an offshoot of the Tudeh. Unlike the Tudeh, it is a coalition, which includes several different currents and tendencies. Unlike the Tudeh, too, it is in part a guerrilla organization. And unlike the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin has no known direct ties with the USSR, its principal foreign links being with Libya and the PLO.

Prerevolutionary period. The Feda'iyin's origins date from the 1960's, when a younger, more militant opposition began to emerge from the universities. Various factors lay behind the frustration felt by this younger opposition. One was the establishment of full political control by the Shah in the mid-1960's. Another was the inactivity of the Tudeh. Yet another was the exposure to Western culture and the experience of study and travel abroad, during which many Iranian youths succumbed to the romance of revolutionary violence, guerrilla movements, and national liberation so prevalent in the youth culture of the late 1960's. For many in the younger generation, the Tupamaros (not the Tudeh) were the role model, and urban guerrilla operations (not party political organization), the means to attain freedom.

This growing radicalization found expression in, among other things, the Feda'iyin. In 1963, six members of the Tudeh decided to establish an independent offshoot espousing Marxism. Two of the founders—'Ali Akbar Safa-e Farahani and Muhammad Ashtiani—went to Palestine. The other four—among them, Hamid Ashraf and Bizhan Jazani—remained in Iran.

Jazani subsequently became the principal exponent of guerrilla operations and "one of the brilliant theoreticians of a reborn communism."[51] In his writings—notably, "Armed Struggle in Iran"[52]—he took stock of the hopelessly disunited opposition to the Shah, a quiescent clergy, a discredited Tudeh, and an effete National Front. The only way to mobilize an apathetic people to assure their politicization, he argued, was through armed struggle by the avant-garde of the revolutionary class. Selected armed actions would be important in two distinct ways: they would undermine the myth of the regime's invincibility, and, followed by the inevitable cycle of repression and attack, they would politicize the populace.

The Feda'iyin soon found considerable foreign support for its emphasis on guerrilla operations. After 1969, the Palestinians provided training in Lebanon.[53] Libya supplied arms and money through the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command). China, Cuba, and South Yemen furnished training for the Feda'iyin core cadres, numbering perhaps 1,200. The Feda'iyin was pro-Chinese until Mao Zedong's death in 1976. Its link with the USSR was probably only indirect, through the PLO. The sanctuary, training, and financial assistance that these foreign backers provided made a considerable difference (and were known to the Shah's government).[54]

In February 1971, the Feda'iyin began a new phase of opposition by attacking a gendarmerie post in Siahkal, near the Caspian Sea. Another group, led by Masud Ahmadzadeh Puyan, commenced its activities independently, combining bank robberies and attacks on military personnel. The two groups—the original Feda'iyin faction and the Puyan faction—subsequently combined to form the Organization of the Iranian People's Feda'iyin Guerrillas (Sazman-e Cherikha-ye Feda'i-ye Khalq-e Iran).

[48] Edward Mortimer, *The Times* (London), Apr. 16, 1980.
[49] Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde,* Apr. 18, 1980.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Faroughy and Reverier, op. cit., pp. 161–63. For more detail on the origins and evolution of the Feda'iyin (and Mojahedin), see Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963–1977," *MERIP Reports* (Washington, DC), No. 86, March–April 1980.
[52] Translated and published by the "Iran Committee," London, 1973(?).
[53] See, e.g., *Daily Telegraph,* Jan. 21 and Feb. 12, 1979.
[54] See *The Guardian* (London), Sept. 17, 1978.

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Several thousand members of the Feda'iyin demonstrate at Tehran University on February 23, 1979.

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

By the end of 1978, the Feda'iyin was an umbrella organization, integrating three main groups: (1) a pro-Tudeh faction, whose principal claim was its long opposition to the regime and which sought to identify itself as "Eurocommunist" rather than pro-Soviet; (2) the followers of the theorist Jazani, who stressed the importance of political organization and who campaigned in the oilfields; and (3) the Puyan faction, which emphasized armed struggle.

The revolution of 1979. The Feda'iyin had played an important role in the early active opposition to the Shah, and it had been able to generate a base of literate, white-collar supporters, much like that of the Tudeh, especially in the universities and technical colleges. For example, its losses (killed and executed) up to January 1979 totaled 155, of which 50 percent were students, 30 percent were government and office workers, and 20 percent were engineers, manual workers, and others.[55] The organization could claim some 5,000 hard-core supporters. Indeed, in the first rallies after the revolution, it could assemble as many as 50,000 sympathizers, including factory workers, teachers, farmers, and oil workers.[56] The Feda'iyin's role just before and during the revolution was significant in two distinctive respects: the group's willingness to risk casualties even when the chances of success appeared remote, and its very effective organization, demonstrated in attacks on military barracks and armories in February 1979 during the final armed phase of the revolution.

Nevertheless, the Feda'iyin was unprepared for the rapid demise of the monarchy. Its emphasis on paramilitary activity, its assassinations, and the autonomous cellular structure of what was in essence a guerrilla organization with no political program—all were ill suited to the political needs of postrevolutionary Iran.[57] And since arms were generally available throughout Iran after February 1979, the holding of arms was no longer the source of influence it had been before the revolution. The Feda'iyin had failed to create a broad national political base, and its prior role was largely overtaken after the revolution.

On the morrow of the revolution, the Feda'iyin was thus faced with a choice: Should it continue its struggle to seize power and combat an admittedly "nationalist" government in so doing, or should it become more political and work within the "system"? The latter would require not only a restructuring of the organization but also a change in outlook, deference to the clergy, and acceptance of the need for compromise and consensus.

The Feda'iyin delayed decision for several months, as party leaders pondered the dilemma. Initially, it accepted the Bazargan government without enthusiasm, feeling that the government was too conservative and unable to meet the people's needs. Furthermore, because it was worried about the religious tinge that the revolution had acquired, it sought to have representatives of striking workers and factories included in the Revolutionary Council, the de facto ruling organ of the

[55] These figures are compiled from Iranian newspapers, as quoted by S. Zabih, *Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretative Essay*, San Francisco, CA, Alchemy, 1979, p. 42. Faroughy and Reverier, op. cit., p. 164, give a total loss of 380 for the guerrillas between 1971 and 1979. This suggests almost equal losses between the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin groupings. For more detail on the guerrillas' social background and numbers, see Abrahamian, loc. cit., pp. 5 ff.

[56] Many participants in Feda'iyin rallies admitted to being Communist. See *International Herald Tribune*, Feb. 24–25, 1980.

[57] However, the Feda'iyin did make attempts in late 1978 to organize strikes and demonstrations in the factories.

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country.[58] Like the Tudeh, thus, the Feda'iyin sought to prevent any group from monopolizing the revolution. Unlike the Tudeh, however, it refused to support the concept of an Islamic Republic. Since it held that a complete revolutionary victory had yet to be won, it refused to participate in any of the various staged elections or to return the weapons it now had in its possession.

In February 1979, the Feda'iyin briefly occupied the US Embassy in Tehran. Consistent with its aim of maintaining revolutionary momentum, it at the same time held large rallies in the capital, at which it demanded the disbanding of the existing army and the creation of a people's army, the expulsion of foreign workers, the nationalization of foreign banks and capital, a root-and-branch reorganization of the state apparatus, and the establishment of a classless society at once free, democratic, and anti-imperialist. Its principal fear was domination of the country by a small elite at the expense of others—an elite that would cooperate with the bourgeoisie and ruin the "struggle of the people." Since Khomeini appeared to be concentrating power in his own hands, the Feda'iyin called for broader worker representation and made clear that its support for Khomeini was for only a transitional period.

After these incidents, the government turned its attention to the threat from the Left. It called support for the Left "un-Islamic" and stigmatized the Left as an agent of the United States.[59] In July, Bazargan accused the Feda'iyin of active opposition, claiming that "wherever there is trouble, the Feda'iyin is involved."[60] The following month, Feda'iyin buildings on the Tehran University campus were seized, and the Feda'iyin's activities and publications were banned.

The Feda'iyin responded to this challenge by finally making the decision it had avoided since the beginning of the revolution. In July 1979, it went underground, reverting to the opposition. While it continued its work among its traditional constituents, it also increasingly shifted to the rural areas, where government control was weaker and where it could thus recruit and train supporters. Already doctrinally committed to cultural autonomy for Iran's various nationalities, it intensified its support, first, for the Turkmen in Mazandaran Province and, subsequently, for the Kurds (in the Kurds' clashes with the army that began in August 1979). The Feda'iyin talked of using Kurdistan as their "Yenan" and extended assistance to Shaykh Ezzedin Hosayn, a Kurdish leader sympathetic to the Left.[61] In its support for the Turkmen, the Kurds, and also the Azeris, it gained valuable experience in combat.

After the Feda'iyin went underground in the summer of 1979, its position vis-à-vis the government shifted in line with the changing nature of alliances in Iranian politics. With the seizure of the American hostages in November 1979, the mutual hostility abated somewhat.[62] Common cause was made in the emotional catharsis afforded by the daily ritual of anti-Americanism. And in February and March 1980, Bani-Sadr, who had sympathy for some of the Left's goals, sought to encourage a dialogue with the Feda'iyin—although with little success. But on other occasions, members of the Feda'iyin were specifically targeted for assassination by Khomeini loyalists, and "disappearances" and "accidents" increased. In April 1980, the decision to "Islamicize" the universities was in reality a decision to confront the Left—Feda'iyin and Mojahedin alike—on its home ground. The clerical leaders waved the red flag before their militant Islamic supporters with predictable results. Thousands were injured, and perhaps 50 people were killed. While Bani-Sadr claimed victory for the "cultural revolution," the Feda'iyin, having fought back, claimed that its adherents had been martyred by a savage repression reminiscent of the prerevolutionary era.[63]

Prospects. The Feda'iyin continues to obtain support from abroad. For example, the Libyan connection seems to have survived the revolution. Iran's Defense Minister Mostafa Chamran alluded to this: "You may have noticed that one country which more than others claims to be Muslim and Islamic, which more than others attempts to defend Iran's revolution, in effect harbours communists . . . and even strengthens our Fedayin."[64] The PLO connection also appears intact.

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[58] The Feda'iyin, unlike the Mojahedin, had no known sympathizers in either the Council or the provisional government's cabinet.

[59] See Khomeini's comments on leftist demonstrators "at war with the philosophical belief of Islam," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1979.

[60] *The Washington Post*, July 3, 1979.

[61] See the excellent report in *The Economist*, Apr. 26, 1980, p. 33.

[62] The Feda'iyin's role in the hostage episode is unclear. The professionalism of the captors pointed to those with prior training, such as the Feda'iyin. But given the many groupings often trained in the same countries, it is difficult to be certain. One thing is clear: To the extent that the hostage episode has served to radicalize the populace, the Left and the Right both favored it.

[63] See, for example, *The Times*, Apr. 24, 1980.

[64] Chamran's speech of Apr. 25, 1980, was broadcast by Radio Tehran on Apr. 25, 1980. See *SWB*, ME/6406/A/4, Apr. 28, 1980. However, Chamran is a biased source, in that he represents the 'Amal group, which favors a militant Shi'a emphasis in foreign policy. Bani-Sadr's more secular "revolutionary" approach favors ties with Libya. Qotbzadeh seems to have good connections with Syria, Libya, the PLO, and the USSR.

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(The PLO maintains links with both the Feda'iyin and the Mojahedin, on the one hand, and with the Khomeinists, on the other. It has attempted to mediate among these groups to reduce their animosity to one another. Such diverse linkages ensure that support for the Palestinian cause continues to be solid within Iran and that Iran remains a sanctuary and a source of passports, funds, and diplomatic support for the PLO.)

But the Feda'iyin's relationship with the USSR remains hazy. According to some, the Feda'iyin is intensely anti-Soviet and is prepared to cooperate with pro-Western groupings in opposition to Khomeini and the Tudeh. Others maintain that the Feda'iyin has sought contacts with the USSR but is disgruntled by the primacy Moscow gives to the Tudeh.[65] Both lines of thinking may be accurate, in that they may reflect different emphases within the Feda'iyin. As far as is known, however, the Feda'iyin has been only an *indirect* beneficiary, through Palestinian and Libyan ties, of Soviet assistance. In mid-1980, a split appears to have occurred within the Feda'iyin between those who wish to maintain their distance from the USSR and those who seek to establish stronger contacts with it. If a stronger tie indeed develops, it will reflect the degree to which the USSR will have succeeded in identifying the United States as the paramount threat to Iran.

In any case, the Feda'iyin's foreign orientation continues to be militantly nationalistic and strongly anti-Western. While sympathetic to the Communist states, the Feda'iyin has so far eschewed any close dependence on the USSR. It sides with the Arabs on the issue of Palestine, not out of religious solidarity but out of support for radical opposition to "imperialism." It would favor an assertive Iranian foreign policy in behalf of the Third World. It would probably support liberation movements and opposition groups where it considered governments unrepresentative or insuffi-

[65] Personal source.

Kurds of the city of Saqqez march in August 1979 in a display of support for fellow Kurds in Marivan who had been encircled by Revolutionary Guards on orders from Tehran. The banner reads: "The destiny of the Kurds can be decided only by the Kurdish Democratic Party. Office of Pîshqam."

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

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ciently progressive. It would tend to cooperate with like-minded Third World states such as Libya and Algeria.

The Feda'iyin's domestic support is more significant than that which it derives from external sources. In mid-1980, the Feda'iyin clearly is becoming increasingly militant about its right to express its views and be consulted. Its willingness to resist the government and to field more than 5,000 adherents prepared to fight testifies to a new confidence. Although it is difficult to estimate the backing that the Feda'iyin enjoys, let alone the *degree* of support for the organization by its adherents, a reasonable estimate is that the Feda'iyin has 7 to 8 million sympathizers throughout the country, perhaps half a million in Tehran. It can mobilize perhaps 100,000 backers for any given demonstration or march.[66]

This scale of support within Iran is remarkable for a secular, Marxist-Leninist organization having to contend with an atheistic image in the very heartland of the "Islamic revival." The Feda'iyin's continuing problem has been the backing that the illiterate, uprooted urban poor have given to Khomeini's brand of radicalism—when the two meet in confrontation, "how can the champions of the poor hit back at the underprivileged?"[67] Until the Feda'iyin expands its support to this sector, its appeal will be restricted to the universities, the radicals, rural areas, and minority regions. This base in itself represents a substantial achievement for an organization that is scarcely political, but it limits the Feda'iyin's effectiveness as a potential alternative to the present regime.

In all likelihood, therefore, the Feda'iyin will remain an *opposition* group as long as the religious card is trumps in Iran. If the clerical Right continues to be as incompetent as it has been to date, this role may not be permanent. But as long as clerical incompetence remains to be conclusively demonstrated, the Feda'iyin's success will be in opening up the road for more "Islamic" groupings like the Mojahedin.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq

The third significant leftist force in Iran is the Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (Organization of Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People). Like the Feda'iyin, it is essentially a coalition, comprising a number of different tendencies. Like the Feda'iyin, it is in part a guerrilla organization that emphasizes armed struggle. Unlike both the Tudeh and the Feda'iyin, however, it is avowedly Islamic rather than secular. In a setting of mass popular religious militance, therefore, its base of recruitment is less narrow than that of either of its competitors on the Left. And its political language—the slogans of Islam—is more evocative than that of its secular competitors.

Prerevolutionary period. The Mojahedin traces its origins to the National Front, the secular centrist coalition of the late 1950's and early 1960's. In 1963, a group of younger people broke away from the National Front and established the Liberation Movement of Iran (Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran). In 1965-66, Sa'id Mohsen and two colleagues in turn broke away from the Liberation Movement of Iran and founded the Organization of Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People.

From the outset, the Mojahedin was a guerrilla organization, initially with extensive foreign links and subsequently with operations within Iran itself. There is evidence that as early as 1969 it received arms and training from the PLO, especially Yasir Arafat's Fatah group. Some of the earliest Mojahedin supporters took part in Black September in 1970 in support of the Palestinians in Jordan.[68] Within Iran, the Mojahedin began armed actions in 1971 at the same time as the Feda'iyin. Its assassinations of US officers in 1973 and 1975, and of American civilians associated with military projects in 1976, were highly professional—much like Soviet operations in terms of timing for maximum political effect, efficiency, and style of operation (although the Soviet link has never been proven).

From the outset, too, the Mojahedin was animated by a mixture of Islamic purity and Communist ideology and rhetoric. Mohsen justified its actions in terms of the Koran—for example, by the need to fight the "devil," tyranny, and falsehood. During his trial by the Shah's government in 1972, he also touched on many of the recurrent themes in Mojahedin rhetoric—the superiority of collective over individual interest, the need for mobilization of the masses and for solidarity against a class of exploiting capitalists, the superiority of models native to Iran (rather than imported ideas), and the necessity for the transformation of man.[69]

In 1975, the Mojahedin split into two groups. One group denounced its Islamic orientation in favor of a clear Marxist-Leninist ideology. Officially known as the Sazman-e Paykar (Battle Organization), this "Marxist Mojahedin" wing wants a People's Democratic Re-

[66] *Le Monde*, May 3, 1980.
[67] *The Economist*, Apr. 26, 1980.
[68] See the issues of *Mojahed* (Tehran), No. 44, 6 Farvardin 1359/Apr. 15, 1980, and No. 48, 2 Ordibehesht 1359/Apr. 22, 1980.
[69] For a summary of Sa'id Mohsen's comments at his trial in 1972, see Faroughy and Reverier, op. cit.

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public and insists that the Muslim faith remains a matter of individual commitment for its members. It is particularly critical of excessive reliance on armed action. Instead, it looks to political activity as a means of mobilizing the urban proletariat and to tactical alliances as a means of energizing the opposition.

The other wing of the party, whose leadership is today usually attributed to the 32-year-old Masud Rajavi, retained its emphasis on armed struggle and its religious identification. This Islamic Mojahedin had been active in urban warfare from 1966 and made effective use of its military training in the last, armed stages of the revolution. It seeks to establish a Socialist Islamic Republic. It stresses both the egalitarian elements in the original doctrine of Islam and the need for radical thought and action. (Its symbol is a clenched fist holding a rifle.) Its principal intellectual mentor is 'Ali Shari'ati, an Islamic modernist of the 1960's who interpreted Islam as a highly radical and progressive ideology and who saw no contradiction between the requirements of Islam, on the one hand, and the classless society and the armed anti-imperialist struggle, on the other. Nevertheless, as Abrahamian has noted, although Shari'ati's thinking was close to that of the Mojahedin and although Shari'ati assisted the Mojahedin in later years, the Mojahedin themselves had earlier concluded that Shi'ism should and could be used for revolutionary purposes.[70]

The postrevolutionary period. Like the Feda'iyin, the Mojahedin has failed to create a broad national political base. It has perhaps only 5,000 trained, hard-core members, but it can mobilize 50,000 supporters virtually at will. Both members and supporters come largely from the same strata that back the Feda'iyin, such as university students, engineers, physicians, and the like, whose numbers have increased in Iran as education has expanded. Of the 57 casualties (killed and executed) that the Mojahedin suffered in the guerrilla struggle up to January 1979, for example, almost two thirds were university students or recent university graduates in engineering, business, medicine, and accounting.[71] In addition, however, the

[70] Abrahamian, loc. cit., p. 10.

[71] Ibid., and Zabih, *Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval . . .*, p. 41. For biographies of some Mojahedin "martyrs" killed by security forces, see *Mojahed*, No. 44, 6 Farvardin 1359/Apr. 15, 1980.

Members of the Mojahedin at weapons training on a range several kilometers outside Tehran.

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

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Mojahedin has been able to appeal to the disgruntled, alienated intelligentsia who have rediscovered solace and identity in Islam. By providing an escape to the past with appropriate "approved" symbols, it can reach a larger constituency and offer a vision of a familiar future.

Each principal faction has an identifiable constituency. The Marxist Paykar faction has no difficulty in attracting 10,000 supporters in the universities.[72] Since the revolution, it has developed into a strong, tightly knit organization, with growing strength in the factories and with active recruitment efforts in the oil fields and among the urban proletariat.

The Islamic faction, for its part, retains its links to the bazaar, which funded it in the prerevolutionary period. It is also known to have supporters—how many is not clear—among the younger, activist clergy trained in the Qom Theological Seminary, whom the members of the Mojahedin often met while in jail.[73] Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, a popular, Tehran-based cleric with leftist sympathies, was the principal bridge between the Mojahedin and the clergy until his death in September 1979. Ayatollah Shaykh 'Ali Tehrani of Meshed, the teacher of 'Ali Shari'ati, represents the branch of progressive Islamic thought within the clergy and is supportive of the Mojahedin. Former Prime Minister Bazargan, who shares the Mojahedin's support for a revitalized Islam and its distaste for a theocratic regime, also remains an important potential intermediary with the clergy.

The Mojahedin has accepted the compatability of Islam and Marx, and under its broad umbrella the descendants of progressive radical Islam and religious Marxists coexist. This "identity problem" is at once a strength and a weakness.

The strength derives from the very existence of diverse elements within the umbrella organization, which encompass tendencies that cover a broad political spectrum, from the highly religious (with reformist tendencies) to the basically Marxist-Leninist (with an individual commitment to Islam). Since no rigorous attempt has been made to discipline the organization and to enforce strict adherence to a uniform doctrine, the precise "mix" of these various tendencies is therefore subject to variation. This feature of the organization provides the Mojahedin with a potential tactical flexibility and adaptability.

The weakness of the Mojahedin derives from precisely this vagueness in the coalition. If the Feda'iyin

The late Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani at the "Palestine Day" staged on the initiative of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on August 17, 1979.

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

finds it difficult to confront the club-wielding mobs of underprivileged who denounce it, the Mojahedin is confused by adversaries who manipulate religious symbols. In the April 1980 clashes in the universities, for example, the Mojahedin obeyed Khomeini's order's banning political activity. Uncertain whether to respond as purveyor of radical change or as loyal Muslim, the Mojahedin has so far failed to harness the inherent ambiguity of its position to maximum political advantage.

The Mojahedin's "identity problem" is not without implications for its foreign orientation as well. That orientation certainly involves an explicit emphasis on Islam. It is certainly anti-Western. The probable result is a mixture of radical Islamic and Third World perspective, a combination of Mu'ammar Qadhafi and Frantz Fanon. Nevertheless, depending on the particular balance of power within the Mojahedin, foreign policy could range from solidarity with the Eastern bloc to a stubborn form of Islamic radicalism.

In revolutionary Iran, the Mojahedin's attitudes have reflected its structural ambivalence. Under the moderate Bazargan government, it, like the secular Left, became distrustful of the pace and thrust of reforms.

[72] See, e.g., *Le Monde*, May 3, 1980.

[73] See the discussion in *Mojahed*, No. 48, 2 Ordibehesht 1359/Apr. 22, 1980.

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Like the Feda'iyin, it was faced with a choice of sullen acquiescence or resistance. It therefore sought to maintain the revolutionary momentum, disband the army, and defend the "revolutionary content of Islam." At the same time, it has no major difficulty in supporting the principle of an Islamic Republic. It had sympathizers in the cabinet of the provisional government, and owing to its strong religious credentials, it even had supporters within Khomeini's entourage. (Nonclerical members of the entourage, such as Ibrahim Yazdi, were suspected by many of being followers of Shari'ati and "closet Mojahedin.") All the same, the Mojahedin soon developed reservations about the excessive centralization of power in the Constitution, about the way in which the Constituent Assembly was set up, and about the emerging dominance of the clergy. Unwilling to confront Khomeini's regime and fearful of a counterrevolution, the Mojahedin found itself excluded from decisions or even consultations.

The Mojahedin has thus received little formal acceptance from the Khomeini regime. Indeed, perceived as a serious potential competitor, it has been systematically excluded from the political life of the country. In the euphoria attendant on the seizure of the American hostages, for example, the Mojahedin offered to train the populace with arms but met with a quick rebuff. Khomeini called instead for general mobilization and training by the Pasdaran (the Revolutionary Guards loyal to Khomeini). In the elections for president, moreover, Khomeini denied Masud Rajavi the right to stand as a candidate, because the Mojahedin had opposed the Constitution. (There are indications that Rajavi would have received several million votes, principally from the young, the women, and the ethnic minorities.)[74] Subsequently, in the two rounds of elections for the Majlis in March and May 1980, Mojahedin supporters were harassed and accused of treason. Rajavi's criticism of voting irregularities was supported by Bani-Sadr and, in veiled terms, by Bazargan, who argued for the election of "all groups" loyal to the revolution. But Khomeini dismissed the criticism and called for the election of only those who were "100 percent Islamic."[75] As a result of these machinations and of electoral procedures designed to make it hard for smaller groupings to win seats, a group that enjoys wide and growing support was unable to secure a single seat in the Majlis.

[74] See *Le Monde*, Mar. 29, 1980. Rajavi was barred by a simple declaration from Khomeini, the Faqih (Supreme Arbiter).

[75] See, for example, *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 13, 1980.

[76] See Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde*, June 14, 1980.

[77] Some 60–70 were arrested. See Fred Halliday interview with Kianuri, in *MERIP Reports*, No. 86, March/April 1980, p. 20.

Moreover, the Mojahedin has even come under outright persecution at the hands of the Khomeini regime. In August 1979, it found itself under attack from armed mobs and, like the Tudeh and Feda'iyin, under a ban on further political activity. In April 1980, in the attacks on the universities, a number of supporters of the Mojahedin were killed, and many of its sympathizers were purged from the faculties. And in June 1980, the Mojahedin was again attacked, with many casualties. This last onslaught prompted one seasoned observer to forecast a civil war in Iran.[76] Since then Khomeini has concentrated on depicting the Mojahedin as "anti-Islamic."

The systematic exclusion and persecution of a group, like the Mojahedin, that has accepted the democratic process will tend to alienate it and push it toward a more militant course. In the face of suppression, the Tudeh has sought security by embracing Khomeini, and the Feda'iyin has gone underground. But the most important political grouping of the Left has done neither. Rather, it has suffered vilification and attacks on its supporters without a major response. It would be surprising if the Mojahedin continued to do so indefinitely. Thus, with the Khomeini regime's failure to accept coexistence with the Mojahedin and other groups with differing outlooks, its attempt to impose unity on a heterogeneous population appears likely to be self-defeating.

Relationships Among the Left

To date, there has been no evidence of systematic or sustained cooperation among the Tudeh, Feda'iyin, and the Mojahedin, in which individual differences have been submerged for a broader common interest. Before the revolution, the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin pursued similar tactics, their actions were mutually reinforcing, and they were at one in their perception of the need to replace the Shah's regime. And the assistance they received came from the same external powers. But there was little formal cooperation among them except in the last year before the revolution. During that time, the two groups did clearly join forces, demonstrating an ability to bury doctrinal differences in the service of a larger interest. The Tudeh had numerous "image" problems in relation to the other two groups—because of its opportunism, its association with the USSR, and particularly its belated support for the revolution (by its own admission, only five party members died in the revolutionary struggle before January 1979[77])—but it did at least seek cooperation in a "united front" against the Shah.

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Since the revolution, each of the three groups has adopted a different approach to the clerical regime. The Tudeh has sought security through proximity, the Feda'iyin has reverted to armed opposition, and the Mojahedin, reflecting its own doctrinal mixture, has been ambivalent. Each approach, moreover, has reflected differing vulnerabilities and strengths. The Tudeh, for example, has been acutely aware of its own weakness and of its need for time to organize and increase its membership. Its attitude toward the other groups has generally been contradictory. Less romantic about the priority of armed struggle, the Tudeh has reacted with a mixture of tolerance and contempt for the "ultra-Left's" ignorance and tendency toward "infantile leftism" (i.e., trying to outdo the Communists with popular appeals for radical measures). At the same time, it has been consistent in its call (as have Radio Moscow's broadcasts to Iran) for a "united front of progressive forces," in which it has explicitly included the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin.[78]

But while this picture may be accurate for the past, it may not afford a good guide to the future. To begin with, the different leftist groups have much in common. Each is exposed to the possibility of suppression by the intolerant and zealous theocratic regime in Tehran. Each has a shared interest in preventing the total consolidation of power in the hands of the clergy or the "monopolization" of the revolution by any group opposed to the Left. The repression of all three groups in August 1979 made this common interest all too clear. In mid-1980, the Left, including the Tudeh, is again under siege.

Moreover, apart from its principal immediate interest in guarding against suppression, the Left has been substantially united on other issues. In a more far-reaching sense, it has sought to assure the success of the revolution and the eradication of counterrevolutionary forces—objectives in which the major leftist parties have made common cause with one another and with the Islamic Right. Despite their differences, key elements of the Left are substantially agreed on the following:

(1) A complete transformation of society and a total revolution are needed. The three major groups agree that what has occurred to date has been a "first step" and partial, that "reformers" and "liberal democrats" have no place in Iranian politics and must give way to revolutionaries.

(2) Iran must achieve a classless society, render assistance to the "oppressed," institute workers' autonomy, and give the state control of foreign trade.

(3) Iran's revolution is inseparable from the general revolutionary struggle (anti-Zionist, anticapitalist), and the primary threat to the revolution comes from the West.

(4) Iran's armed forces must be dismantled and replaced by a loyal people's army or militia.

(5) The central government should be generally more tolerant of autonomy schemes for the national minorities.

With the emergence of these overlapping, but by no means identical, interests since the revolution, it is not surprising to see a gap developing between party rhetoric and reality. The leftist groups' distaste for one another has softened, and programmatic divergences are less prominent than might be expected from a simple perusal of party manifestos.

As a practical matter, tacit cooperation exists among the three major groups. The Feda'iyin is prepared to work informally with the Mojahedin, regarding it as a "useful staging post from religious to secular socialism."[79] The Mojahedin is prepared to bury its distaste for the atheism of the Feda'iyin where common interests are concerned—for example, in the achievement of workers' rights or in the "permanent struggle against imperialism." Thus, the Feda'iyin party workers active in Kurdistan have been joined by the Paykar (Mojahedin) group. In their foreign policy stances, too, the Mojahedin and Feda'iyin are not far apart.

On certain issues, all three major groups have achieved de facto cooperation. For example, they have besieged the Khomeini government with a constant stream of demands for a "representative" army. On this issue alone, the Left has exerted so much pressure that the regime has grown increasingly defensive about the army's loyalty and the army's support for the Islamic Republic. To be sure, the issue has been one of power, not ideology. Any disbanding of the armed forces in the aftermath of the revolution would have given disproportionate importance to the well-organized and armed guerrilla organizations—a fact readily appreciated by the Khomeini regime.[80] Indeed, it may not have been coincidental that the first Chief of Staff appointed after the revolution, General Valiolah Garani, was promptly assassinated, allegedly by the "Forqan" right-wing anticlerical faction, when he indicated that Iran would need Western military advis-

[78] See, for example, Mikhail Krutikhin, "Before the Parliamentary Election," *New Times* (Moscow), February 1980, p. 10.

[79] *The Economist*, Feb. 3, 1979.

[80] Note, for example, Bazargan's comments about the aim of Marxists "who resided in Eastern Europe, Syria and Southern Lebanon" (the Tudeh, Feda'iyin, and Mojahedin) and who wish to disarm the government. See *FBIS-MEA*, Annex, Apr. 13, 1979.

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ers and spare parts for arms.[81]

In the elections to the Majlis, too, informal cooperation was evident. For instance, all three major parties supported Masud Rajavi's candidacy for the Majlis. The Tudeh leader Kianuri even attempted to form a joint electoral front (the Tudeh and Feda'iyin did not field their own candidates but supported suitable independents). Although the attempt did not succeed, the fact that it had been made was itself significant.

Will the Iranian Left continue this informal cooperation? The prospects seem fairly good. Such cooperation could take many forms. The Tudeh has apparently overcome its fear of being outflanked on the left and has established contact with the popular and progressive leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, Abdel Rahman Qassemlou, whom it suspected of "deviationism." Similarly, the Feda'iyin's distrust of the Tudeh has been diminished by its distaste for the clerical forces in power. In the future, the progressive Muslims of the Mojahedin may well show a greater willingness to compromise with the Marxist Feda'iyin.

But until a number of such steps of an informal nature are taken, *formal* cooperation among the Left is likely to be minimal. Is the Left therefore doomed to failure, even though the different leftist groups have almost identical priorities and goals? Do the leftist groups' appeals to the same constituencies (the universities, the non-Persian minorities) and their internecine competition (even in the face of a regime each finds distasteful) condemn the Left to impotence, as some observers have argued?[82]

Abdel Rahman Qassemlou (center), leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, pictured in December 1979 with two Pishqam bodyguards.

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

Perhaps. But in the fluid state of politics in Iran, it is useful to keep in mind that something less than formal cooperation may have considerable effect. Each group in its own way, with its own tactical emphasis, and with its own quest for support within Iranian society, has found it expedient to pursue the common goal of a total revolution. Each group has also demanded the appointment of representative revolutionaries to power. The mass appeal of the Left's demands is undeniable. Such demands thus constitute a source of pressure that Khomeini can ignore only at his peril.

To counter these pressures and to maintain his own revolutionary credentials within a society dominated numerically by the young, Khomeini has stolen the Left's clothes, quickly incorporating the Left's demands into the language of the Islamic revolution.[83] The pressure from the Left has thus been the motive force behind the "leftward drift" of the Iranian revolution. This pressure, and the corresponding pressure from the Right, are responsible for the squeezing of the already weakened moderate Center.

It seems doubtful that Khomeini's concessions have defused the pressure from the Left and weakened the Left's role as a mutually reinforcing interest group. More likely, Khomeini has been reminded that while each leftist group is vulnerable by itself, the Left as a bloc united in advocacy of a similar program must be either appeased or extirpated. Appropriation of the Left's program is one answer. It is an answer, however, that testifies not to the weakness but to the strength of the Left.

Left and Right

In addition, one cannot adequately assess the potential role of the Left without understanding the complexities of its relationship with the Right. These have been manifest in the attitudes of Khomeini himself toward the Left.

Khomeini's view of the Left. Khomeini's public declarations about the "Left" have been as inconsistent as his policies toward the Left have been. In mid-1978, Khomeini forbade his supporters to cooperate with the Marxist Left, even in a united front to topple the Shah. He argued that the Left stood for dictatorship, but he promised freedom for the Left to organize

[81] *The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1980.
[82] See Eric Rouleau in *Le Monde*, June 16, 1979.
[83] See *The Economist*, Feb. 23, 1980, for a brilliant discussion of postrevolutionary Iran. The author, not identified, was Shaul Bakhash.

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The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini greets crowd from the rooftop of his home in Qom.

—Photoreporters.

and expressed confidence in the ability of Islam to withstand the assaults of the Left.[84] In February 1979, Khomeini qualified his pledge so as to exclude those groups that took orders from "foreign powers" (i.e., beyond the frontiers of Islam).[85]

Since the revolution, Khomeini has varied his tactics, alternating between threats and exhortations. During the first months after the revolution, he observed that "if Iranians open their eyes to the ways of the Prophet, they would forget Marx and Lenin." At the same time, however, he declared that he was the only force restraining Iran's vast Islamic majority from attacking the leftists.[86] In his admonitions to workers to end their strikes and slowdowns, he also denounced the leftist groups as dictators responsible for misleading the workers.

By August 1979, when it had become apparent that the Left as a whole had not been cowed, Khomeini banned all political activity by the Left (including the right of publication). He equated the Left with another enemy of the revolution, the United States: "Let no one expect that the corrupt and the American or non-American Left will be able to reappear in this country."[87] (Whether this obfuscation was but a tactic or reflected genuine confusion in the mind of Khomeini, it has been repeated by others since then, notably by Khomeini's putative successor, Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri.[88]) At the same time, Khomeini

[84] See *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1979.
[85] See *Financial Times*, Feb. 13, 1979; and *International Herald Tribune*, Feb. 13, 1979.
[86] *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1979.
[87] *The Guardian*, Aug. 17, 1979.

[88] Montazeri stated: "The groups formed in the Shah's time, calling themselves supporters of the so-called masses, have been created and formed for American purposes. Most of these groups are tied to Washington and Moscow." See *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 23, 1980.

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tried to keep the Left off balance. He took an extreme anti-American stance, and he gave his support to revolutionary change—for instance, he rebuked the Revolutionary Guards in August 1979 for being insufficiently revolutionary.[89]

Since August 1979, Khomeini has sought to avoid a direct confrontation with all the forces of the Left simultaneously. He has been more tolerant of the less militant Tudeh than he has been of the Feda'iyin, and he has even allowed the Tudeh a role as a controlled safety valve.

All the same, Khomeini has not encouraged the Left to participate in the political process. In the elections to the Majlis, Khomeini pointedly called for support of those "who are faithful to Islam and the Constitution, and are free of tendencies toward the left or right."[90] The Mojahedin were labeled "atheist Marxists," Masud Rajavi was called an agent of SAVAK, and intimidation and armed assaults were typical risks for leftist sympathizers. In case of doubt, Khomeini suggested, the people (65 percent of whom are illiterate) should consult their local mullah for advice. Moreover, the elections were run on an "absolute majority" basis, which required those with less than 50 percent of the vote to run in a second round and eliminated those with less than 40 percent of the vote. The Mojahedin and Feda'iyin saw this electoral provision as an attempt to exclude them.

Khomeini's inconsistencies toward the Left reflect a number of conflicting considerations. First, there is a fundamental distaste for the Left. Khomeini has reserved his strongest criticism for the Left, which he sees as a threat to Islam and the clergy and as an impure "Westernism" imported into the country. Another consideration—the Left's powerful, if diffuse, radical appeal—has encouraged Khomeini to cover his left flank. Yet another, the strength that the Left would possess were it to become unified, kept Khomeini from mounting a direct confrontation with the Left between August 1979 and June 1980.

In a larger sense, however, these inconsistencies mirror the nature of the political situation in Iran. It is a fact, for example, that some of Khomeini's entourage entertain notions that might be labeled Marxist if they were not already labeled Islamic. That is, many of the traditional distinctions between Right and Left, secular and clerical, progressive and reactionary, are one-dimensional oversimplifications in the Iranian context. Moreover, there is genuine confusion about political orientations, and political labels are as often used to besmirch an opponent as to describe his objectives.

The ambiguities of the Iranian political context as a whole must thus be taken into account in examining the position of the Left in contemporary Iranian politics. Part of the reason for these ambiguities, for the religious Right's relative tolerance of the Left, lies in the existence of a progressive strain of Islam within Iran.

Traditional and progressive Islam. Progressive Islam in Iran took shape in the 1940's and 1950's, growing out of the work of many of the figures who inspire today's blend of religion and radicalism. For example, 'Ali Shari'ati, the intellectual patron of the Mojahedin, contributed greatly to the revolutionary appeal of Islam that so animated the early opposition to the Shah in the 1960's. Secular intellectuals took part in this opposition out of a desire to provide a progressive interpretation of the Koran and thereby to radicalize the opposition movement of Islam. Yet, the vision of a radicalized Islam—*without* clerical domination—was by no means universal. The Muslim clergy within Iran largely held to a strict religious interpretation of the Koran and the Prophet. (The division between the traditionalist clergy and the radical opposition should not be overstressed. Within the younger clergy are many radicals closer to Shari'ati and radical Islam than to either the fundamentalism of Khomeini or the traditionalism of Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari'at-Madari).

This division has persisted throughout the past decade and is no nearer to being bridged today. Despite the important contribution of the Mojahedin to the revolution, especially in its initial and closing stages, the Mojahedin brand of Islamic modernism is now looked upon with great disapproval by the turbaned Hojjat al-Islam ("Proofs of Islam"). For Khomeini's "notion of the sovereignty of the religious jurists is almost diametrically opposed to Shari'ati's notion of a clergyless and egalitarian social order to be born of Islamic reformation."[91]

Despite the differences between the two, the Mojahedin's progressive Muslim wing has not sought a total break with Khomeini. One reason is that, as Sharif Arani convincingly argues, the objectives of the two overlap—for example, in the "charitable patriarchal measures" taken by the mullahs to improve the lot of the poor. Taking Maxime Rodinson's view of the Islamic radical outlook as a mixture of political

[89] *Financial Times*, Aug. 22, 1979.

[90] *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 13, 1980. There was even some doubt whether, in view of the Left's opposition to the Constitution, those leftists who won seats would be accepted by the majority.

[91] Arani, loc. cit., p. 21. In this section, I lean heavily on Arani's superb analysis.

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radicalism and social archaism, Arani maintains that young radicals tend to overlook the Islamic regime's political shortcomings and that "their moral indignation at the sinful modern world is satisfied by atavistic forms of punishment administered by Mullahs," i.e., by the regime's social archaism.[92] As a result, Arani contends, many Islamic radicals are oblivious to Khomeini's long-standing championship of Shi'ite traditionalism and his vehement attacks on Shari'at Sangelaji (the precursor of 'Ali Shari'ati in Islamic modernism) in the 1940's; they have (so far) indiscriminately equated "Shariati's vision of a reformed Islamic order and the rigidly traditionalist world view of the Shi'ite clergy."[93]

Another reason for the absence of a complete break so far is that the ruling group is by no means monolithic. Some of Khomeini's secular advisers have been abroad, have been influenced by Shari'ati's writings, and are sympathetic to the Mojahedin, if indeed they are not "closet Mojahedin" themselves. Yazdi and Bani-Sadr are two notable examples. In March 1980, as mentioned earlier, Bani-Sadr declared that he might be prepared to work with the Mojahedin. Nor is the clergy itself by any means of one mind. Before his death, Ayatollah Taleqani served as a link between the Left and the clerics. In a discussion with the Cuban envoy to Iran in mid-1979, he observed that while he could not accept the Marxists' notion of the "originality of matter" (i.e., atheism), "in the negation of exploitation and colonialism and defence of freedom we have common beliefs with Marxists."[94] Ayatollahs Zanjani and Khoe'ni are also known to be sympathetic to the Left. (Although not part of the ruling group, Shari'at-Madari, a centrist opposed to a theocratic political order, would be at least an important tactical ally.) The clergy even has "some contact" with the Tudeh.[95]

Here, at what seem to be the extremes of the political spectrum, there is still room for at least limited agreement. How is one to explain this accommodation between the religious Right and the secular Marxist Left?

Islam and Marxism. The compatability between Islam and Marxism is a subject that requires far more space than is available here, but a brief discussion, even at the risk of oversimplification, is essential for an understanding of the relationship between the Left and the religious Right in Iran. To grasp why a Marxist wing and a progressive-Muslim wing can coexist within the Mojahedin or why a modus vivendi exists between the Tudeh and the Islamic Republic Party, one must recognize the similarity between Marxism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. As Elie Kedourie has trenchantly observed, the two are united in their antipathies and sympathies.[96] Both are anti-Western. Both equate imperialism with capitalism and the latter with exploitation, corruption, and moral decay. Both are opposed to constitutional government, and both exalt the interests of the collectivity above those of the individual. Both have a predilection for egalitarianism: "believers are brethren, and brethren are equal."

In Islamic radicalism, this predilection has economic connotations. Bani-Sadr, for example, argues that "the Islamic notion of property means exclusively man's continuous right to his own labour, and this in turn means a classless society." The objective of the Koran, he holds, is to "abolish man's domination over man and build a unitary society."[97] This "unitary economics" (Eqtesad-e Towhidi) is popular not just with the Khomeinists but also with the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin, and the Mojahedin. In substance, much of the government's economic program—the extension of state control, nationalization, and ensuring the worker's right to the fruits of his own labor—is virtually identical to what the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin called for in their programs of February 1979.[98]

Similarly, in the Third World rhetoric of opposition to the West and to "dependency," it is difficult to disentangle the Islamic and Marxist elements of support for the Palestinians and the "disinherited masses." Above all, as Kedourie observes, the Islamic doctrines preached by Khomeini, despite his periodic anti-Communist slogans, are essentially anti-Western. Although they embody a "backward looking vision of a society in which Koranic prescriptions would be supreme," they merge with "the most powerful current of revolutionary doctrine in the world today, that of Marxism."[99]

Khomeini and his advisers also encourage opposition to capitalism and imperialism, seek a classless society in which wealth is redistributed, advocate state nationalization of industries, and pursue a foreign

[92] Note Eric Rouleau's similar descriptions of Khomeini's regime as one of "archaic populism." *Le Monde,* Aug. 17, 1979.
[93] Arani, loc. cit., p. 22.
[94] Transcript in "Facts on Iran," mimeographed, Aug. 17, 1979.
[95] See Kianuri's interview, *Le Monde,* Apr. 18, 1980.

[96] I am indebted to his *Islamic Revolution,* Salisbury Papers, No. 6, London, The Salisbury Group. For a summary, see *Daily Telegraph,* Dec. 14, 1979. See also Elie Kedourie, "Khomeini's Political Heresy," *Policy Review* (Washington, DC), Spring 1980, pp. 133–46.
[97] Kedourie, *Islamic Revolution,* p. 4.
[98] *The Economist,* Feb. 23, 1980, p. 32.
[99] Kedourie, *Islamic Revolution,* p. 4.

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policy of militant nonalignment. Thus, the rhetoric of Islamic militancy now "incites factory workers against their capitalist masters."[100] The government supports even the idea of "land to the peasants" and has "acquiesced in the takeover of housing by students and revolutionary committees."[101] And with regard to the armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards have now had their role enshrined in the Constitution and are undergoing development as a counter to the regular army. It is scarcely surprising that the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin, and the Mojahedin find little to criticize in much of the Khomeini regime's actions.

In sum, the similarity between the extreme Right and the extreme Left at times makes them virtually indistinguishable. It is precisely this interdependence between radical Right and Left that accounts for the erosion of the Center and the "leftward drift" of the Iranian revolution in the name of Islam. As a total transformation of society is achieved and as the traditional mediating institutions of Iranian society are destroyed, so will end the moderation that has characterized the "plasticity of informal politics" to date. With no discernible replacements yet in sight, it is too early to appreciate the ultimate consequences. It is possible to note, however, that if the process continues, the Left could well be in a position to vie for power. For the seizure of power becomes immeasurably easier as the political system is reduced to an empty shell.

The Left and Achievement of Power

There are numerous indicators of dissent and discontent within Iran today that under appropriate circumstances could build up to threaten the present regime. Under those circumstances, the Left would be poised to benefit—not as an interest group "radicalizing the revolution" and as a force requiring appeasement or imitation, but as a genuine contender for power.

The squeezing of the Center leaves no visible alternative. By the denial of political rights to their opponents, the clerics have hastened the radicalization of the Center (as liberal democrats and progressive Muslims defect to the ranks of the secular Left) and hence the strengthening of the Left. New evidence of clerical incompetence will only accelerate this trend and increase the Left's constituency among the young, the ethnic minorities, the workers, and the intellectuals. As the only source of opposition within Iran, the Left

[100] *The Economist*, Feb. 23, 1980, p. 32.
[101] Ibid.

Iranian President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr at a January 1980 press conference; at the left rear is Abu Sharif, Commander in Chief of the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards).

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

can only benefit from the country's current malaise.

Furthermore, the demagoguery characteristic of Iran today will raise expectations that would be difficult for even a competent government to fulfill. Foreign diversion, parades, and exultation in purity and martyrdom will not suffice to meet the workaday needs of the populace. The crowds currently supporting the Imam have been politically mobilized. They are devoted, but they are suggestible, volatile, and (ultimately) fickle.

Khomeini's stature and his sensitivity as a charismatic leader to the reciprocal interdependence between leader and led has not yet yielded a false step. But under what conditions could the mass passion in Iran be harnessed by the Left?

As in many similar political orders, the most readily identifiable scenario is a succession crisis. Khomeini has been the cement of the revolution, but his strength has been one of personality, not dogma. It is dubious that his legitimacy will be transferable or that allegiance will automatically be extended to his successor. If Khomeini's charisma is not institutionalized (or routinized), the clerical divisions and schisms that fragment the Right would be reflected in the nation at large, and the clerical regime would lose ground to other forces.

An alternative (or complementary) scenario is the slow and steady discrediting of the clergy as a result of incapacity to produce the fruits of the revolution. The

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clergy may be attractive as an opposition group. But will it be equally attractive as the establishment? Starkly put—will fundamentalist Islamic credentials make corruption, arbitrariness, and ineptitude any more tolerable in the future than they have been in the past? It seems doubtful. A coalition built around opposition to a theocracy could well emerge in a society that still seeks an Islamic component in its revolution.

A third scenario would envisage a major setback administered to the regime by a domestic or foreign foe. Already, in mid-1980, the regime is beset by problems, the nationwide consensus (though still large) has eroded, and an air of passive apathy reigns in much of the country. A major defeat at the hands of, say, the Kurds, combined with economic problems, social discontent, and restiveness among the minorities (particularly in the Turkmen/Baluchi regions), could unravel the threads that bind together the diverse elements behind Khomeini (so the scenario goes). Another variant of this scenario would be decisive military action by an outside power, such as Iraq, that inflicted heavy casualties on the Revolutionary Guards and damaged the economic infrastructure, thus dispelling the mystique of "success" that continues to surround the regime.

A final scenario takes the current situation in Iran and projects it ahead a few years to assess the political consequences. It looks to a slow collapse of the regime from its own weakness rather than from a direct challenge. It sees accelerated disaffection resulting from economic malaise and arbitrariness toward the national minorities and political opponents. It also sees increasing governmental deterioration and decreasing governmental capacity to influence developments outside a few major cities, as well as international isolation and posturing for effect overseas. For all practical purposes, a national government would no longer exist, and the country would revert to a condition of fragmentation, with autonomous rule in the provinces and multiple centers of power. The capital would contain a populace nursing heightened expectations in a revolutionary condition.

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. The last (a slow-motion collapse) merely describes the current situation. The third, at least in part, describes the present conflict with the Kurds and Iraq. Elements of other scenarios are even now with us. A power struggle is already under way over the question of succession to Khomeini. The IRP control of the Majlis appears to augur a fully theocratic regime—which some clerics (notably Ayatollahs Shari'at-Madari and Qomi) by no means support.

The Left stands only to benefit from the failures of the present regime. It has a more tolerant policy toward the minorities and a better idea of the economic program it would seek to implement. If the government falters, therefore, it will be there to pick up the pieces.

Within the Left, the Mojahedin is the most likely contender for power. It combines the right ingredients —revolutionary credentials and the acceptable face of Islam. If respect for the clerical side of the revolution wanes, respect for the untried and uncontaminated Mojahedin will surely rise. And the Mojahedin may emerge as the grouping most likely to bring stability and order to Iran.

Even though the Mojahedin lacks the stigma of association with either the USSR (the Tudeh) or pure Marxism (the Feda'iyin), however, it may be handicapped in a different way. If it were to erect a Marxist regime with Islamic overtones (or an Islamic regime with Marxist overtones), it would be a source of considerable concern to the USSR. Indeed, to Moscow, a strong, independent quasi-Marxist regime would be the least attractive outcome of the Iranian revolution. Allied to Islam, it would be a model that would attract attention in the Soviet empire and beyond.

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The Left in Turkey

By George S. Harris

By persistent involvement in political strife, the Left has helped to make violence an established feature of political life in Turkey. Politically motivated assassinations and clashes between leftist and rightist groups currently account for some eight deaths a day on average. But the significance of the Turkish Left goes well beyond its contribution to violence. Although the parties of the Left in Turkey are so tiny that they lack even the remotest chance of coming to power in elections, leftist ideologies have held special fascination for a significant proportion of the country's opinion makers. Journalists and professors, as well as artists and literary figures, have espoused leftist causes. Their ideas have had an important impact on the thinking of the Turkish elite as a whole. Moreover, some of the positions they defended have over time become, at least in attenuated form, accepted wisdom for the masses as well.

In understanding the Left, it is necessary in the first place to inspect its origins and recent history to account for both its insignificance as an organized movement within Turkish party politics and its appeal to intellectuals. This account also will provide background for understanding the deepening involvement of the Left in terrorism, despite the best efforts of the government to extirpate this dangerous current. On this basis, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the future challenge of the Left to the political order in Turkey.

Mr. Harris has been a Professorial Lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, DC) of The Johns Hopkins University since 1968 and is currently Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East and South Asia in the US Department of State. He is author of several works, including The Origins of Communism in Turkey, *1967, and* Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971, *1972, and has contributed articles on Turkey to numerous journals in the US and abroad. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Government.*

The Political Context

Multiparty politics took root in Turkey only after World War II. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's successful nationalist movement, which had squeezed out its domestic opposition by the mid-1920's, could not maintain its political monopoly after his death in 1938. With the tacit approval of Ismet Inonu (Ataturk's successor as head of the Republican People's Party), a major bourgeois opposition party—the Democrat Party—sprang up to fashion a broad vote-getting machine representing the more modern peasantry and the emerging commercial and industrial elite. Promising economic advance without the social engineering reforms dear to Ataturk's party, the Democrats swept to power in elections in 1950. Thereafter, with the exception of 1960 and 1971 when military forces intervened briefly against civilian regimes that appeared to be perverting the system or failing to protect the state, parliamentary procedure has operated relatively smoothly.

The political contest has been chiefly between the Republican People's Party on the one hand, with its tradition of state-directed reform, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and the business and professional elite on the other, working through first the Democrat Party (until it was outlawed after the 1960 military intervention) and then the Justice Party. Neither of these major groups has had a strong commitment to ideology. The Ataturkist reformers of the Republican People's Party did enunciate a statist policy of economic development in the 1930's and strongly supported creation of a central planning organization at

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the end of the 1950's.[1] More recently, the Republican People's Party joined the Socialist International, and leaders of the party began to style it a kind of European social democratic party. Yet both the Justice Party and the Republicans are in contest for the political center in Turkey. The economic policies of both when in power have been based on a mixed economy and cooperation with Western financial organizations.

Outside of these main political organizations, which together are backed by about 80 percent of the electorate, a number of splinter parties have grown up in the favorable climate of proportional representation. A few of these have been conservative or ultranationalist factions, usually identified as "right-wing" by Turks. Others are parties called "leftist" in Turkish parlance. These latter form the primary subject of the present study.

[1] See E. Gunçe, "Early Planning Experiences in Turkey," in Ş. Ilkin and E. Inanç, Eds., *Planning in Turkey*, Ankara, Middle East Technical University, Publication No. 9, 1967, especially p. 13.

Emergence of the Left

The Left in Turkey as it will be defined in the current investigation has a clear distinguishing feature: unlike other Turkish political formations, it does not derive in a formal sense from the Ataturkist reform movement. Instead, what will be subsumed under the rubric "Left" will be those organizations and currents of thought that grew up on the base of European Socialist



Weapons, ammunition, money, typewritten propaganda, and a banner of the Turkish National Liberation Front (THKC), confiscated by Turkey's martial-law authorities during searches of dormitories and faculty buildings of a number of high schools in early 1980.

—Camera Press.

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and Communist movements as well as their later Trotskyist, Maoist, and Third World variants. These groups are the ones that see themselves and are seen as "the Left" in Turkey.[2]

Socialist thinking and practice entered the Ottoman Empire as an import from the West at the turn of the 20th century. France played the main role in this transmission. Moreover, it was minority groups—like the Jews, Bulgarians, and Greeks left in the empire—who were especially drawn into the early small-scale leftist activity. Even today, leftist currents still cater to the minorities inside Turkey (the Kurds above all), although ethnic Turks now clearly predominate in these movements.

Communist thinking made its appearance at the end of the Ottoman era after World War I. The Communists, linked to both the French and Soviet parties, visibly influenced the outlook of Ataturk's national movement. In the struggle for independence against the Ottoman Sultans and outside invaders, Ataturk himself at one time formed his own so-called "Communist party" in Turkey, in an effort to assure his domination of that brand of political activity.[3]

Greater success in incorporating leftist ideas into Turkish reformist thought came later, as a result of Ataturk's efforts to woo Communists away from the Moscow-dominated Turkish Communist Party. In the early 1930's, the Kadro movement, led by ex-Communists who had been accepted into the Republican People's Party, produced a blend of dogma that sought to bridge the gap between Ottoman state-directed reform and Soviet doctrine. But this doctrinal adaptation was never accepted by the majority of Ataturk's party, which continued to hew to an essentially pragmatic approach.

Ataturk maintained control of the political scene through a one-party regime during his lifetime. In 1925, he closed down the Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party, which had provided a facade for the activity of the Turkish Communists. Yet the tiny Moscow-oriented Communist Party continued to operate illegally after its chief leaders fled abroad. It worked underground to make recruits within the intellectual community on the one hand, and within the working class on the other. While communism never attracted a significant mass following, it did succeed in winning the allegiance of Turkey's leading poet, Nazim Hikmet, as a champion of leftist ideas. His influence was important in preparing the way for the acceptance of the Left by students in a later era.

Leftists failed utterly in their bid to organize legitimate parties when the political dominance of the Republican People's Party was relaxed after World War II. Soviet pressure on Turkey in 1945 promoted a rigid national unity which rejected anything smacking of communism. Thus, various leftist parties (which surfaced as revivals of the earlier movement during the move toward multiparty democracy in Turkey after 1945) were summarily closed down without any protests from elsewhere in the body politic. The Communist movement continued mainly as an émigré party based in Eastern Europe, attending world Communist gatherings, publishing party pronouncements in *Yeni* Çag (New Age)—the Turkish-language edition of the Prague-based *World Marxist Review*—and broadcasting over the clandestine Bizim Radyo (Our Radio) from East Germany. For the next decade and a half, the Turkish elite appeared to consider socialism as well as communism tantamount to treason.

The Decade of the 1960's

In 1960, military officers took power in Turkey with the aim of correcting the errors they perceived in the Democrat Party administration of Adnan Menderes. Among the major accusations leveled at the Democrats was the charge of having neglected the obligation of promoting social justice. As a result, one of the prime concerns of the soldiers was to establish institutions to assure the more equitable division of national wealth. The slant of the new constitution (approved by referendum on July 9, 1961) expressed this intent. Its preamble spoke of "social justice," and Article 1 proclaimed the new Republic to be a "social state." The import of these statements was clarified by President Cemal Gursel, who explained that these words meant that Turkey was "open to socialism."[4]

This radical shift in view regarding the Left was an indication that beneath the surface in the 1950's distinctions between communism and socialism had been sharpening. By this time, Socialist approaches had earned respectability in Europe. Moreover, with the waning of the cold war and the start of peaceful coexistence, the foreign danger had palpably lessened in the eyes of many Turks. Thus, the stage was set for

[2] Although the beliefs of the left wing of the Republican People's Party may shade into Marxist teachings, the Republicans will not be included in "the Left" for purposes of the present study.

[3] The party was known as the Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party. For more detailed treatment of this period, see George S. Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey*, Stanford, CA, The Hoover Institution, 1967, pp. 80–85.

[4] Ismet Giritli, "Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution," *Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Winter 1962, pp. 7, 11–12.

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the rapid emergence of a Socialist movement.

During the 1960's, this movement centered on the Turkish Labor Party, founded by a small group of second-echelon union leaders in March 1961. Inexperienced in the ways of politics, they offered the party presidency in February 1962 to Mehmet Ali Aybar, a prominent Istanbul lawyer with a long history of anti-imperialist crusading.

The decision to go outside of union circles for a leader reflected the fact that by this time the educated elite had begun to take up social reform with vigor. A group of intellectuals had at the end of 1961 founded a periodical, *Yon* (Direction), that for the next six years would point the way for an impressive body of Turkish political thought exploring leftist ideological currents. *Yon* grouped the left wing of the Republican People's Party with social reformers of far more extreme views, who eventually dominated its pages. From an initial concentration on Turkey's domestic problems, the journal gradually shifted its emphasis to calls on Turkey to abandon its close bilateral ties with the United States and to adopt a neutralist stance.

Aybar's arrival changed the nature of the Labor Party. Even in theory, it ceased to be exclusively a working-class organization; its statutes now called it "the party of the people" as well as "the party of the workers."[5] Moreover, the Turkish Labor Party was not yet avowedly Marxist (it became so only after 1968). It rejected revolution as a way to power and specifically proclaimed its willingness to work gradually to win popular support. To punctuate these points, it accepted as members Kurdish tribal figures from eastern Turkey and wealthy landowners, alongside manual workers.

The Labor Party hit its stride only after the Cyprus crisis broke out in December 1963. Although Aybar did not at first exploit anti-American and anti-NATO themes (as late as May 1964, he said "for us there exists no problem called the Cyprus problem"[6]), by the summer of 1964 he was strongly attacking the Ankara government for relying on the United States. This foreign policy line provided the party with its first significant entrée into university circles. In fact, anti-imperialism was the most popular issue the party ever found to generate support. By harping on these themes, it was finally able to build a sufficient organization to qualify to run in the 1965 general elections.



Mehmet Ali Aybar at a rally of the Turkish Labor Party, which he headed from 1962 to 1969.

—From the back cover of Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Bagimsizlik, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm* (Independence, Democracy, Socialism), Istanbul, Gerçek Yayinevi, 1968.

The effort of the Labor Party to exploit these issues played a role in impelling the Republican People's Party to adopt a left-of-center stance for the 1965 elections. While the Republicans were generally silent on Aybar's proposal for a united front, they echoed many of the notes his party sounded in the campaign.

In the election, the Republican People's Party experienced a sharp decline in votes as some of its more conservative constituents stayed away from the polls. The Turkish Labor Party, on the other hand, turned in an impressive performance for a minor party. It won nearly 3 percent of the ballots and managed to elect 15 members to the 450-man National Assembly.

Most of the Labor Party's urban vote came from upper-class districts; elsewhere, it traded on traditional political alignments with Kurdish tribal leaders rather than on the appeal of its socialist doctrine. The shantytown quarters of the major cities and the peasantry in general gave few votes to the party.

[5] See Dr. Muzaffer Sencer, *Turkiye'de Siyasal Partiler'in Sosyal Temelleri* (The Social Foundations of Political Parties in Turkey), Istanbul, May Yayinlari, 1974, pp. 315–31; and an unsigned article, "Critique of the Turkish Labor Party," *Ilke* (Istanbul), October 1974, p. 86.

[6] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), May 11, 1964. The next day, the Turkish National Students Federation protested Aybar's words. Thereupon the Labor Party issued a "clarification" that the Turkish people's "fundamental rights should be safeguarded" on Cyprus. Ibid., May 12 and 13, 1964.

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Behice Boran, leader of the Turkish Labor Party.

—Wide World.

Lack of worker support testified to the Labor Party's difficulties in organizing union backing. The principal labor confederation, Turk-Iş, had seen the obvious advantage of keeping on good terms with the governing Republican People's Party and had been wary of violating the law against outright political affiliation. Turk-Iş thus displayed no interest in the fortunes of the Turkish Labor Party. It was only in 1967, when in protest against this moderate stand several small constituent unions broke off from Turk-Iş to form the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DISK), that Aybar's party gained active union support. However, DISK's membership was still relatively small and could not effectively deliver the labor vote.

Ironically, the Labor Party's promising beginning in the 1965 elections raised problems for the unity of the Left. The division of the spoils under the proportional representation system of the day (which left decisions on the allocation of 13 of the 15 seats won to the party leadership) set the workers in the party against the intellectuals, who, thanks to Aybar's prestige, ended up with the major share of seats. The party's brightened prospects also inspired former convicted Communists to try to take over the organization. Aybar turned back their challenge and a number were purged for damaging party unity.[7]

Those expelled fought back. In November 1967, the followers of Mihri Belli, who himself had been excluded from the Labor Party because of his Communist past, set up the publication *Turk Solu* (Turkish Left) as an organ outside of the party, in opposition to Aybar. It called for a union of revolutionary forces and argued that a "national democratic revolution" was needed as a first step toward socialism. Belli's belief in the desirability of rendering the government helpless through popular anarchy appeared to conflict with the Labor Party's commitment to parliamentary procedures and formed an ideological underpinning for the leftist violence to follow. Indeed, this public dispute was a harbinger of the splits that were to characterize the Left in the 1970's.[8]

The underlying disunity of the Left in Turkey was revealed more starkly by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Aybar wasted no time in condemning Moscow. He took the position that Turkey should follow its own brand of socialism, a "human-faced socialism" that depended not only on Marx but on all socialist thinkers from Proudhon onward. This frontal assault on Soviet imperialism came as a rude shock to many in the Turkish Labor Party, who had preached improving relations with Moscow. While a majority supported Aybar, his rivals scented the chance to attack his leadership. Professor Behice Boran, who was soon to supplant Aybar as party president, and her supporters branded his new formulations as "unscientific."[9]

Aybar was able to remain party leader until the parliamentary elections in the fall of 1969, when the Labor Party scored poorly, losing 13 of its 15 seats. Although the decline in seats was due more to the changes in the election law than to the dropoff in party votes (from 3 percent of the ballots to 2.7 percent), Aybar was held responsible. He resigned in October 1969. Two temporary successors occupied the presidency until Boran was elected at the party's National Congress in November 1970.

With the departure of Aybar, the Turkish Labor Party began to slide toward extremism. Although the last supporters of Belli's anarchist line quit when they

[7] "Critique of the Turkish Labor Party," loc. cit., p. 93.

[8] See the unsigned article, "The Need for a Union of Forces," *Turk Solu* (Ankara), Nov. 17, 1967, p. 1; and Mihri Belli, "Turkey's Revolution Strategy," in ibid., Jan. 16, 1968, pp. 4-5.

[9] *Akşam* (Istanbul), Aug. 23, 1968; also, "Forward for the Working Class Party," *Ant* (Istanbul), November 1970, pp. 21-22; Aclan Sayilgan, *Turkiye'de Sol Hareketler* (Leftist Movements in Turkey), Istanbul, Hareket Yayinlari, 1972, pp. 467-71; and Sadun Aren, "Rift in the TLP," *Tum* (Ankara), Dec. 11, 1968, p. 9.

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Left-wing students rushing to attack the Turkish-American trade bank and the Pan American Airways offices in Ankara on April 20, 1970.

—Pictorial Parade.

failed to win over the majority at the Congress, the Labor Party under Boran frankly pointed itself toward the urban proletariat and the rural minorities (specifically the Kurds). The party henceforth minimized the role of the peasant and put more emphasis on the need for revolutionary change. However, it did continue to reiterate its commitment to legal paths and condemned the trend toward terrorism emerging among students in the later 1960's.

The emphasis on rights for the Kurds added to the party statutes in November 1970[10] set the stage for the court order in 1971 outlawing the party. The above-party government installed after the generals' intervention of March 1971 was particularly sensitive to threats to national unity. In that climate, the Labor Party leaders were given long prison terms for violating the Constitution and the Political Parties Law.[11]

[10] "Decisions of the Fourth Grand Congress of the Turkish Labor Party," *Emek* (Istanbul), December 1970, pp. 1-8.

[11] "Critique of the Turkish Labor Party," loc. cit., p. 119.

The Turn Toward Terrorism

The Labor Party's difficulties came at a time of growing violence on the political scene. This phenomenon seemed to have its genesis among Turkish students who used the freedom afforded by university autonomy (granted in 1960) to engage in political activity. Leftist students struggled fiercely against rightists for control of both the old-line Turkish National Students Union and the newer Turkish National Students Federation. Although the leftists failed to dominate these large organizations, they did score success with the far smaller Federation of Intellectual Clubs—a grouping of student debating societies which had burgeoned in the mid-1960's under the leadership of the Turkish Labor Party. In 1969, the Federation of Intellectual Clubs was reorganized as the Revolutionary Youth Federation (Dev Genç) under the control of leftists far more radical than those of the Labor Party. Under this leadership, Dev Genç ceased

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to anticipate an eventual electoral victory of the Left.

By this time, the rivalry between rightist and leftist students had turned violent. The example of the university demonstrations of 1968 in France powerfully affected student leaders in Turkey. Physical conflict sprang up between student organizations on the campuses, at Turkish Labor Party gatherings, and at meetings of rightists called to condemn communism. The public at large felt the effects of this strife more directly when the leftists undertook a concerted campaign of off-campus protests against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in general and the United States in particular. Student extremists also turned to bank robberies, a heretofore unknown crime in Turkey, to finance political activities.

Preeminent among the groups on the Left that carried out such acts was the so-called Turkish People's Liberation Army, organized in about 1970. Drawing on the intellectual underpinnings of Carlos Marighella and Ché Guevara and on training by the Palestinians, this tiny conspiratorial group proclaimed that the country could attain genuine national independence only by armed struggle. Its most prominent leader, Deniz Gezmiş, was far more an activist than a theoretician of revolution. While he believed that revolution should start in the urban areas, he expected that it would subsequently spread to the countryside. Indeed, he himself was finally arrested on his way to the mountains near Malatya after a spree of politically-inspired terrorism that included capturing several American servicemen in an abortive effort to collect ransom. Although he and his principal lieutenants were executed in 1972 in a government effort to deter imitators, he is hailed as one of the martyrs of the revolution by the current generation of leftist youth.[12]

The other major student leftist terrorist figure of the early 1970's was Mahir Çayan, who headed a sister group, the Turkish People's Liberation Front, organized in October 1970. Çayan was far more intellectually inclined than Gezmiş; he for a time in mid-1970 edited the radical journal *Aydinlik* (Clarity). In his ideological experimentation, Çayan attempted to meld Maoist and Leninist formulas into a two-stage model of revolutionary tactics. In the first stage, he saw the workers taking the lead, with the peasants playing a supporting role. But for the revolution to succeed, he believed, the rural population would eventually have to be drawn into a mass popular movement, with workers taking a back seat.[13] Because of these views, some Turkish leftists labeled Çayan a Maoist. However, both he and Gezmiş actively opposed the faction which split off from *Aydinlik* in mid-1970 to found a rival journal—*Proleter Devrimci Aydinlik* (Proletarian Revolutionary Clarity)—which specifically celebrated the Chinese interpretation of revolution.



Deniz Gezmiş, Turkish terrorist leader, hurls an accusation at a Turkish military tribunal in 1972, in a proceeding which resulted in the death sentence for Gezmiş.

—Camera Press.

Çayan's intellectual and organizational vigor brought him and his confederates to a leading role in the radical movement. His small band was responsible for the May 1971 kidnap-killing of the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul, Ephraim Elrom. Çayan was subsequently wounded and captured by security forces, but engineered an escape which appeared to have been assisted by air force officers assigned to guard him.[14] He was finally killed early in 1972 in a shoot-out after

[12] *I. THKO Davasi (Mahkeme Dosyasi)* (The First TPLA Case [Trial Record]), Istanbul, Yontem Yayinlari, 1974, passim.

[13] For Çayan's views, see *Aydinlik* (Istanbul), January 1970, pp. 188–221, and ibid., June 1970, pp. 127–58.

[14] *Milliyet*, Mar. 12, 1972, reported that 57 officers and 11 noncommissioned officers were involved in the escape.

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seizing three British and Canadian technicians as hostages. He, too, has taken a prominent place in the pantheon of leftist martyrs for the present student generation.

The kidnapings of foreigners, the rash of bank robberies, and the increasingly frequent clashes between leftist and rightist students caused increasing concern among Turkey's military. Their decision in 1971 to demand more effective government was probably reinforced by the belated discovery that the university campuses, off limits to normal police procedures, had become arsenals of small arms. Moreover, when the security forces finally got permission to launch broad searches, they met with armed resistance from the leftist students. The resulting casualties among regular troops brought home to the generals just how far out of control the situation in Turkey had become.

Above-Party Government

The advent of nonparty governments in March 1971 had immediate consequences for the Left in Turkey. The more radical leftist publications, such as *Aydinlik* and its Maoist competitor, were summarily closed. Widespread arrests swept up leftist professors, journalists, and others, whether or not they were involved in the political violence. The entire leadership of the Turkish Labor Party was jailed. Using extensive search authority, the martial-law forces managed to track down the remainder of the Gezmiş and Çayan bands in bloody clashes that left few survivors among the terrorists.

These government security measures were generally successful in stopping the student violence. While extremists on the right for the most part escaped incarceration, it was clear that efforts to organize leftist students would be severely punished. Fortunately, the taste for political violence had not yet spread widely beyond university circles.

The general crackdown on leftist activities in Turkey gave impetus to the efforts of the émigré Turkish Communist Party (TCP) in Europe. Ismail Bilen, who formally took over leadership of the party from Zeki Baştimar in May 1973, substantially expanded its propaganda activity. The main target of its operations appeared to be the Turkish workers in West Germany, whose numbers had risen rapidly in the late 1960's, reaching (with family members) about 1 million by the early 1970's. TCP propaganda was spread there by



Three Turkish Gastarbeiter *in Gelsenkirchen, West Germany. Such Turks working abroad have been the target of propaganda and organizational efforts by the émigré Turkish Communist Party.*

—Katherine Young.

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such clandestine bodies as the Şafak (Dawn) organization. Some of this material was also filtered into Turkey. Martial-law authorities periodically confiscated Şafak literature calling for a "people's army" of armed workers and peasants to rise and oust the government and take Turkey out of NATO.[15] Broadcasts of the so-called "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" also began in the early 1970's. The increasing agitation from Turks in Europe led Prime Minister Nihat Erim to complain in 1972 of unrelenting Communist pressure from without seeking to subvert the Turkish state.[16]

Return to Politics as Usual

Nonetheless, pressure was mounting within Turkey to release the artificial clamp put on political activity, including that of the Left. The Republican People's Party complained that the wholesale arrests of Left sympathizers had included Republicans as well. The party was eager to campaign freely in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 1973. For its part, the Justice Party pressed to be rid of restrictions to carry on its own campaign to recover after its fall from power through the military ultimatum of 1971. Under this pressure from the major parties, martial law was lifted in September 1973 to allow political competition to resume before the October elections.

However, the Left was not able to take immediate advantage of the easing of restraints. Indeed, many leftists, including the leaders of the Turkish Labor Party, were not released from jail until after the general amnesty enacted in mid-1974 by the coalition government headed by the Republican People's Party (and the Turkish Labor Party itself had to wait until 1975 to be officially revived). Some of the more radical leftists were either in self-imposed exile or had died. The 1973 elections, therefore, passed without any leftist party being eligible to participate and without much visible leftist agitation.

In this situation, those of leftist persuasion generally voted for the Republican People's Party. DISK, which despite its close ties to the Turkish Labor Party had survived the 1971–73 period intact by avoiding overt political acts, shifted its backing to the Republicans. Even the émigré Communists used Bizim Radyo broadcasts to urge their followers to vote for the Republican People's Party rather than sit out the election. And by adding the far larger quantity of votes from the Center as well, the Republicans gained sharply over their previous showing. The party was able to form a coalition government in conjunction with the small Islamic traditionalist National Salvation Party.[17]

As the specter of military intervention receded and a more tolerant atmosphere was ushered in during 1974 with the formation of the coalition regime headed by Bulent Ecevit, a procession of leftist parties emerged to vie with each other for the allegiance of the leftist constituency. This process was abetted by the severe foreign policy crisis that the use of Turkish troops on Cyprus triggered. The resulting arms embargo that Washington imposed in February 1975 threatened Turkey's traditional foreign policy orientation. Continuance of this embargo in partial form until September 1978 generated a wide receptivity to the anti-Western propaganda that has been the stock-in-trade of the Left in Turkey.

First to organize was the Turkish Socialist Labor Party, established in June 1974 by a group of former second-level Turkish Labor Party members headed by Ahmet Kaçmaz. The new party strongly condemned association with the West in foreign policy and was notable for its public dissent from the general Turkish consensus in calling for an "independent" Cyprus while Turkish troops were still conducting military operations on the island. In the domestic realm, it attacked the former Turkish Labor Party for "syndicalism and populism," which it saw as responsible for the "cancer of parliamentarism" practiced by dilettantes; and it prescribed a united front of all leftist parties and individuals.[18] While the new party attracted a significant fraction of the Left, it suffered from factional disputes and was not able to extend its organization sufficiently even by 1977 to qualify to run in the general elections of that year.

In 1975, several other fragments of the Left also organized as formal parties. Mihri Belli took advantage of the opportunity to create the Workers Party, a legal organization, to advocate a "national democratic revolution." The party remained essentially a debating society rather than an effective political machine, though its nationalist approach aroused some response in university circles. The followers of another former Communist, Hikmet Kivilcimli (who had died in

[15] Ibid., Mar. 22 and May 17, 1972.

[16] Cited in "Chronology: Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Summer 1972, p. 304.

[17] In the October 1973 elections, the Republicans won 185 seats in the 450-seat National Assembly, and the National Salvation Party won 48 seats. See David E. Long and Bernard Reich, Eds., *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 50–51.

[18] See "Critique of the Turkish Labor Party," loc. cit., pp. 119–21. *Ilke* is the organ of the Turkish Socialist Labor Party.

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Yugoslavia in 1971, revived his minuscule Fatherland Party with the mission of attacking both Moscow and Beijing.[19]

The final leftist party to be founded in 1975 was the Socialist Revolution Party of Mehmet Ali Aybar. Resting on Aybar's personal prestige, this organization appealed to the more conservative elements of the Turkish Left. In addition to elaborating Socialist solutions for Turkey's domestic problems, it expressed suspicions of both Western defense arrangements for Turkey and Moscow's intentions regarding Turkey. Although he was joined by some of his longtime admirers, Aybar experienced difficulty in extending his organization outside of the major urban centers. His party was unable to qualify for the 1977 elections.

The spectacle of five legal parties (the Turkish Labor Party plus the four new groups) contesting for the tiny share of the Turkish electorate that was receptive to leftist ideas did not bode well for the future of the Turkish Left. Much of the energy of these factions was devoted to emphasizing their mutual differences, although Belli's group and the Fatherland Party did associate themselves for a time with the Turkish Socialist Labor Party in seeking a union of forces on the left. Moreover, all leftist parties had to confront the Republican People's Party, which, with its left-of-center wing firmly in control, asserted its own claims to represent the leftist constituency. And those who looked to Moscow for guidance found that through the general elections of 1977, the Kremlin appeared to regard the Republicans as the only force capable of defeating the Justice Party coalition which the émigré Communists identified as their principal enemy. Radio Moscow acknowledged the Republicans "to be linked to the Turkish leftist democratic movement," and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party called the election outcome (in which the Republicans won a plurality of 214 seats in the National Assembly) a "victory for the progressive democratic forces,"[20] despite the failure of the Turkish Labor Party to elect a single deputy.

The factionalization of the leftist political constituency was mirrored by divisions among its sympathizers in the labor movement. DISK as an organization remained committed to the Republican People's Party, although more radical elements continued to oppose this position. Indeed, the confederation's president, who championed support of the Republicans, barely won reelection in 1975. Sentiment among many of the constituent unions in DISK was strongly leftist, and this body was clearly not a reliable ally of the Republican People's Party.

Another prominent labor organization that housed Marxists of all varieties was the Turkish Teachers Unity and Solidarity Association (TOB-DER). It was the successor to the Turkish Teachers Union, which had been closed by the martial-law authorities in 1971, when the Constitution was amended to prohibit government employees (including teachers) from engaging in formal union activity. The new teachers' associ-



Ismail Bilen, General Secretary of the Turkish Communist Party.

***—TKP MK Genel Sekretari I. Bilen Yoldaşin Merkez Komitesi Plenumu'nda okudugu Politik Buro Raporu 1978* (Report of the Politburo by TCP CC General Secretary Comrade I. Bilen to a 1978 Central Committee Plenum), Istanbul, Urun Yayinlari, 1978, p. 3.**

[19] The Fatherland Party was the sole legal leftist party to be sharply attacked by Moscow in this period. On Jan. 4, 1976, the clandestine Voice of the Turkish Communist Party branded the Fatherland Front as a "pseudo-Communist organization" seeking to sabotage the Soviet-line party. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-WEU*), Jan. 6, 1976. The Fatherland Party was lauded by Turkish Trotskyists in their "revolutionary Marxist monthly" *Ne Yapmali* (Istanbul), April 1980, pp. 12–13.

[20] Radio Moscow, June 6, 1977, in *FBIS-WEU*, June 7, 1977; and Voice of the Turkish Communist Party, June 8, 1977, in ibid., June 9, 1977.

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

A demonstration of tens of thousands on September 9, 1975, in Istanbul, organized by the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DISK) and almost all leftist political groups, protests "the repressive attitude of the government against the democratic and social rights of the workers."

— Pictorial Parade.

ation paid only lip service to the legal requirements banning union and political action. With more than 150,000 members, including village teachers in the remotest corners of Turkey, TOB-DER organized militant demonstrations protesting abuses of the rights of the working class. Its often Marxist rhetoric doubtless encouraged the tendency among leftists to slip into violence.[21]

Descent into Disorder

Statistically, it was not until 1976 that political violence became a major problem. In that year, 104 politically-related killings took place, a threefold increase over the previous year. The pace quickened during the 22 months of the Republican-led government in 1978–79, when more than 2,400 such deaths were recorded.[22] And the violence has accelerated still more in 1980 under the minority government of Suleyman Demirel.[23]

While some type of conflict between the Right and Left has been involved in most of these events, the totals conceal at least three quite different forms of violence. The smallest number of political killings have been attributable to tiny, radical leftist, clandestine plotting groups which are the successors to the People's Liberation Army movement of an earlier era. Among the most active of these organizations seem to be, on the one hand, the Armed Propaganda Unit and the Action Unit of the Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and on the other hand, the Turkish

[21] "TOB-DER," *Pulse Supplement* (Ankara), No. 113, Dec. 19, 1975.

[22] For an analysis of the violence, see Serif Mardin, "Youth and Violence in Turkey," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* (Paris), Vol. XIX (1979), pp. 229–54.

[23] Alfred Friendly, "Mounting Political Violence Pushes Turkey Toward Chaos," *The Washington Post*, July 6, 1980, p. C1.

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Workers and Peasants Liberation Army, often labeled Maoist. These largely student-led conspiratorial bodies apparently seek to upset the system and bring down the political order. They have selected high-impact targets to alarm the elite, possibly with the hope of triggering retaliation by the Right and/or intervention by the military to create a climate of disorder from which they might prosper. Before 1979, their main targets appeared to be university administrators and professors. More recently, they have turned on American servicemen and Turkish journalists (though the most sensational murder of a journalist was carried out by a right-wing extremist[24]), as well as members of the Turkish police, the military establishment, and—increasingly—Turkish national politicians.

A much larger number of the deaths resulted from clashes between members of rightist and leftist legal organizations, rather than intentional murders. Members of the TOB-DER teachers' association, the Progressive Youth Association of university students, and the reformed Dev Genç have battled against the commandos associated with the radical right-wing Turkish Nationalist Movement Party. These clashes have typically taken place on university campuses or during public demonstrations on such occasions as May Day rallies. The victims have usually been students or innocent bystanders. These killings have thus lacked the sensational character of the incidents carried out by the secret plotting groups. However, the violence has disrupted the educational process by necessitating frequent university closings and spreading a climate of fear.

By far the largest cause of violence, however, has been more sociological than political in nature—in the form of traditional feuds imported from the countryside to the city and only subsequently garbed in ideological trappings. Rapidly growing urbanization in Turkey created shantytown quarters grouped to reflect the solidarity of origin in common villages or sections of Turkey. After the mid-1970's, these urban groups tended to take on ideological identity, sometimes reinforced by identification with one or another Islamic sect—either Sunni conservative orthodoxy or Alevi (Shiite) heterodoxy. Labor or educational affiliations of leading families in these settlements may also have helped to form such Right-Left cleavages in

[24] Abdi Ipekçi, editor of *Milliyet*, was assassinated by Mehmet Ali Agca, a right-wing terrorist. Agca escaped from military prison in Istanbul several months later, apparently with the help of military personnel. See "Abdi Ipekçi Was Killed," *Hurriyet 1980 Ansiklopedik Yilligi* (Hurriyet's 1980 Encyclopedic Yearbook), Istanbul, Hurriyet Ofset Matbaasi, 1980, pp. 137–40.

A family seeks shelter during the communal rioting that ripped the provincial capital of Kahramanmaraş in December 1978.

—Wide World.

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community consciousness. The resulting rivalries and feuds between family or larger solidarity groups were responsible for large-scale violence, of which the riots of December 1978 in the provincial capital Kahramanmaraş were only the most striking example. This clash between leftist Alevis and rightist Sunnis, which grew out of the shooting of two Alevi teachers, left over 100 dead and led to the imposition of martial law, which continues to this day in most of Turkey's major cities and in the volatile eastern provinces.

Some Turkish observers see yet another major factor contributing to leftist violence—attacks against security forces in the eastern provinces by radical leftist organizations seeking autonomy or independence for the Kurds. The shadowy Kawa society (named for a blacksmith who in bygone times revolted against the tyrannical regime), the so-called Apocu militants organized in 1975, and the group that published the journal *Ozgurluk Yolu* (Freedom Path) are among the main organizations periodically identified as perpetrators of political violence in the east.[25] What little we know about these groups suggests that they differ mainly in the personality of their leaders. In addition to educated elements and others attracted by their philosophy, the Apocus especially appear to have drawn adherents from those who had fallen afoul of the law for nonideological reasons.

Security measures alone have been unable to arrest the spread of violence, fed as it is from such complex sources. Moreover, the police themselves seem to have been divided to a degree between leftists and rightists. The rash of jailbreaks, which increased visibly after the mid-1970's, seemingly reflected the sympathy of some of the security forces for the Left. As one of its first steps, the martial-law administration of Ankara Province moved to reduce this factionalism by

[25] "Disturbances in East Anatolia and Their True Nature," *Hurriyet 1979 Ansiklopedik Yilligi* (Hirriyet's 1979 Encyclopedic Yearbook), Istanbul, Hurriyet Ofset Matbaasi, 1979, pp. 180–81; 15 Groups in the East in Documents and Incidents," *Aydinlik*, June 21–July 11, 1979.

The émigré TCP has encouraged Turkey's Kurds to press only for "regional autonomy," i.e., not seek to secede from the Turkish state. See "Secretary General Bilen's Report to Turkish Communist Party Plenum," Joint Publications Research Service, *West Europe* (Arlington, VA), Report No. 1585, JPRS 75817, June 3, 1980.

Police forces search households in Istanbul in late 1979 in an attempt to quell communal and political violence.

—Camera Press.

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banning leftist and rightist police organizations within its jurisdction.[26]

Martial law disrupted the Left only fitfully. The Turkish Communist Party did not stop its agitation to gain legal status and infiltrate unions and political parties. It even pressed to expand publication of its literature in Turkey, especially through Urun (Product) publishing house, which printed the party program as well as reports of party plenums. According to its Maoist rivals, the Communist Party also formed a Kurdish Bureau to direct propaganda and arms into Kurdish areas of Eastern Turkey.[27]

In the first flush after the Kahramanmaraş rioting, the military commanders closed some of the more extreme publications and banned circulation of others in the martial-law area. That prevented the public sale of radical leftist literature in Ankara and Istanbul, although even some Communist publications continued to circulate. Izmir was subject to no restrictions until after the violence of February 1980, when a sit-in of cotton-yarn workers at a factory of the producers' sales cooperative union brought martial law to that city. But this slowed the active distribution only of those leftist works that were deemed to incite revolution or violence.

At this time, Turkey's Maoists came forward to lay their claim to legal party status. The Turkish Worker and Peasant Party organized by Dogu Perinçek in January 1978 specifically renounced violence. Moreover, the party was so anti-Soviet that it saw some merit in NATO and at a number of points paralleled the positions of the Republicans and the Justice Party. Much of its foreign policy position was devoted to such issues as supporting Pol Pot in Kampuchea against the Heng Samrin regime. Domestically, it focused on "fascism," celebrating what it interpreted as Leninist, Stalinist, and Maoist recipes for confronting this danger.[28] The party's organizers had been jailed for antiregime activities in the 1971 era (some of its members had previously worked alongside Çayan and Gezmiş). While in jail, they apparently concluded that clandestine activities would help only the USSR, which they now accused of stirring up the Kurds and trying to take over Turkey. Because of its strong support of the authorities against disorder and separatism, the new party was able to operate and publish freely under the martial-law government.

The operation of martial law after 1978 (as distinguished from the period between 1971 and 1973) was as much against the Right as against the Left. Nonetheless, the Republican People's Party's involvement in the administering of martial law apparently dissipated some of the support it had received from the extreme Left in the 1977 elections.[29] In the 1979 senatorial elections, the legal leftist parties profited from this backlash against the Republicans. Both the Turkish Socialist Labor Party and the Socialist Revolution Party qualified for participation. The former ran most strongly of all of the leftist parties, garnering 1.3 percent of the Senate vote, while the latter received about half as many ballots, running neck and neck with the revived Turkish Labor Party. Beria Onger, an independent running for the Senate from Istanbul Province, who was endorsed by the émigré Communist Party, got over 20,000 votes, or nearly 2 percent of those cast. Although she fell far short of election, she ran well ahead of the three leftist parties in her electoral district.[30]

Prospects for the Left

Although the Left is clearly recovering from the effects of suppression in the early 1970's, its performance in the 1979 senatorial elections fell short of the high-water mark reached in the late 1960's. Despite some progress in recapturing their old constituency, the leftist parties appear unable to cut significantly into the Republican vote. (It was the rightist and centrist support of the Republican People's Party that was most eroded by the exigencies of coalition rule; the party's left wing appears to have been less affected.)

A major reason for the inability of the Left to do better has been its extreme fragmentation and the absence of an accepted overall leader. The involvement of some leftists in violence may also have reduced the appeal of leftist parties, which right-wing opponents have branded as disloyal and subversive. Moreover, the knowledge that a vote for the tiny parties of the Left would have only protest value may have discouraged would-be voters in Turkey, where much emphasis is put on being on the winning side.

[26] *Milliyet*, Jan. 29, 1979.

[27] See "15 Groups in the East in Documents and Incidents," *Aydinlik*, July 6 and 7, 1979.

[28] See "Let's Unite Against the Reactionary Civil War that Russia and the NAP Are Provoking," in *Turkiye* (Istanbul), March 1979, pp. 37-38.

[29] The TCP now called for "solidarity among the leftist parties and leftist independent candidates . . ." rather than support for the Republicans. See Voice of the Turkish Communist Party broadcast of Sept. 22, 1979, in *FBIS-WEU*, Sept. 25, 1979; and Hasan Şerif, "Truths Behind the Election Results and Figures," *Ilke*, October-December 1979, pp. 57-67.

[30] *Milliyet*, Oct. 15, 16, 1979; *Hurriyet 1980 Ansiklopedik Yilligi*, p. 152; and "Distribution of Votes in Istanbul by County," *Gunaydin* (Istanbul), Oct. 16, 1979.

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Dogu Perinçek (left), leader of the Turkish Worker and Peasant Party, photographed in July 1979 with Turkey's Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel (right) and Başkani Beyhan Cenkçi (center), head of the Ankara Journalist Society. At the Journalist Society, Perinçek attacked Demirel for failing to criticize the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union.

—*Aydinlik* (Istanbul), July 10, 1979, p. 1.

These problems are not likely to be overcome in significant degree in the foreseeable future. Stubborn personality clashes perpetuate the divisions of the Left. The competition that has raged for more than a decade between Aybar and the current leaders of the Turkish Labor Party has left a background of bitterness that cannot be erased. It is unrealistic to expect either Ahmet Kaçmaz or Behice Boran to agree amicably to subordination to the other. And Mihri Belli's independent course no doubt reflects his personal rivalry with the leaders of the Turkish Communist Party.

The deep personality conflicts are reinforced by important differences over principle and tactics. One continuing controversy has focused on the theory and practice of the united front. The Turkish Labor Party's journal *Yurt ve Dunya* (Homeland and World) has ridiculed the Socialist Labor Party's protestations of attachment to the concept of unity, charging it with actually working to sabotage cooperation.[31] Differences over this issue have also split the émigré Turkish Communist Party in two. The Voice of the Workers faction, led by Veli Dursun in London, put forth its own program in 1977 challenging the party's call for a national democratic front. While those advocating such a front initially attempted to compromise with the dissidents, the latter were expelled from the TCP in 1979.[32]

Clearly, the cleavage between the Maoists and the rest of the leftist groups regarding the Soviet Union remains unbridgeable. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 also has generated differing responses. Thus, Perinçek's Turkish Worker and Peasant Party and Aybar's Socialist Revolution Party sharply condemned the Soviets, as did various other leftist individuals and organizations. By contrast, Boran and the Turkish Labor Party made excuses for

[31] Yavuz Unal, "The Unity Question and the TSLP's Concept of 'Unity,'" *Yurt ve Dunya* (Istanbul), July 1979, pp. 7–29.

[32] See "Secretary General Bilen's Report to Turkish Communist Party Plenum," loc. cit.

The Fatherland Front seized this opportunity to taunt the Turkish Communist Party for its "weakness." *"Zayif" Halkasi TKP* (The TCP, the "Weak Link"), Istanbul Kivilcim Yayinlari, 1980, passim.

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the Soviet action. The Turkish Socialist Labor Party came down even more explicitly on the side of the Soviets. Its executive committee justified the invasion as being "within the framework of proletarian internationalism," and warned against new American efforts to conclude "additional imperialistic military plots" in the Middle East. These last two parties, along with such other organizations as the TOB-DER teachers' association, the Revolutionary Youth Association, and various constituent unions in DISK, joined in issuing a declaration in January 1980 defending the Soviet move.[33]

Despite this controversy, the Soviet invasion did not fundamentally discredit the Left in Turkey. Nor has the spread of leftist ideas and dogma, especially among the student population, been materially affected by martial-law restrictions or the ups and downs of factional bickering. Freedom of debate in Turkey is by now quite well established, and literature reflecting schools of thought of almost all varieties is easily available in all major urban centers. Exposure to these political currents begins early in adolescence, and since the mid-1960's a majority of university students have considered themselves "socialists."

It is still far too early to tell what the long-term effects of this exposure will be for Turkish society. Thus far, most of the youthful advocates of leftist approaches have in time come to terms with the existing order. This process has been abetted by the existence of the reformist Kemalist movement, which has provided a natural bridge whereby radicals can be integrated into the traditional structure of political activity. That route appears destined to remain important for the sons and daughters of today's educated elite.

At the same time, the Republican People's Party seems to recognize more clearly than at some times past the need to combat the radical extremists of both the Left and the Right. In part, that recognition grew out of experience in power. Under challenge from leftist radicals, who were unimpressed by the reformist credentials of the Kemalists, the Republican leaders are now agreed on the necessity to support martial law and tough security. The Justice Party is also more than ever convinced of the need for strong action. Thus, the relatively timid approach of governments in the 1960's and the appearance in the 1970's that the Republicans were protecting the Left are not likely to be repeated.

In the current climate, clandestine leftist plotting groups will probably be limited in their operations. They still have a capability to stage occasional disruptive acts against the kinds of targets they have hit in the past. But arrests of their members are continuing, and police work should be able to frustrate at least a significant portion of their activity. Provided that the terrorists can be prevented from carrying out numerous spectacular killings, their ability to shake the body politic seems destined to be limited.

Social violence in which ideology is only an overtone, however, will be harder for the government to handle effectively. The institutionalization of traditional feuding mechanisms in an urban setting has no easy antidote. Economic improvement and decreasing unemployment—neither of which is likely in the short run—may be important in the long-term eradication of this problem. But as long as social conflict garbed in ideological guise continues, the Left will have a place in Turkey's political process far more significant than its numbers would otherwise suggest.

[33] "Professor's Reaction to the Afghanistan Events," *Yeni Forum* (Ankara), Mar. 1, 1980, p. 4; *Politika* (Istanbul), Jan. 15, 1980; and Voice of the Turkish Communist Party broadcast of Jan. 16, 1980, in *FBIS-WEU*, Jan. 18, 1980.

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Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas

By William S. Turley

Few countries have emerged from war more challenged by peace than was Vietnam at the cessation of hostilities throughout Indochina in the spring of 1975. In duration and destruction, relative to size of population and territory, the previous armed conflict had matched any in this century. Even if the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) managed to overcome the effects of war quickly, it would still confront major problems of economic development, as one of the poorest countries in the world.

Nonetheless, the leaders of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) looked forward with optimism to the rapid and peaceful transformation of their formerly divided nation into a united, modern, socialist state. To them—and to many foreign observers as well—this optimism seemed justified, partly because Vietnam was now freer to concentrate on internal development, without fear of foreign intervention or major armed conflict, than it had been since the middle of the 19th century.

A combination of international events and internal difficulties dashed these expectations of the leadership. Although the former delivered the final blow, it was already apparent before the international situation deteriorated sharply that domestic development was not proceeding as smoothly as SRV planners had initially anticipated. Not until 1978 did external factors add much to the economic and administrative distortions, natural calamities, postwar malaise, corruption, and indiscipline that were slowing recovery. External and internal influences became closely intertwined with the worsening of Vietnam's relations with Kampuchea and China (culminating in the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 and the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979) and the failure of efforts to improve relations with non-Communist powers. Though the precise reasons for the return to war may be moot, the Vietnamese leadership perceived it to be unavoidable.[1] In any case, these international events exacerbated the domestic problems, without restoring much of the self-sacrifice, cooperation, and discipline through which the North had prevailed over earlier threats. It then became impossible to continue holding optimistic expectations and necessary to question some of the most important decisions on which the SRV's postwar development had been based. Hanoi thus has been forced to reassess its priorities and lower its sights.

The present article focuses on key internal developments since the VCP's Fourth Party Congress in December 1976. Since that date, the SRV leadership has had to face several dilemmas concerning development strategy, long-standing party commitments, and structural characteristics of a reunified Vietnamese society, that would have complicated postwar development even if the conflicts with China and Kampuchea had not occurred. The party finds itself in charge of a much more refractory society than that which it governed before 1975. In the North, former enemies had obligingly departed in 1954, the party could build upon the significant degree of integration with the population that it had achieved before taking power, and the cleavages within society were weaker than the bonds that held society together. In the South, the party enjoyed no such broad popular consensus behind its rule. Ethnic and religious cleavages were deep. Some groups such as the Hoa Hao sect had long held grudges against the party; highland

Mr. Turley is Associate Professor of Political Science, Southern Illinois University (Carbondale, IL). He has edited Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective, *1980, and has contributed articles on Vietnam to various symposia and to journals such as* Foreign Policy, Pacific Affairs, *and* Problems of Communism.

[1] For an analysis of this background, see William S. Turley and Jeffrey Race, "The Third Indochina War," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1980. pp. 92–116.

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The first session of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in July 1976.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

minorities under the banner of a revived Front Unifié pour la Lutte des Races Opprimeés (FULRO) clung stubbornly to what little autonomy they still had; the well-organized Catholics were dominated by elements that had fled Communist rule in 1954 and presumably were no more enthusiastic about it now than they had been then; and the large Kampuchean and Chinese communities represented potential fifth columns in the event of conflict with neighbors. Some 40 percent of the South's population lived in the cities, where the party's presence had been minimal before 1975 and where the petit bourgeois and commercial classes were much larger than they had been in the North. Self-sufficient peasant freeholders—not tenants, landless laborers, and other natural allies of the party—dominated the rural 60 percent of the population. And of course the sizable proportion of the South's population that had served in the old Saigon government's army or administration, lacking another part of Vietnam in which to take refuge, remained behind. Under such circumstances, the party could hardly expect to enjoy instant universal acceptance, and it has demonstrated an abiding suspicion of at least some former enemies by continuing to hold putatively unreliable elements in "reeducation camps." Some actual opposition plainly exists, though in the absence of conclusive evidence, views may differ as to whether such opposition reflects rejection of specifically Communist rule and objectives. But the exact nature of opposition, particularly whether it is ideological or nonideological, is not really germane to the present discussion, for implementation of the VCP program requires the active, preferably voluntary, participation of the general population. For the VCP, therefore, the central dilemma is constructing a modern socialist industrial state with a minimum of coercion in a context of agrarian poverty and social division.

Key Decisions

For a time after the victory in 1975, the party refrained from making decisions on two issues that it previously had ignored, hedged, or avoided. Its hesita-

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tion was probably due as much to the complexity of the issues and the war's unexpectedly quick ending as to the difficulties of achieving consensus. The first issue concerned whether priority should be given to strengthening socialist institutions or to building the means of production. In ideological parlance, the issue was whether to stress the development of "new relations of production" or of "new productive forces," to emphasize "transformation" or "construction." "Transformation" implied a largely organizational approach to development; "construction," an emphasis on material factors, with incentive policies designed to achieve immediate production increases. During the 1950's and 1960's, this issue had cropped up in party debate in the North on the pace, scope, and methods of cooperativization—which had usually pitted Party Secretary-General Le Duan against fellow Political Bureau member Truong Chinh—until the subject was displaced by war as the center of attention. In 1973, the debate had reappeared in connection with the North's return to recovery and development, and it was being debated right up until the Communist victory in the South in 1975. A compromise then emerged on the need to employ both approaches simultaneously, although in the recovery period some priority for "construction" was necessary. The Fourth Congress described this line as "combining transformation with construction, in which construction is the main aspect."[2] Ambiguities in the statements of some leaders, however, indicated that the matter was not regarded as permanently closed.[3]

In the spring of 1975, the party also turned to the issue of how fast and by what means to transform military victory into political and economic integration. Amid indications that some leaders wanted the South to commence reconstruction separately from the North and to postpone major institutional change until recovery was complete, the Central Committee decided in mid-1975 to move directly toward integration by having the South combine reconstruction with transformation. A national conference on reunification announced this decision in November, elections for a unified National Assembly took place in April 1976, and subsequent statements by top leaders reaffirmed the decision.[4] This approach to integration followed inexorably from the decision to combine transformation with construction in national development policy, because such a decision, by resuming the North's effort to perfect socialist institutions, left no choice but to begin the South's socialist transformation immediately if it were to catch up.

The decisions on these two key issues cleared the way for the first comprehensive national Five-Year Plan (1976–80), which was unveiled at the Fourth Congress at the end of 1976. The plan provided that the South should begin reconstruction and transformation simultaneously, with emphasis on agriculture and light industry. Meanwhile, the North was to recentralize its economy and resume development of large-scale socialist production, including heavy industry. Other significant features of the plan were balanced investment in industry and agriculture, with a focus on industries that served agricultural needs; a gradual shift of investment priority from agriculture to industry as the plan progressed; dependence on foreign aid for more than half of all investment outlays; rapid expansion of export industries and foreign trade; dispersal of population to open vast new tracts of land for cultivation; achievement of agricultural self-sufficiency in the mid-1980's; and projected annual growth of 13 to 14 percent.[5] The long-term goal was the construction of a modern industrial state on a model combining East European and Soviet elements.

Integration of the South

These decisions placed the greatest demand for change on the South, where the party's resources for effecting change were weakest, so it is not surprising that the greatest difficulties should have been encountered there. In one sense, the party had an advantage

[2] "Resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party," *Hoc Tap* (Hanoi), December 1976, p. 27. For further discussion, see David Elliott, "Institutionalizing the Revolution: Vietnam's Search for a Model of Development," in William S. Turley, Ed., *Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 214–15.

[3] In an article published on the eve of the Congress, Nguyen Duy Trinh, for example, used the formulation, "construction is the key factor, and transformation is an extremely important factor"; then he added that "a bias toward either aspect is incorrect." "Determine a Correct Viewpoint, Raise the Capability and Quality of Cadres and Party Members," *Hoc Tap*, September 1976, p. 21. Truong Chinh, speaking at the Congress, uncharacteristically glossed over the issue without declaring either transformation or construction to be "key" or "most important." Radio Hanoi, Dec. 17, 1976, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Dec. 21, 1976.

[4] See Truong Chinh, "Achieving National Unity with Respect to the State," *Hoc Tap*, November 1975, pp. 20–22; Le Duan "All Unite to Build the Unified Socialist Fatherland of Vietnam," ibid., July 1976, p. 20; and Pham Hung, "The South Vows to Commit All Its Spirit and Energy with Compatriots Nationwide to Maintain Peace . . . ," ibid., July 1976, pp. 51–53.

[5] For further details on the Fourth Party Congress, see William S. Turley, "Vietnam Since Reunification," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1977, pp. 36–54.

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that few other revolutions upon achieving power have had—namely, 20 years' experience in administering the North. But this experience was not always directly applicable to the South.

In the countryside in the South, war, revolution, and reform had by 1975 virtually abolished tenancy and created a large class of peasant freeholders. A majority of the southern rural population owned sufficient land and tools to meet the party's criteria for middle peasants. Since local party organs were weak and the restoration of southern agricultural production was crucial to national economic recovery, the party could not afford to antagonize this important group. Until 1977, therefore, the southern system of individual proprietorship was left largely untouched.

At its second plenum, in late June 1977, the VCP's Central Committee issued instructions on the reorganization of agriculture whose main purpose was to set a course toward the institutional convergence of North and South. While the North initiated cooperative management at the district level, the South was to begin setting up pilot cooperatives in late 1977, with a view to establishing "socialist relations of production" by the early 1980's.[6]

In the fall, the Political Bureau created a Committee for the Transformation of Southern Agriculture, chaired by Vo Chi Cong, a Political Bureau member who had been a secret leader in the southern party organization before 1975, and the Bureau issued instructions to organize "production solidarity teams" and "production collectives" as steps toward larger-scale cooperativization. Thus, except in a few localities where large landholdings survived, the transformation of southern agriculture skipped the stage of redistribution of land to equalize wealth and destroy the landlord class that had been so disruptive in the North. The somewhat larger size of cooperatives in the South than in the North at a comparable time also represented a skipping of stages. Although the campaign's ambitions were high, directives stressed the need to secure voluntary participation, to transfer authority promptly to local leaders recruited during the move-

[6] "Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Fourth Party Central Committee," *Tap chi Cong san* (Hanoi), September 1977, pp. 21-23.

Workers photographed in July 1975 in one of the "new economic zones" established by Hanoi in southern Vietnam.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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ment, and to avoid coercion or pressure tactics.[7]

Why did the party embark on this course in June 1977, when party and state institutions in the South were still quite weak? The main objective was to implement earlier decisions on integration and to build economies of scale, as directed by the Five-Year Plan.[8] At least one Political Bureau member indicated that for those who had consistently stressed the importance of transforming the relations of production, the belief that pausing at early stages risked backsliding or at least loss of momentum, as had occurred in the North in 1960, was also a factor.[9]

Over the next year, the campaign yielded uneven results. It certainly had no positive impact on the productivity of southern agriculture, although the shortfalls in output in the South had additional explanations. The region continued to be plagued by adverse weather, and there were other distracting factors such as Kampuchean commando raids, which Hanoi called "deep penetration raids," into some of the most fertile areas of the Mekong delta. According to official claims, these raids during 1977–78 turned "almost all the villages lying along the border of Kien Giang Province . . . into wilderness." Villages in other provinces were affected as well. Some 40,000 persons were said to have been dislocated, leaving more than 100,000 hectares to lie fallow, while the SRV became host to 120,000 refugees from Kampuchea.[10]

In February 1979, Vo Chi Cong, who in the meanwhile had become Minister of Agriculture, was replaced at this post by Nguyen Ngoc Triu, a Central Committee member only since 1976. But as Chairman of the Central Committee Department for the Transformation of Agriculture as well as of the Committee for the Transformation of Southern Agriculture, Cong remained the leading voice on agricultural policy for the entire country.

At a review conference in April on agricultural transformation in the Mekong delta, Cong reported that nearly 16 percent of the land and 18.5 percent of peasant families in this area had been brought into "collective production organizations."[11] In some provinces, these proportions were as high as 30 percent; in others, as low as 2 percent. The difference in rates of progress stemmed from the great variety of local conditions with which the movement had to cope. In localities that had been under the control of revolutionary forces throughout the war, the availability of cadres and favorable popular attitudes made it possible to skip some introductory steps and advance quickly through others to the formation of cooperatives. But where peasants had become habituated to "individual cultivation" or where cadre resources were unavailable, progress was slow. It turned out to be slow, too, in provinces such as Binh-Tri-Thien, where local cadres had put down deep roots in their communities and were reluctant to lead a campaign for change. It also tended to be slow in provinces heavily populated by the Hoa Hao, a religious sect that had resisted the party ever since the late 1940's. "The cooperativization movement," said Cong, "has not yet become popular among the peasants. It has been active only in certain areas and has not yet become wide-spread." If this situation continued, he added, "we are not likely to achieve the goal of basically completing cooperativization activities by 1980."

Whereas in mid-1977 a grand strategy for the political and economic integration of the South had dictated collectivization, concern for the SRV's security now dominated Cong's report. The target date for completion remained the same, but uneven progress in the context of the Chinese threat and the implications of that threat for the SRV's internal stability made the accomplishment of this goal an urgent requirement. It was necessary to push the movement in the South, Cong declared, in order to stabilize production and to organize the rural population for the purpose of strengthening national defense. Collectivization would likewise enhance the capacity of communities to reform and absorb "members of the former puppet army and government and to re-educate bad elements." The sooner southern peasants were collectivized, the sooner they would have a stake in the socialist system and cease to provide "operational bases" for "coun-

[7] For more detailed discussion, see David Elliott, "Vietnam: Institutional Development in a Time of Crisis," *Southeast Asian Affairs 1979*, Singapore, Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), Ltd., 1980, pp. 350–55. The paragraph in the text draws heavily upon this source.

[8] At the Fourth Congress, Political Bureau member Pham Hung, speaking on policy toward the South, noted that the North's earlier accomplishments, combined with peace, independence, and unification, had enabled "the southern provinces to promptly catch up with and match the north in socialism. The economy of our entire country will, by the end of the second 5-year plan [1976–80], have the necessary conditions to be thoroughly unified on the basis of advancing toward large-scale socialist production. . . . In reforming the former economy and building large-scale socialist production in the southern provinces, in the coming years the problem of first importance is to actively reform the former production relations and build new, socialist production relations. . . ." Radio Hanoi, Dec. 17, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 27, 1976.

[9] Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Hold Firm to the Relationship Between Transformation and Construction in Our Country's Socialist Revolution," *Tap chi Cong san*, January 1978, p. 18.

[10] "Communique of the Commission of Inquiry into PRC Aggression," Vietnam News Agency (Hanoi), Aug. 31, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 5, 1979.

[11] Broadcast in installments over Radio Ho Chi Minh City, May 14, 15, 18, and 28, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, May 17, 18, and 31, 1979.

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Workers at an irrigation project on a state farm some 70 kilometers outside of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon).

—Matthew Naythons/Liaison.

terrevolutionary elements." But Cong remained adamantly opposed to the use of coercion to achieve these ends and condemned local party and state organs that had allowed coercion to occur.

The drive to conclude the basic stages of collectivization throughout the South by 1980 involved some tension with the party's commitment to an orderly, voluntary process largely under the supervision of local citizens recruited during the movement. Cadres charged with pushing the movement were bound to feel that they could meet the target only by intimidation or perfunctory efforts. By late 1979, more than 30 percent of peasant households in the Mekong delta and "almost all" peasant households in central Vietnam were reported to have joined production collectives or agricultural cooperatives,[12] but this achievement was marred by "violation of the principles of mutually beneficial voluntariness," "a tendency to resort to drastic administrative measures to force peasants to join collectives," and "hastiness in attaining high results." In reflection of the revived interest of party leaders in boosting agricultural output, if necessary at the expense of ideological purity, "negativism in production" was attributed to poorly conceived incentive policies.[13]

The other sector of the economy in the South that needed integration—commerce—was in some ways an even greater challenge for the party than agriculture. Before 1975, the party organization in the South had never administered any cities, where commerce was concentrated. War and revolution, instead of removing obstacles to socialist-oriented change as they had in agriculture, had only enlarged the classes whose interests were incompatible with socialism. Lacking adequate cadre resources and heavily dependent upon private initiative for economic recovery, the regime had little choice at first but to limit changes to the rounding-up of "comprador bourgeoisie"—i.e., wealthy merchants who had parlayed war-profiteering into sectoral monopolies—and to attempts (largely unsuccessful) to control prices, speculative hoarding, and black marketeering.[14] Only gradually did the state take over construction and transportation, form joint enterprises with the larger manufacturing concerns, organize consumer and marketing cooperatives, and set up shops and distribution under its control. By 1978, these measures had brought a large segment of southern commerce under state management or influence, but an undetermined amount of commerce, primarily in Ho Chi Minh City, remained beyond effective control because of the enterprising efforts of small traders, who were predominantly from the Chinese or "Hoa" minority.

Up to this point, the policy on commerce had been modeled after that carried out in the North in 1954–57, but it had not proved as effective with the South's much larger and more complex commercial sector. Therefore, in March 1978, a "Communique on Private Trade" ordered the complete and immediate abolition of trade carried on by "bourgeois tradesmen."[15]

The communique reiterated charges against private traders that had been made ever since 1975. The continued existence of a sizable free market alongside the socialist one, according to the communique, encour-

[12] Report by Le Thanh Nghi to the National Assembly, Vietnam News Agency, Dec. 25, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 10, 1980.

[13] Speech by Vo Chi Cong at a conference on collectivization in former Mekong delta provinces, broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Sept. 5, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 13, 1979.

[14] For further discussion, see William S. Turley, "Urban Transformation in South Vietnam," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, British Columbia), Winter 1976–77, pp. 607–24.

[15] For the text, see Radio Ho Chi Minh City, Mar. 23, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 27, 1978.

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

A sidewalk "flea market" in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) in early 1978.

—Jean-Claude Labbé/Gamma-Liaison.

aged speculation, black marketeering, and hoarding, to the detriment of price stability and state purchasing operations. Private traders capitalized on shortages to peddle stolen, smuggled, and illicitly manufactured goods; "enriched" themselves; and thus perpetuated inequalities of wealth. Traders corrupted state cadres and then used "this very corruption to denigrate the new regime."[16]

Many traders, especially what the communique called small merchants, were simply individuals with no alternative employment (except in the New Economic Zones in the countryside, to which they were loathe to move) who were trying to make a living within the cracks of an economy of scarcity.[17] But the combined effects of their activities were to thwart state plans, to mock egalitarian ideals, and to undermine popular respect for the socialist system. However constricted the free market, it held potential for the regeneration of capitalism and, by affording peasants an alternative to compulsory sales to the state, undermined the cooperativization campaign then under way.

Private trade was abolished by physical seizures of goods, commodities, and business facilities. The assets of "bourgeois tradesmen" were absorbed by state enterprises, while according to the communique, "progressive bourgeois tradesmen who formerly served the revolution," especially those with technical and professional skills, stood a good chance of finding employment in the state trade sector. "Small merchants" were exempt from expropriation until employment could be found for them—which could mean relocation to a New Economic Zone. The communique implicitly acknowledged that the effects would fall most heavily on one ethnic group (the Chinese) and, foreseeing the international response, warned against conducting the campaign in a way that would leave the regime open to a charge of discrimination:

The city people's committee reminds everyone that the policy . . . will be carried out in a unified manner throughout the city and all southern provinces, regardless of nationality or religion. Our people must remain vigilant against all reactionary plots to distort this policy and to divide our laboring people.

There is little evidence that the abolition of private trade was a deliberate attempt to provoke an exodus of Chinese for reasons of security or racial antipathy. The campaign addressed long-standing problems, it was part of the party's larger strategy of socialist transformation, it was consistent with the objectives and methods of the Five-Year Plan, it implemented important tenets of party doctrine, a Political Bureau resolution in May 1976 and subsequent statements by party leaders had foreshadowed it, and there was precedent for it in the history of the North.[18] Refugee testimony confirms that the campaign was conducted for the most part without discrimination between Vietnamese and Chinese and that Chinese felt more strongly moti-

[16] Ibid.

[17] Since 1975, it was claimed, the number of small traders in the South, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City, had actually increased. Many traders were making a minimal livelihood, and of these, "the majority supported and followed the revolution." Do Muoi, "Push Socialist Transformation of Privately Operated Capitalist Industry and Commerce in the South," *Tap chi Cong san,* May 1978, p. 57.

[18] The campaign to socialize private industry and commerce in the North had been most intense in 1957–58, in conjunction with the parallel movement to collectivize agriculture. By late 1960, 100 percent of private industry, 98 percent of private commerce, 88 percent of handicrafts workers, and 45 percent of all small traders in the North's urban centers had been socialized or drawn into some form of

(continued on page 49)

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Closed shops in the Chinese section of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) in July 1978 after issuance of a government decree limiting private trade.

—Jean-Claude Labbé/Liaison.

vated to leave than did Vietnamese because Chinese feared persecution in the event of war with China.[19] The first major exodus in the spring of 1978 was from the North, not the South, and came in response to war rumors which SRV authorities attempted to still.

Although it anticipated hostile reaction from the West, Hanoi seems to have been genuinely surprised by the intensity with which its avowedly Marxist-Leninist neighbor denounced the abolition of private trade as an anti-Chinese measure. When, after the SRV's admission to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) on June 29, Beijing suspended its US$300-million aid program, the Vietnamese concluded that they had more to gain than to lose by encouraging the departures.

National Economic Performance

The emphasis on transforming production relations, however, ran afoul of poor economic performance. For a time, party leaders blamed economic shortcomings on natural calamities and objective structural defects over which the regime had limited control. They apparently did not believe that the emphasis on transformation was itself to blame, if only because in the

cooperative production. Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Hold Firm to the Relationship," p. 18.

But the campaign had been much easier to execute in the North than it was to prove to be in the South because the cities in the North had been relatively small, the scale of commerce even in Hanoi, primarily an administrative center, had been modest, and the organizational resources had been substantial. Despite this fact, the regime had still found it expedient for both economic and diplomatic reasons to tolerate the private commercial activities, minor black marketeering, and smuggling across the Chinese border by which families in the North's small Chinese community managed to earn significantly higher incomes than average. (The Chinese were also exempt from the draft.) About 1970, however, Hanoi began urging Chinese residents to adopt Vietnamese citizenship, and it sharply accelerated this effort in May 1978, when a simultaneous campaign against corruption caused many northern Chinese to foresee the end of their economic privileges and therefore to flee. On the Chinese in the North, see Charles Benoit, "Vietnam's Boat People," unpublished manuscript, September 1979.

The campaign in the South was if anything behind schedule. At the National Assembly meeting in January 1977, Le Thanh Nghi had said that the "pressing issue" for the South that year was "to rapidly advance socialist transformation in circulation and distribution." Speech to the National Assembly, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, Jan. 17, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 27, 1977. The sharpness of the crackdown in the spring of 1978 was simply a reaction to the failure of preceding measures to make sufficient inroads against the South's private commercial sector.

[19] On these and related points concerning the exodus, see Benoit, loc. cit., and Gareth Porter, "Vietnam's Ethnic Chinese and the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict," paper presented at the 1980 annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, DC, Mar. 21-23, 1980.

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absence of large capital resources they believed they had little choice but to stress an organizational approach. But unremitting difficulties, exacerbated by the conflicts with Kampuchea and China, forced them to reassess certain aspects of this approach in terms of the country's immediate material needs rather than in terms of their long-range development goals.

It was apparent by the Central Committee's fifth plenum in July 1978 that performance in many sectors of the economy would fall short of the Five-Year Plan targets. Speaking to the National Assembly in late December 1978, Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, noted that significant gains in a few areas, sometimes exceeding plan targets, were more than offset by shortfalls in others.[20] Industrial production suffered generally from poor management; from shortages of raw materials, accessories, and energy; and from underutilization of the labor force. In agriculture, the gap between production and consumption had widened rather than narrowed. According to Nghi, the reasons for these disappointing results were the country's weak economic base at the start, the lingering effects of war, economic distortions left by the "neocolonialist regime," the sharpening conflict with Kampuchea over the preceding year, and two consecutive years of bad weather that matched the worst in history. The storms and floods, he held, had been largely responsible for holding food production to 3 million tons below minimum consumption requirements and for reducing cattle herds by 20 percent.

In these circumstances, Hanoi had little choice but to revise its priorities for the remainder of the plan period in favor of agriculture, although the basic methods and many objectives of the plan remained intact. This revision of priorities must have been accepted with chagrin by leaders who had hoped that investment capital could be shifted from agriculture to industry as the plan progressed.

[20] Report by Le Thanh Nghi to the National Assembly, Vietnam News Agency, Dec. 23, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 23, 1979, Supplement.

A Vietnamese casualty in the fighting along the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border in early 1978.

—Jean-Claude Labbé/Gamma-Liaison.

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

Le Thanh Nghi (second from right), Vietnam Communist Party Political Bureau member and then Chairman of Vietnam's Planning Commission, meets with Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin (far left) in Moscow in July 1978.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

By the end of 1979, the situation had grown worse. Capital construction was slowing down, despite the fact that only 281 out of 774 "key and high priority projects" had been completed since 1976. Owing to construction delays, many nominally finished projects were operating at a fraction of capacity and returning little or no capital.[21] A year-end report on industrial production noted that gross industrial output in 1979, showing the effects of destruction, diversion of resources, and loss of foreign aid and supplies caused by the conflicts with Kampuchea and China, was just equal to what it had been in 1978. (Nevertheless, this source indicated that industrial output had been expected to decline, suggesting the leaders' willingness to bear even more serious costs to sustain their international policies.)[22]

The problems of agriculture were still more grave. Le Thanh Nghi, again citing the seemingly endless cycle of drought and flood as the main source of difficulty, noted that production of foodstuffs had increased only 19.5 percent since 1975, even though that had been a year of low output and since then an additional 1.1 million hectares had been brought under cultivation.[23] An editorial in the party organ *Nhan dan* confirmed that the deficit in foodstuffs was continuing to run at 3 million metric tons a year and that per capita food consumption had declined.[24] In fiscal 1978–79, the SRV imported 2.1 million metric tons of foodstuffs from the Soviet Union alone.[25]

Coming at a time when by Hanoi's own admission the country had "too little foreign exchange to pay our creditors," these procurements severely limited purchases of supplies and capital goods desperately needed for development in all sectors.[26] The entire economy seemed on the verge of lapsing into worse poverty and dependency.

Circumstances no longer permitted the revision of plan goals downward without questioning of the plan's basic premises. Organization and incentives now had to share responsibility with weather and war for bad performance. The international situation, too, was a

[21] Editorial, *Nhan dan* (Hanoi), Dec. 18, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 21, 1979.

[22] Radio Hanoi, Dec. 26, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 2, 1980.

[23] Report by Le Thanh Nghi, Vietnam News Agency, Dec. 25, 1979, loc. cit.

[24] *Nhan dan*, Oct. 9, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 11, 1979.

[25] Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), Oct. 11, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 11, 1979.

[26] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Oct. 10, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 16, 1979.

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factor in the setting-aside of long-term objectives in order to meet the immediate need for production increases. The overriding importance of defense was underscored when General Vo Nguyen Giap, rather than Premier Pham Van Dong, presented the government report to the National Assembly in May 1979.[27] All aspects of economic development, said Giap, had to be subordinated to national defense. It was necessary to "race against time" during peace to "accelerate economic construction" for this purpose.

In agriculture, the focus turned to the inability of the state grain-purchasing system to extract adequate supplies from rural areas to feed the urban population, workers, and the troops then in Kampuchea or defending the northern border.[28] The system worked poorly because peasants had little motivation to produce more than they could consume. Lacking consumer goods to buy with the proceeds of surplus production, peasants turned what surplus they did produce into alcohol, hog feed, and sales on the black market. The leadership could have recommended strengthening the extractive apparatus or using force, as the Soviet regime had done during the period of War Communism, but such an approach was beyond the state's capacity, especially in the South, and would only have shifted the hardship from city to country without increasing output. It followed that a solution had to be found in the revision of incentives and the removal of obstacles to individual initiative and circulation of goods.

This solution emerged from the sixth plenum of the Central Committee, in the summer of 1979. The plenum focused on the "unnecessary confusion" in the local handicrafts and consumer goods industries owing to excessive haste in the recent past to bring them under centralized state management, and emphasized the need to mobilize all productive forces in addition to those already socialized.[29] "If," the resolution said, "some type of state-produced goods can now be better produced and developed by the handicrafts and artisan industry and private capitalists, they must be boldly assigned to the latter. The organizational forms of production must not be fixed." The resolution in effect halted further socialization of these sectors and revised supply, marketing, and banking procedures so as to stimulate private production. One of the first steps taken to implement the resolution was to remove the control stations set up earlier throughout the South to check "dishonest merchants."[30] The stations, manned by poorly trained, sometimes overzealous, and often corrupt cadres, had impeded the flow of goods and stirred popular resentment.[31]

By removing the stations and in other ways stimulating the production and circulation of consumer goods, the government sought to "buy" the agricultural output it could not obtain by organizational means alone. The approach invited comparison with Lenin's New Economic Policy, despite significant differences of context (the SRV was still at war, and most of its economy was already collectivized).

Condition of the Party

There is probably no doubt in the minds of SRV leaders that their problems could be more successfully addressed by organizational means if the party were not, from their point of view, in so poor a condition. Not long after the war ended, the party press began to report widespread corruption, avoidance of responsibility, indiscipline, bureaucratic detachment, resort to oppressive techniques, and general inefficiency among cadres at all levels.[32] These difficulties have persisted in spite of a succession of campaigns attacking them.

Many problems have resulted from poor training, unfamiliarity with peacetime priorities, and organizational distortions left by war. Another cause of difficulties has been the predominance in leadership and management ranks of older cadres who are set in their ways, who lack sufficient technical training to carry out the new tasks assigned by the Five-Year Plan, and who, owing to past sacrifices for the revolution, are now often weak, sick, and absent from their posts. "In not a few central and province level organs," it was reported in early 1978, one half to one third of the leadership and management cadres would be eligible for retirement in three to five years.[33] At lower levels, there has been a decline in morale, motivation, and ethics that has eroded interpersonal solidarity and damaged the bases of trust and cooperation. Accord-

[27] Broadcast in installments over Radio Hanoi, May 29–31, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, June 5, 1979, Supplement.

[28] *Nhan dan*, May 23, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, June 5, 1979.

[29] Sixth VCP Central Committee Plenum Resolution, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Oct. 9 and 11, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 12 and 16, 1979.

[30] Radio Hanoi, Aug. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 9, 1979.

[31] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Sept. 13, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 20, 1979.

[32] Campaigns against such faults commenced with an emulation movement and anti-bureaucracy drive in late 1976. See the Premier's directive on the emulation movement, Radio Ho Chi Minh City, Dec. 21, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 29, 1976; and the Premier's directive on the anti-bureaucracy drive, Radio Ho Chi Minh City, Dec. 22, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 29, 1976.

[33] Le Duc Binh, "Gradual Replacement of Leadership and Management Cadres," *Tap chi Cong san*, February 1978, p. 54.

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ing to an article in *Tap chi Cong san* in October 1979, "Communists loved and protected one another of necessity during the war," but "a number of individuals" found this mutual devotion difficult to sustain when they shifted to peacetime administration.[34] Such individuals tended to become "divorced from reality and the people," "degenerate and debauched," and more concerned with competition for "profits and social titles" than with cooperation for the common good. Furthermore, cadres whose careers had stagnated while they had languished in the jails of the non-Communist government in the South were jealous of comrades whose careers had experienced no such interruption.

It was inevitable that cadre problems would be most severe in the South. There the supply of locally recruited cadres was shortest, the demands on the administrative structure were heaviest, the justifications for violating procedure seemed strongest, and the opportunities for corruption were greatest. The intractability of these problems was evident in the decision of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Council in December 1979 to launch still another campaign against "negativism, bureaucracy, officialism, thievery, bribery and . . . oppression of the masses. . . [,] sabotage . . .[,] speculative hoarding, smuggling and hooliganism."[35] In promulgating this decision, the council revealed that some cadres at "high echelons" had intervened to obstruct proceedings against corrupt individuals, while others had "persecuted their denouncers." Collusion among cadres at all levels to cover up each other's thievery, bribery, and extortion was a major obstacle to correction.[36] And there was fear that the contagion would spread as the South took its odd revenge: "Because of the 'interaction' between the two parts of our country, the vestiges of the blatant practice of bribery left behind by the neocolonialist system in the southern society have invaded the North."[37]

One of the party's principal problems in the South has been its relatively small size there. Party membership probably was not more than 200,000 at the war's end and in mid-1978 stood at 273,000, about 1.3 percent of the South's population.[38] This figure contrasted with a total party membership at the time of the Fourth Congress of 1,533,500, or 3.13 percent of the total population. Northern membership was then about 6.3 percent of the North's population.[39] The small size of the party organization in the South was attributable to combat deaths, assassination, imprisonment, and the difficulty between 1965 and 1975 of finding people who were willing to risk such fates among that portion of the population that was susceptible to mobilization.

It was this condition of limited party membership that required Hanoi to send large numbers of northern party and state cadres to the South in 1975. But the assignment of personnel (and some "regroupees" of Southern origin who had lived in the North since 1954) could only be a stop-gap measure, as it depleted resources needed in the North and risked a backlash in the South. Nonetheless, the Fourth Congress stressed the need to recruit cautiously, because of unfavorable social conditions.[40] The peasantry was not yet collectivized, even poor peasants and farm laborers were still dominated by the "small-producer mentality," and the intelligentsia was overwhelmingly bourgeois. Thus, there was fear that "reactionaries and spies" would infiltrate the party.

To southern cadres, these guidelines must have seemed to legitimize the prejudices that they held against that part of the population which in their view had been implicated in the effort to exterminate them. Recruitment of new members proceeded very slowly because these cadres tended to disqualify candidates on the basis of extremely tenuous connections to the old Saigon government, citing the "complex" situation to justify elaborate screening procedures and impossibly high standards for political reliability. According to an article in the party theoretical journal in 1978, potentially valuable assets such as "the former regime's scientific and technical cadres and intellectuals" were going unexploited.[41] The effect of denying membership to anyone who had had any connection whatsoever with the former government, the journal pointed out, would be the permanent underdevelopment of the party organization in the South because "very few families did not have one or more of their members in the puppet army and administration."

Throughout the country, the party has suffered from

[34] Trong-Nghia, "Comradeship," ibid., October 1979, pp. 76–79.

[35] Radio Hanoi, Dec. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 11, 1979.

[36] Official SRV sources have reported trials of cadres for corruption, and a recent inmate of Ho Chi Minh City's Chi Hoa prison has claimed that "most of the prisoners are bureaucrats of the present regime accused of accepting bribes." Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), May 10, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 13, 1980.

[37] Phan Lang, "Practice of Bribery," *Tap chi Cong san*, March 1980, pp. 68–71, translated in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 16, 1980.

[38] Elliott, "Vietnam," p. 358, citing Alexander Casella in *Foreign Policy* (New York, NY), Spring 1978, p. 72, and *The Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 18, 1978.

[39] Speech by Le Duc Tho at Fourth Party Congress, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, Dec. 17, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 23, 1976.

[40] Central Committee Political Report, Part II, as conveyed by the Vietnam News Agency, in *FBIS-APA*, Supplement, Vol. 2, Dec. 27, 1976, p. 9. See also Le Duc Tho's speech at the Congress, loc. cit.

[41] Nguoi xay dung (pseud., "The Builder"), "Relationship," *Tap chi Cong san*, November 1978, pp. 93–95, translated in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 4, 1979.

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disorganization, inadequate education levels, neglect of the preparation and recruitment of new members, and failure to weed out substandard members. To try to restore the party to health, the Central Committee Secretariat in May 1979 announced a campaign to intensify party development work. The campaign was to culminate in a general review and requalification of members, i.e., a purge, extending into 1980.[42] Although this and related pronouncements drew a parallel with the campaign to recruit a "Ho Chi Minh class" of party members in 1970, the present campaign seems more systematic and far-reaching.

As the Secretariat observed in launching the campaign, many hamlets, factories, military units, and schools, especially in southern and mountainous regions, still lacked party chapters. The unevenness of the party's geographic and functional distribution translated into uneven performance in the implementation of orders.

The party also suffered from chronological unevenness, the result of "massive recruitment" in one period (the party doubled in size from 1965 to 1975) followed by "sluggish recruiting" in the next.[43] According to *Tap chi Cong san*, "very many" basic-level party organs had failed in the preceeding 10 years to recruit a single new member, and in some localities upwards of 70 percent of these organs had conducted no party development work.[44] The result, in the words of the Secretariat's directive, was an "inordinately high average age of party members." Actually, the problem was not so much the high average as the extreme shortage of members in the 18 to 30 range, which meant that the party soon would have difficulty replenishing its mid-level and leadership ranks with selected, experienced people.[45] This was a problem to which veteran but otherwise unqualified senior members had contributed by "obstinately holding on to their positions, . . . obstructing the party's efforts to absorb new vitality from society."[46]

Another kind of unevenness was the underrepresentation of important groups. Workers (*cong nhan*) accounted for only 8.8 percent of party membership; ethnic minorities, 9.6 percent; and women, 17 percent.[47] Now that national independence and reunification had been achieved, it was time to erase the legacy of largely peasant-based struggles and to make the VCP a party of the proletariat in more than rhetoric.

And finally, there were elliptical references to party members who were "very courageous . . . in one struggle" but "cowardly or corrupt in a new one."[48] These pointed to the singular lack of enthusiasm for the conflicts with China and Kampuchea among members who, after lifetimes of war, had found peace congenial.

The Secretariat directed that party chapters be established in all basic-level organizations of society by the end of 1980. Recruitment of new members was to give priority to people who had been active in revolutionary movements during the war, to people in the South and mountainous areas, and to youth, women, and ethnic minorities. Special effort was to be made to recruit people between the ages of 18 and 30 who were technical workers in factories, members of cooperatives or production collectives, military personnel, or students in colleges and vocational schools.

The Secretariat further directed that all existing members be evaluated for political awareness, functional competence, and motivation, and, if found unfit, be reeducated or ejected from the party. Even "key cadres" were to be "decisively removed" if they were found to "have committed errors."[49] The review process was completed in late 1979, and members who passed review began to receive membership cards on the party's 50th anniversary, February 3, 1980. (This was the first time in the party's history that it had used the device of distributing new cards to all qualified members to effect a purge.) Card No. 000001 was issued in memoriam to Ho Chi Minh, No. 000002 went to Le Duan, and No. 000003 to Truong Chinh.[50]

Some indication of how many members may be dropped when this process is completed in late 1980 appeared in a report in April 1980. In the nearly 12 percent of all party organizations then finished with the campaign, "more than 80 percent of the members . . . were declared as qualified for receiving party membership cards."[51] During the first quarter of 1980, almost 70 percent of the new members were from military party organizations, and more than 90 percent were 30 or younger.[52]

[42] Radio Hanoi, May 25, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, May 25, 1979.

[43] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, June 8, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, June 12, 1979.

[44] Editorial, "Pay Attention to Developing the Party and to Perfecting and Consolidating the Party's Organization," *Tap chi Cong san*, July 1979, p. 2.

[45] In many party committees (*dan bo*) where this was reported to be a problem, the average age was from 40 to 42, sometimes higher. Ibid., p. 3.

[46] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, June 8, 1979, loc. cit.

[47] "Pay Attention to Developing . . . ," p. 6.

[48] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, June 8, 1979, loc. cit.

[49] Central Committee Secretariat directive, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, May 25, 1979, loc. cit.

[50] Radio Hanoi, Feb. 3, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 6, 1980.

[51] Radio Hanoi, Apr. 20, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 24, 1980.

[52] Radio Hanoi, May 5, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 6, 1980.

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Hoang Van Hoan, then a member of the Political Bureau of the Vietnam Workers' Party, renamed the Vietnam Communist Party in December 1976, shown at the 11th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in March 1976.

—EUPRA.

The Intraparty Debate

The foregoing developments could not have occurred without provoking debate within the party; they also held potential for exacerbating its divisions. While there were already signs of a variety of frictions at the Fourth Congress, no party source has mentioned debate on the issue upon which it was obviously most difficult to achieve consensus—namely, the strengthening of ties with the Soviet Union at the risk of confrontation with China.[53] Subsequent evidence suggests that some leaders refused to be reconciled with the majority position. Political Bureau member Hoang Van Hoan, a former ambassador to China, was divested of all his party posts, and four other former emissaries to the People's Republic of China (Ly Ban, Ngo Minh Loan, Ngo Thuyen, and Nguyen Trong Vinh) lost their seats on the Central Committee. Three individuals with links to the minorities that straddle the China-Vietnam border (Chu Van Tan, Le Quang Ba, and Tran Dinh Tri) also were dropped from the Central Committee.

Opposition to the international line did not completely subside, however, as events following the fifth plenum in July 1978 made clear. By this time, the SRV had joined CMEA, China had suspended aid to the SRV, the final decision to invade Kampuchea had been reached, and Hanoi was about to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. The movement toward confrontation was irreversible. Yet editorials still inveighed against unnamed "bourgeois nationalist" elements within the party who, under the influence of "opportunists and reactionaries in the international revolutionary movement" (i.e. China), had strayed from the true path of proletarian internationalism.[54] China was "opportunistic" and "bourgeois nationalist" because it went so far in pursuing its national interests, in opposition to the world revolution led by the Soviet Union, as to seek a tacit alliance with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. "Opportunists" and "bourgeois nationalists" in the VCP obviously were party members who refused to accept one or a combination of the following: the growing dependence on the Soviet Union, the forcible overthrow of Pol Pot, the confrontation with China, and the alienation of non-Communist neighbors.

The charge against this internal opposition was the most serious that could be made. One editorial, naming three "traitors" during the French colonial period, noted that "no party engaged in revolutionary struggle has ever been able to avoid losses and betrayal by some people" and that a party "often has to leave behind or discard weak elements incapable of enduring trials or bent on giving up or betraying the cause."[55] Thus, it was apparently felt necessary to suppress the still strong dissent with the threat of a purge.

A year later, Hoang Van Hoan deplaned at Karachi while en route to East Berlin and took the "Kissinger Trail" to Beijing, where he issued a lengthy rebuttal to Hanoi's charge of Chinese duplicity. Shortly thereafter, Ly Ban, Tran Dinh Tri, Le Quang Ba, and Chu Van Tan

[53] In retrospect, Le Duc Tho's references at the Fourth Congress to "great power chauvinistic tendencies," "selfish nationalism," and "arbitrary patriarchy" in passages discussing the party's commitment to proletarian internationalism and traditions of unity appear to have been veiled attacks on members of the party who resisted this trend. See his speech to the Congress, loc. cit.

[54] See especially *Nhan dan*, Aug. 1, 1978, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Aug. 1, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 2, 1978; *Nhan dan*, Aug. 2, 1978, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Aug. 1, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 2, 1978; and "Proletarian Internationalism and Bourgeois Nationalism," *Tap chi Cong san*, September 1970, pp. 35–40.

[55] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Aug. 4, 1978, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Aug. 3, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 8, 1978.

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were reported to have been placed under house arrest.[56]

As the fifth plenum in July 1978 sought to impose unity on international issues, it also had to deal with the reappearance of dissent in domestic politics. From party commentary at the time, it appears that this dissent arose from the inability of many party members to adjust to new peacetime roles and from economic difficulties that provided these members an opportunity to vent their grievances against the party's choice of a development model. The core of the dissent was in the large proportion of party members who had been recruited during the "national democratic" phase of the revolution (pre-1954 in the North and pre-1975 in the South), who were accustomed by experience in that phase to be "bourgeois patriotic" and were lacking in class consciousness, and who were mostly of rural, often middle-peasant, origin. Such cadres were inclined to "overemphasize the role of the peasantry and to deny the leadership of the working class,"[57] or to hold the "counterscientific concept that the poorest social class is the most revolutionary one and that the communist party is the party of the poor and landless peasants."[58] These views led many members to misinterpret or even deliberately subvert directives on building the dictatorship of the proletariat, centralizing management under the "people's collective mastership," distributing income according to labor, and proletarianizing the party. Clinging to "utopian" and "pseudosocialist" fantasies, they preferred an agrarian road to socialism over the established line on developing industry, a long-range goal from which the leadership refused to swerve despite existing difficulties.[59]

While these issues highlighted the domestic tension between the party's origins in largely peasant-based revolutionary struggles and the peacetime priorities of socialist industrialization, they were entwined with the debate over the international line. Criticisms of overemphasis on the role of the peasantry appeared alongside attacks on "traitors" and suggested parallels with Chinese—or, more specifically, "Maoist"—

Key figures in the Vietnamese government in early 1980: from left to right, Interior Minister Pham Hung, Premier Pham Van Dong, and Defense Minister Van Tien Dong.

—Jean-Claude Labbé/Gamma-Liaison.

positions that had long been discredited within the party. Although some members may have seized upon economic difficulties to intensify objections to the development model, the party majority obviously sought to stigmatize dissent with a Chinese association. It is inconceivable that the current purge is not intended in part to remove members who oppose or weakly support the anti-China line and the long-term development strategy aimed at shifting the nation's center of gravity from agriculture to industry and from peasants to workers.

The terms of debate shifted, without significantly affecting the tensions discussed above, when the sixth plenum made changes in economic policy in 1979. These changes, it will be recalled, softened some of the emphasis on socialist transformation that had been quite marked since the acceleration of cooperativization in 1977 and the abolition of private trade in the South in 1978. While the modifications undoubtedly pleased individuals who believed priority had to be given to increasing production by whatever means worked, these modifications were opposed by those who remained dedicated to transforming production relations first. One might think that, given the circumstances, no cadre could persist in advocating the liquidation of any productive potential, but public explanations of the plenum resolution made clear that

[56] Nayan Chanda, "A Massive Shock for Vietnam," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 10, 1979. But note that Chu Van Tan spoke on "the settlement of nomads and the training of ethnic minority cadres" at the National Assembly meeting of Dec. 28, 1978. Radio Hanoi, Dec. 28, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 23, 1979, Supplement.

Hoang Van Hoan was sentenced to death in absentia for high treason by the Supreme People's Court in June 1980. For the court communique, see Vietnam News Agency, June 26, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, June 27, 1980.

[57] *Nhan dan*, Aug. 1, 1978, loc. cit.

[58] *Nhan dan*, Aug. 2, 1978, loc. cit.

[59] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Aug. 5, 1978, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Aug. 4, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 8, 1978.

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opposition existed. "It is wrong," *Nhan dan* editorialized, "to regard the sideline family economy and the other private activities . . . as the tail of capitalism, to oppose them to the interests of socialism and to seek ways to reduce or prohibit these activities."[60] Similarly, overstress on psychological as opposed to material incentives was criticized:

Any tendency to regard attention to individual material incentives as inconducive to the working masses' revolutionary zeal is erroneous. On the contrary, completely ignoring the workers' economic interests while emptily calling for revolutionary zeal is nothing more than the manifestation of an extremely dangerous kind of voluntarism.[61]

Thus, between the fifth and sixth plenums, the weight of opinion in the leadership shifted from emphasizing socialist transformation to emphasizing immediate production increases at some cost to ideological purity, but support for this shift was not universal. No doubt this issue will be an important agenda item when circumstances permit a return to the earlier order of priorities.

Leadership Changes

In most Communist countries, developments as complex and divisive as those which the SRV has experienced since 1976 would lead to major changes of leadership as a matter of course, and there is good reason to believe that the Vietnamese, no longer facing a threat to national survival and now nearing a generational succession, will not continue to be immune to such changes. For the moment, however, the remarkable solidarity of the top leadership (which the singular Hoang Van Hoan affair served only to affirm) provides a foundation of stability and continuity, regardless of shuffles in responsibility or rank. The Political Bureau apparently still practices a consensual style of decision-making, and alignments within the Bureau evidently still shift depending on the issue. In analyzing the SRV leadership, therefore, it remains essential to avoid assumptions about dichotomous factions, misleading labels for presumed ideological tendencies, and hasty conclusions. Furthermore, it is necessary to be cautious about imputing specific policy positions to individuals or drawing relationships between policy and personnel shifts, because in the SRV's constricted policy process interpersonal accommodation often supersedes diametrical opposition. The interpretation of leadership changes in the SRV must assume this process is complex and fluid yet held together by traditions of consensus and incrementalism among top leaders.

Early 1979 brought the first leadership changes of any consequence since the Fourth Congress in 1976, in the form of several new appointments in the SRV Council of Ministers.[62] About the same time, there was speculation that so-called "pro-Soviet hard-liners" led by Le Duan were in the ascendancy and that the "moderate" Premier Pham Van Dong was about to be shunted aside by "promotion" to the Presidency, making way for Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap to become Premier and for Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung to replace Giap at Defense.[63] The massive cabinet reshuffle announced in February 1980 seemed to confirm this prediction.[64] General Giap relinquished his post as Minister of Defense, which he had held continuously since 1946 except for one brief interlude, but he remained a vice-premier and very active in important state affairs. Dung was duly promoted to Minister of Defense.

But speculation about future shifts and the motives for them should be regarded with skepticism. Pham Van Dong remains Premier (his position since 1955) without any decline in status, and though the death of Ton Duc Thang on March 30, 1980, left the Presidency vacant, the current Acting President and former head of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, Nguyen Huu Tho, could stay in this position as a symbol of regional solidarity.[65] Moreover, General Giap seems an implausible candidate for the premier-

[60] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Sept. 27, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 4, 1979.
[61] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Sept. 24, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 28, 1979.
[62] Nguyen Ngoc Triu replaced Vo Chi Cong as Minister of Agriculture, Huynh Tan Phat became Chairman of the State Commission for Capital Construction, and Nguyen Tuan Tai succeeded Hoang Van Kieu as Minister of Afforestation, freeing Kieu to replace Le Quang Ba as Chairman of the State Commission for Nationalities. Vietnam News Agency, Feb. 24, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 26, 1979. Only the substitution of Kieu for Ba, one of the men reportedly placed under house arrest in connection with the debate over policy toward China, had clear political significance.
[63] Derek Davies, "Carter's Neglect, Moscow's Victory," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 2, 1979, pp. 16-21.
[64] Vietnam News Agency, Feb. 7, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 8, 1980.
[65] An alternative "promotion" that some analysts have hypothesized is that Dong might receive the chairmanship of the State Council that will come into existence upon promulgation of the new constitution. (For the draft version of the constitution, see *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 21, 1979, Supplement. Recent indications suggest that the final version will contain some minor modifications when it appears in the near future.) However, the Council in effect will supplant the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, an organ that Truong Chinh, ranked second in the Political Bureau, just ahead of Dong, has chaired since 1960 and managed to use as a base of influence. If Dong is named Chairman of the Council, the problem then would be to compensate Chinh, who could make his own claim to the Council chairmanship.

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A Vietnamese military delegation in Moscow on March 11, 1977: from left to right, Le Trong Tan, then Deputy Chief and now Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN); Soviet Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov; Vo Nguyen Giap, then Vietnamese Minister of Defense; Le Quang Hoa, then Deputy Chief of the Main Political Department of the PAVN; First Deputy USSR Defense Minister N.V. Ogarkov; Soviet Air Force Colonel General G.P. Skorikov; and First Deputy USSR Defense Minister V.G. Kulikov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ship, because of his personality and because of latent fears within the leadership of Bonapartism.[66]

If these shifts do occur, the top leaders' consciousness of their mortality may play a larger role than differences over policy. Signs of a desire to groom successors were evident at the Fourth Congress, and the subsequent policy shifts have been made without disturbing party ranks. Moreover, the age factor grows inexorably in importance. With the 12 most senior Political Bureau members averaging 70 years of age and differing in age by only seven years, there is good reason to make way for younger men by "promoting" elder statesmen. Trying to explain the specific shift mentioned above in terms of age, however, is somewhat dubious. While Dong at 74 is the oldest of the senior leaders, he is only two years older than Party Secretary-General Le Duan. Giap, at 68, is one of the youngest of the top leaders. (See Table 1.)

The February 1980 cabinet changes affected 19 people altogether. One potentially significant change was Vice-Premier Pham Hung's appointment as Minister of Interior to replace Tran Quoc Hoan. Hoan had held the post since 1953. This change may have come about as the result of the Ministry of Interior's inability to cope effectively with several internal security problems, especially the stubborn dissidence of ethnic minorities in southern central Vietnam. Certainly, Pham Hung, a southern-born leader who headed the southern party organization from 1967 to 1975, focused attention on security in the central highlands immediately upon taking office. But official Vietnamese sources claimed Hoan's health was the primary consideration.[67]

Another suggestive cluster of changes involved the State Planning Commission. In all, five men lost or gained positions in the Commission. The longtime chairman, Le Thanh Nghi, and his assistant, Nguyen Huu Mai, were removed from their posts; Vice-Chairman Nguyen Lam was promoted to the chairmanship; and two men of essentially "technocratic" persuasion were named vice-chairmen. These changes may have reflected disenchantment with Nghi, but it is noteworthy that he presented the government's economic report to the National Assembly

[66] A volatile and brusque individual, Giap does not enjoy such broad trust among his colleagues as Dong. For a somewhat fanciful account of intraelite maneuvers that focuses on Giap's political ambitions, see the interview with a former major in the SRV intelligence services by Jean-Louis Arnaud in *Le Matin* (Paris), Oct. 17 and 27–28, 1979.

[67] Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), Apr. 1, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 1, 1980.

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Table 1. Members of the Vietnam Communist Party's Political Bureau and Their Responsibilities

(as of June 1980)

	Position in central party organs			Position in the central government			Other positions
(Year of birth)	Secretariat of the VCP	VCP Central Committee Dept. headed	Central Military Party Committee	N. Assembly Standing Committee	Council of Ministers	National Defense Council	
Full members							
Le Duan (1908)	Secretary-General					Member	
Truong Chinh (1908)		Legislation; Research on Party History		Chairman		Member	
Pham Van Dong (1906)					Premier	Vice-Chairman	President, Central Committee for Educational Reform
Pham Hung (1912)					Vice Premier; Minister of Interior		
Le Duc Tho (1910)	Member	Organization	Deputy Secretary				
Vo Nguyen Giap (1912)			Secretary		Vice-Premier	Member	
Nguyen Duy Trinh (1910)	Member					Member	
Le Thanh Nghi (1911)	Member[a]				Vice Premier	Member	
Van Tien Dung (1917)			Deputy Secretary		Minister of National Defense	Member	
Tran Quoc Hoan (1910)	Member[a]					Member	
Le Van Luong (1910)							Secretary, Hanoi Party Committee
Nguyen Van Linh (1913)	Member						President, Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions
Vo Chi Cong (1912)		Agricultural Transformation			Vice Premier		Chairman, Committee for Transformation of Southern Agric.
Chu Huy Man (1920)			Deputy Secretary; head, Control Committee				
To Huu (1920)		Science and Education					Vice-President, CC for Educ. Reform
Alternate members							
Vo Van Kiet[b] (not available)							Secretary, Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee
Do Muoi (1910)					Vice-Premier		Chairman, Central Committee for Transformation of Industry and Trade

[a] Nghi and Hoan recently have ceased to be cited as members of the Secretariat and may have been dropped from it. See Vietnam News Agency (hereafter, VNA), June 20, 1980, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), June 20, 1980; and VNA, June 20, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, June 25, 1980.

[b] VNA, May 21, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 22, 1980, referred to him as a full Political Bureau member, but so far there has been no other report which would confirm this promotion from alternate member.

SOURCES: VNA, Dec. 15, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 21, 1978; VNA, Aug. 25, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 29, 1979; Radio Hanoi, Feb. 19, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 21, 1980; name list of state funeral committee for President Ton Duc Thang, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, Mar. 30, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 31, 1980; report on memorial services for President Ton Duc Thang, Radio Hanoi, Apr. 3, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 3, 1980; and VNA, May 21, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 22, 1980.

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in December 1979 and has continued to speak on development policy. Moreover, the new appointees have not articulated any major modifications of long-range goals or strategy.

Health quite likely was a factor in the departure of Nguyen Duy Trinh from his posts as Minister of Foreign Affairs and vice-premier. Trinh was replaced by Nguyen Co Thach, who already had taken over many of Trinh's duties the preceding year as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, attached to the Premier's Office. Trinh also may have wished to return to party organization work in connection with the campaign to rebuild the party.

Other changes in the state structure involved mainly exchanges of portfolios. What significance they might have is even more speculative.

In the army, Giap's departure and Dung's promotion opened the position of Chief of the General Staff for Le Trong Tan, a Soviet- and East German-trained professional officer who had been deputy commander of armed forces in the South for much of the war against the United States. Tan also was promoted to the rank of colonel general at this time. Chu Huy Man, Tan's political officer in the final campaign of the war in the South and head of the Army's General Political Directorate since the Fourth Congress, was accorded the rank of senior general, equal in status to Giap, Dung, and Hoan Van Thai.[68]

Though it may seem such sweeping changes should have important political implications, the foolhardiness of inferring much from them is evident in the fact that few parallel changes occurred in the party. The order of precedence in the Political Bureau (as shown in Table 1) remains the same as it was at the Fourth Congress, except that Van Tien Dung has leapfrogged over Tran Quoc Hoan. To Huu and possibly Vo Van Kiet have been promoted from alternate to full membership.[69] The political ambiguity is underlined by the case of To Huu. Though made a full Political Bureau member and vice-premier in February, he was replaced by Hoan Tung, the editor of *Nhan dan*, as Chairman of the Central Committee's Propaganda and Ideological Education Department and apparently no longer occupies the seat on the Secretariat that he held at the Fourth Congress. Likewise, Le Thanh Nghi, no longer Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Tran Quoc Hoan, no longer Minister of Interior, both won seats on the Secretariat subsequent to the Fourth Congress, and may still hold them. At the level of the Central Committee, it is equally difficult to determine the precise significance of reassignments of party responsibilities.

About the only patterns that can be discerned in the foregoing leadership changes (and a few others at lower levels, not discussed here) are the gravitation of power toward leaders who are likely to give consistent support to the policies of Le Duan. Advances also were made by leaders who had key roles in the planning and execution of the war for reunification. Since Le Duan was perhaps the most persistent advocate among top party leaders of forcible reunfication, there is a great deal of overlap between the two groups. It is not inconceivable that a mutual regard built up among those men while they were jointly arguing for particular strategies during that war has become mutual support in postwar politics. If these observations are justified, they point to consolidation rather than erosion of support for the basic principles enunciated at the Fourth Congress. Thus, they indicate continuity rather than change in the fundamentals of both international and domestic policy.

The Future

Despite adjustments such as those adopted at the sixth plenum, the VCP remains committed to the construction of a modern, industrialized socialist state based on adaptation of the post-1960 East European and Soviet models. It will revise its priorities to reflect this commitment as soon as conditions permit. This long-range goal implies, internationally, continuing dependence on the Soviet Union and therefore confrontation with China; and, internally, favorable prospects for the emergence of new leaders from the ranks of the professionally trained and technocratically oriented.

To the extent that departing leaders are successful in arranging their replacement by people from this background, the flexible, rational bureaucratic, and revisionist tendencies in Vietnamese communism will be further strengthened. But it is inevitable that some new leaders will also emerge from the ranks of cadres whose careers matured in the struggle for reunification. The two groups are by no means incompatible, as many individuals who fulfill the first description can be found in the ranks of the latter, but there is more diversity in the origins and qualifications of VCP members now than at any time in the party's past. One change that is bound to flow from the transfer of power to these groups is a shift from leadership by the sophisticated, cosmopolitan "mandarin proletarians"

[68] Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), Jan. 31, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 31, 1980.

[69] Ibid., and Vietnam News Agency, May 21, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 22, 1980.

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who founded the party or joined in the 1930's to leadership by individuals of somewhat more parochial experience from lower-class, provincial backgrounds.[70]

These facts cannot help but affect the political process in the future, probably in the direction of greater turbulence than has been customary for this very stable, unified party. Reflection on this prospect probably lies behind the apparent ambivalence of top leaders about whether they should step aside for younger men at the upcoming party congress (in late 1980, if held on schedule) and direct the transition from honorific posts, or should retain firm control.

Regardless of the individuals or generations in power, the SRV for the next several years will confront much the same sort of dilemmas that it has faced since the Fourth Congress. Principal among these is how much emphasis should be placed on socialist transformation, when the virtual certainty of continuing economic dependence and external threat must focus attention overwhelmingly on the need for production increases. Against the argument that reorganization of production is the only viable means for the SRV to lay the foundations of development, present conditions require that ideological prescriptions be leavened with flexibility. But the latter approach lengthens the road to socialism. A related dilemma involves the difficulty of reconciling the commitment of party leaders to pushing transformation no faster than the population will tolerate, on the one hand, and the social divisions and malaise, especially in the South, that inhibit building popular consensus on the matter, on the other. The temptation to resort, in the name of national security or the socialist utopia, to coercion, or to tolerate it on the part of harried cadres, must be ever present. The ways in which the VCP resolves these dilemmas will leave lasting marks on the character of the Vietnamese revolution.

[70] "Mandarin proletarians" refers to the progeny of upper-class Confucian scholars and imperial bureaucrats who had led earlier generations in resistance to French rule. Such individuals dominated the founding generation of the Indochinese Communist Party. See Alexander B. Woodside, *Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam*, Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976, pp. 201–45.

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Books

Political Participation and the Soviet System

By D. Richard Little

JAN S. ADAMS. *Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union: The People's Control Committee.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

THEODORE H. FRIEDGUT. *Political Participation in the USSR.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

ARCADIUS KAHAN and BLAIR A. RUBLE, Eds. *Industrial Labor in the USSR.* Elmsford, NY, Pergamon, 1979.

DAVID LANE and FELICITY O'DELL. *The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social Class, Education and Control.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

MURRAY YANOWITCH, Ed. *Soviet Work Attitudes: The Issue of Participation in Management.* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, and London, Martin Robertson, 1979.

IN HIS ACCOUNT of his life as a dissenter and frequent inmate of Soviet penal institutions, Vladimir Bukovsky relates a remarkable instance of participation in the Soviet political system.[1] A number of incarcerated dissidents reacted to a 1975 governmental decree ordering political prisoners to be put to work along with criminal inmates, by launching a letter-writing campaign from their cells. Within two years, this campaign resulted in the rescinding of the decree and the dismissal of several prominent officials. In the land of democratic centralism and mobilizational politics, the success of Bukovsky and his outcast friends in opposing the system through legal channels reminds us once again of the complexities involved in the relationship between Soviet citizens and their government.

On the one hand, no people is more actively involved in governmental activities than the Soviet population. They regularly cast ballots for millions of legislative candidates who assemble in parliamentary bodies (soviets) to vote on bills proposed by the government and party, they belong to a huge variety of social and political organizations which have public functions, they write letters to elected officials expressing complaints and suggestions for public action, and they attend countless public meetings convened to discuss political issues.

On the other hand, the authoritarian nature of the Soviet political system seems to deprive these activities of much real significance beyond the symbolic legitimation of the regime. There is no record of a soviet at any level ever having rejected a government proposal, much of the "popular participation" is formalistic, and the underlying power of the Communist Party leadership to have its way is indisputable.

Still, it is true that much of the leadership's power has been devoted over the years to promoting not only obedient mass compliance with party policies but the enthusiastic involvement of citizens in the generation, implementation, and verification of those policies, always of course within strictly defined limits. What this has produced in the Soviet Union may be "participation" of a sort, but it is not what Americans and most Europeans mean by that term. Soviet participation does not involve the citizenry in the selection of leaders, in the definition of major policy objectives, or in public opposition to those objectives. It is not, therefore, the participation of "citizens," as Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba have defined

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[1] Vladimir Bukovsky, *To Build a Castle—My Life as a Dissenter,* New York, NY, Viking, 1978.

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that term,[2] but a different kind of relationship, one that has proved difficult for Western observers to grasp and conceptualize.

The books under review have, in different ways, addressed themselves to this task, and they reflect some of the major points of disagreement on the subject. There is a wealth of detailed analysis in the works, much of it based on extensive personal interviews. This is especially true of the volumes by Jan Adams and Theodore Friedgut, which treat in a definitive way the participation of citizens in, respectively, the people's control commissions and organizations associated with local soviets. The book edited by Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble is a collection of conference papers which are on the whole of high quality and which blend well into a coherent and broad-based study of industrial labor in the Soviet Union. The work by David Lane and Felicity O'Dell provides a synthesis of recent Soviet and Western research on the Soviet industrial labor force. It portrays the impressive extent to which Soviet scholars have delved into environmental and attitudinal aspects of the working class and summarizes a good deal of useful information. The collection of six Soviet essays brought together by Murray Yanowitch provides a brief overview of the evolution of Soviet thinking about some aspects of the labor problem. These are nicely integrated in his introductory essay.

THE COLLECTIVE importance of these works lies mainly in the empirical evidence they offer for addressing the complex issue of popular participation in the Soviet Union. They are particularly informative in regard to types of citizen involvement which are not widely practiced in Western countries but which encompass great numbers of Soviet citizens. These types include "control," administrative support, and job-related initiatives.

The control function is the subject of Adams' study of the people's control commissions, which enlist 9.5 million citizen inspectors in a wide variety of activities. They are part of an even larger "public compliance system," which includes 13 million activists attached to soviets or serving as soviet deputies, 10 million trade union inspectors, and more than 4 million Komsomol *prozhektory*. These 36.5 million public inspectors amount to 22 percent of the adult population of the country, and this figure does not include the membership of newspaper inspectorates and a large assortment of smaller, specialized volunteer associations. Adams concludes that "it is likely that one out of every four or five adult citizens participates in some form of public control activity, and this places the citizen inspector in almost every area of economic and social life in the Soviet Union today" (p. 139). The general function of these "citizen inspectors" is to ensure that government and party policies are efficiently and honestly carried out, but as Adams makes clear, they perform other functions as well, involving inputs to policymaking and planning, processing of citizen demands, and socialization.

A second major citizen activity is direct administrative efforts which supplement the work of paid administrators. "The Druzhiny," says Friedgut in his excellent study of political participation, "are a civilian extension of the militia; the house and block committees have functional links to the housing administration in terms of maintaining residence registration and rent

[2] *The Civic Culture*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company, 1965.

Reviewers in This Issue

D. RICHARD LITTLE—Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University (San Diego, CA); editor of *Liberalization in the USSR*. 1968; contributor of articles on Soviet politics to various symposia and journals such as *Slavic Review*, *Soviet Studies*, and *Legislative Studies Quarterly*.

ROBERT M. SLUSSER—Professor of History, Michigan State University (East Lansing, MI); author of *The Berlin Crisis of 1961*, 1973.

HANS H. BAERWALD—Professor of Political Science and Vice-Chairman of the Council on International Comparative Studies, University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA); author of *Japan's Parliament: An Introduction*, 1974, and essays on Japanese electoral politics in *Asian Survey*.

VLAD GEORGESCU—International Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution (Washington, DC); author of many works on Balkan and Romanian history, including *Politics and History: The Case of the Romanian Communists* and *The Rise of Balkan Nationalism*, both forthcoming.

DENNIS REINHARTZ—Associate Professor of History and Russian, University of Texas (Arlington, TX); contributor to *Slavic Review*, *Problems of Communism*, and other journals; and author of a forthcoming literary biography of Milovan Djilas.

JONATHAN D. POLLACK—Staff Member of the Social Science Department, Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, CA); coeditor and contributor, *Military Power and Policy in Asian States*, 1980; author of *Security, Strategy, and the Logic of Chinese Foreign Policy*, forthcoming.

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records; volunteer staffs attached to clinics help carry out the nonmedical and paramedical work of the clinics" (p. 286). Bernice Madison, in the Kahan and Ruble volume, describes the work of 2.3 million "social insurance representatives," who are elected at general meetings of union groups to assist in the administration of public health and medical care programs. "The delegaty visit union members in their homes and in hospitals; they see to it that the children of the disabled are properly cared for, at home or through placement in day-care centers and institutions; and sometimes they shop and clean house for incapacitated members" (p. 95).

While such undertakings no doubt have some of the characteristics of voluntary participation, it is difficult to distinguish the activities of volunteers from those of their paid counterparts in the bureaucracy. As Rensselaer Lee (in Kahan and Ruble) states, many volunteers "duplicate the assigned responsibilities of some of the overburdened factory administrative offices. In this respect, the mobilization function is less a corrective of formal administration than an extension of it" (p. 121). Nevertheless, they do fulfill some of the regime's participatory goals since "member workers increase their awareness of the technical environment of the enterprise," and thereby "increase their participation in changing this environment . . ." (p. 121).

The third major category of volunteer activity is work directly related to one's job, work which in the American industrial environment would not be viewed as social participation but as a normal activity of employment. The main organizations established to promote this kind of activity are the Society of Inventors and Rationalizers (VOIR) and the Scientific-Technical Societies (NTO), which are described in the Lane and O'Dell volume. While "innovation" is purportedly the major purpose of these organizations, the main activities in practice are providing on-the-job technical training for workers, organizing interbrigade competition for greater productivity, and stimulating worker suggestions for improving the efficiency of machines, production lines, and the quality control of products. The two organizations together have a total membership of nearly 14 million, and their activities are heavily promoted by economic and party officials. While there is obvious economic gain involved, Lane and O'Dell argue:

> *For the Soviet authorities the value of such organizations is as much in providing psychological satisfaction as in economic gain. They have the effect of developing a sense of active participation in the system and attempt to make work more fulfilling for many workers.* (p. 33)

ALL OF these activities involve Soviet citizens in governmental affairs in ways that are not widely practiced in Western democracies. Whether such activities constitute genuine participation in the political system is a matter about which various authors are in sharp disagreement with each other. In addressing the issue, much of this research exhibits a disappointing degree of conceptual vagueness. In every one of the books, virtually all activities of workers are referred to as "participation," and only Friedgut defines the concept in empirically useful terms. Evidence of the involvement of public organizations, trade unions, and collectives of various kinds in reviewing and "approving" policy proposals tends to be offered as proof of participation in policymaking, without clear distinctions being drawn between the legal rights of organizations and their political effectiveness. This is especially true in regard to two fundamental issues: whether the involvement of Soviet citizens is really voluntary, and whether such involvement significantly affects the policy decisions of the top leadership.

Friedgut argues that a citizen's involvement should be considered participation only if it is a voluntary act, which he distinguishes from compulsory acts, "the nonperformance of which draw[s] state-invoked coercive sanctions as distinct from social pressures" (p. 18). But he accepts the Soviet definition of "voluntary" as those acts which are "unpaid and performed (at least theoretically) in addition to the citizen's professional employment . . ." (p. 20). In this sense, all members of mass organizations are "volunteers," since there is no statutory requirement that citizens belong.

Data from other studies make this conclusion unacceptable. For example, Lee, in the Kahan and Ruble volume, reports a Soviet survey that revealed that "a minority of members—one-fourth of the technical staff, two-fifths of the workers —participate by choice" in union activities. For the rest, such involvement amounts to "an involuntary extension of the working day" (p. 126). Adams cites no specific figures regarding the "voluntary" nature of participation in the people's control commissions, but she suggests that in addition to "thousands, or hundreds of thousands" of committed, enthusiastic inspectors, there are probably millions who are disinterested and bored (p. 184). The "voluntary" character of the latter group's activities is highly questionable.

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Despite the dubious nature of Friedgut's use of the term "voluntary," the term does have applicability to the Soviet context. The mobilization character of the political system does not prevent many citizens from choosing not to become involved in mass organizations, even when doing so may generate official pressure and unofficial penalties. The Lane and O'Dell study of industrial workers offers persuasive data showing that some of the most heavily promoted collective activities fail to attract many workers. Although the VOIR and NTO together contain nearly 14 million members, a recent Soviet study indicated that 90 percent of unskilled workers and 37.7 percent of skilled workers never participate in these organizations (p. 33). Another study revealed that "participation in some form of social work (such as Komsomol, trade union or club activity) included 64% of the workers on a 'practically always' basis, while 28% 'rarely' participated and 9% 'never' did" (p. 34). In a survey of 10 different Soviet studies of sociopolitical participation, Stephen White (cited in Lane and O'Dell, p. 35) concluded that the average level of participation for technical staff was 67.7 percent and for manual workers, 35.37 percent. Clearly, both technical and manual workers have a choice in the matter, and many choose not be become involved.

Soviet researchers in recent years have also attempted to assess worker attitudes toward participation, with interesting results. Lane and O'Dell cite one study that found that 11 percent of the workers surveyed believed that it was "completely unnecessary" to take part in the administration of production, while 44 percent "said that they did not see the necessity for such participation by everybody . . ." (p. 35). A survey of worker participants in "permanent production conferences" in the Urals showed that less than half of them thought their participation had any significant effect on the efficiency and quality of production (p. 36). In the Yanowitch volume, several Soviet authors attempt to relate the incidence of worker participation to attitudes toward work, with positive results. N.I. Alekseev, for example, finds strong correlations between, on the one hand, the frequency of participation in discussions on production methods and, on the other, the degree to which workers find their jobs interesting and satisfying (pp. 92-93).

These studies make clear that despite the incessant urging of officials and the media, many workers choose not to participate in public organizations and activities. Many others participate reluctantly and indifferently, preferring to avoid unpleasant pressures by contributing a half hour or so a week to public service. And no doubt many participate with enthusiasm and conviction. To a considerable extent, the decision appears to rest with the individual and to impart to the participatory process an important voluntary character.

THE MORE fundamental question is whether these types of participation have any significant effect on policymaking. Most of the authors reviewed here have moved beyond the simple distinction between policy formulation and policy implementation, often applied to the Soviet process, to a view of policymaking as a continuous process of addressing long-term problems. Adams especially has recognized decision-making as:

. . . an interlinking series of decisions, in which the partial realization of past decisions provides the premises for new decisions. The degree of implementation of past decisions therefore becomes an input into future decision-making. To the extent that the work of the inspector alters policy outcomes—to the extent that it reduces the "distortion in application of Soviet policy"—it alters the conditions for ensuing decisions in this endless process whereby old policy outcomes are converted to new policy inputs. (p. 195)

Jerry Hough, in his analysis of policymaking related to wage differentiation in industry (in Kahan and Ruble), goes a step further in arguing that the trade unions have actually exercised political power in advocating a more egalitarian wage policy, a policy which "has been adopted against the advice of leading economists, industrialists, and top officials in the State Committee for Labour and Social Questions" (p. 387). In fact, he states that "all Soviet written sources and all persons who were interviewed insist unequivocally that no governmental agency can take an action that touches on labor relations without the approval—'the second signature' — of the appropriate trade union" (pp. 382-83), a conclusion he cites without disagreement.

This conclusion is rejected by other authors. Ruble (in Kahan and Ruble) argues that while trade union committees may play an instrumental role in protecting workers' rights, "a significant number of factory union and management officials tend to overlook the juridical rights" when those rights conflict with other ends, such as increased production (p. 79). In a work not reviewed here, Mary McAuley has concluded that trade union actions are essentially determined by party policy and not the independent interests of the workers or the

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unions. "There is no evidence," she states, "that the trade union leadership adopts a different attitude on, for example, wage questions from that of the government's State Committee on Labour and Wages or of individual ministries. (And incidentally, personnel seem to move between posts in the State Committee and top trade-union jobs quite naturally.)"[3]

Regarding the role of the VOIR and NTO in protecting the rights of workers to their inventions and innovations, Lee (in Kahan and Ruble) points out that "in the real world of Soviet enterprise, bureaucratic violations of authorship rights are common, and except in flagrant instances, go unpunished" (p. 123). Furthermore, these two organizations are, according to Lee, dominated by engineering-technical personnel who are directly subordinate to plant management: "In the case of VOIR, workers make up a little over 50 percent of the membership; however, well over 90 percent of the leadership positions are held by engineering-technical personnel." In general, he maintains, the staffs of these and other control agencies "do not, except in rare cases, exist apart from the enterprise collective" (p. 126).

Hough concedes that the adoption of trade union positions on the wage issue by the party leadership "may simply have been a coincidence between Politburo and trade union views" (p. 387), caused by conditions unrelated to the policy objectives of the unions. In fact, as other authors point out, there are persuasive reasons for believing that the apparent success of the trade unions on this issue was heavily, if not totally, dependent on economic and political conditions that might well have determined the Politburo's policy regardless of the unions' advocacy. Lane and O'Dell, for example, stress the importance of structural characteristics of advanced industrial systems as prime determinants of wage scales, personnel policies, educational requirements, and authority structures. Kahan (in Kahan and Ruble) argues that "the strongest impetus toward income equalization during the last decades" (p. 296) has been a demographic factor:

The phenomenon of large families among low-earning, low-skilled workers is fast disappearing. The extreme of per capita income inequality was taken care of by those who suffered most. Their response was to have fewer children, and thus ensure a relatively higher income level to the diminished number of their family members. (p. 297)

Hough himself cites the regime's sensitivity to worker unrest in Czechoslovakia and Poland and an eagerness to prevent a similar phenomenon in the Soviet Union as a factor in moving the Politburo toward greater wage equalization (p. 397). Likewise, Alex Pravda (in Kahan and Ruble) attributes the regime's increasing attention to worker benefits and working conditions to a serious problem of rapid job turnover in industry (p. 337). This approach has long been advocated by unions and by academics, but the regime's recent willingness to move in such a direction seems more easily explained by the desire to solve the problem than by the importunings of interest aggregations.

Academics, like trade unions, are credited by Hough with considerable influence on policymaking. "The scale of scholarly participation in the Soviet policy process," he states, "is enormous" (p. 378), and he cites as an example the Institute of Labor, which employs some 280 research associates and is attached to the State Committee for Labor and Social Questions. No doubt the Institute is an important source of analysis and policy recommendations for officials in the State Committee, but it is also true that the policy positions of academics often find little support among top decision-makers, without which their ability to affect policy decisions is practically nil. In the introduction to his anthology of Soviet articles on participation in industrial management, Yanowitch identifies a number of policy positions representing the strongly held views of prominent academics. Yet he concludes that "none of the findings or proposals included in the studies collected here (or in any other studies that I am aware of) have been translated into institutional changes that would redistribute managerial authority and reduce the enduring barriers between those who plan and control the enterprise's operations and those who execute its work assignments" (p. xiii). Whatever changes along these lines the regime may decide to make, he suggests, are likely to result from evidence that they will improve productivity rather than from advocacy by academics or trade unions.

Whether the Politburo is really listening to the unions, the control commissions, and the myriad other organizations that involve the mass public is very difficult to know, and the present volumes do not, and probably could not, resolve the issue. But one fact seems clear from the works reviewed here: These organizations seem to have established their right, even duty, to speak for the interests of their members. If they also promote

[3] Mary McAuley, *Politics and the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Penguin, 1977, p. 247.

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party policies—which they obviously do—and are thus part of the overall mobilization mechanism of the regime, they often appear to find, or at least seek, ways to harmonize the objectives of the party and the interests of their members. The advocacy by the trade unions of reduced wage differentiation, in contradiction to the position of many academics and economic leaders, clearly serves the interests of the wage earner against those of management. And since this is an ongoing issue, the union's position is obviously an input to the policy-making process, not merely a matter of implementation.

Nevertheless, the limits on effective participation are also clear and give no indication of a basic change in the authoritarian, mobilizational nature of the Soviet system. There is no evidence that the party leadership's ability to go either way on the wage issue, for example, is constrained by any forces other than the anticipated success or failure of either policy in stimulating economic growth.

IT REMAINS to consider, therefore, whether there is any real manifestation of popular participation in the factors contributing to that success or failure. Friedgut raises this point in alluding to the failure of some TVA programs in the United States because of "officials who failed to create a desire for solution of local problems among the population of a particular area" (p. 18). A Soviet working class that is unmotivated to contribute to greater productivity may effectively nullify policy decisions of the highest political authorities. Friedgut quotes Teodore Shanin as arguing that "enormous numbers of government decrees and orders all over the world have been voided of effect by the peasant's spontaneous, stubborn, and silent non-fulfillment" (p. 18). If Kahan is correct in attributing the falling birth-rate among Soviet urban families to the low wages earned by industrial workers, it is not unreasonable to argue that these families are challenging the Politburo's wage policy and succeeding in forcing a new policy of diminished wage differentiation on that august body, a policy for which the trade unions can take very little credit.

This is surely participation in policymaking, but of a peculiar type. It is, first of all, unorganized and unrepresented by any existing unions, committees, or collectives. The decision to have fewer children, to be frequently late for work, to abandon defective machinery rather than attempt to repair it, to move restlessly from job to job, or to fail to show up for evening classes, is purely an individual decision which nevertheless has important consequences for the party's ability to establish realistic and achievable policy goals.

Second, such actions present the regime not with countervailing power, as is often implied in studies of union and other organizational activities, but only with alternative policy choices, concerning which the regime must weigh the cost, as related to the success of the policy, of failing or refusing to accommodate the interests of the working population.

Third, the effects of this kind of participation are gradual and long-term, rather than focused in time and circumstance. And it depends to a considerable extent on how much, and for how long, the workers are willing to endure the consequences of refusing to cooperate with a powerful and determined party leadership. It is worth remembering that Bukovsky and his friends did not win their struggle with the leadership merely by writing letters. They also endured severe deprivations and punishments from officials and engaged in a desperate hunger strike before the regime finally caved in.

This is political participation in a genuine and determined sense. But it is not the participation of citizens or organized groups interacting in legitimate ways with decision-makers on the basis of shared power. That kind of participation in the Soviet Union is still in a primitive state of development.

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The USSR and Western Europe

By Robert M. Slusser

RICHARD PIPES, Ed. *Soviet Strategy in Europe.* New York, NY, Crane, Russak & Co., 1976.

GEORGE GINSBURGS and ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, Eds., *Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

EBERHARD SCHULZ, Ed. *Die Ostbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Von nationalstaatlicher Politik zu gemeinsamer Verantwortung* (The Relations of the European Community with the East. From National-State Policy to Common Responsibility). Vienna, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1977.

A.W. DEPORTE. *Europe Between the Superpowers. The Enduring Balance.* New Haven, CT, and London, Yale University Press, 1979.

CHRISTOPH ROYEN. *Die sowjetische Koexistenzpolitik gegenüber Westeuropa. Voraussetzungen, Ziele, Risiken* (Soviet Coexistence Policy Toward Western Europe. Assumptions, Goals, Risks). Ebenhausen, Haus Eggenberg, 1977.

RENATA FRITSCH-BOURNAZEL. *L'Union Soviétique et les Allemagnes* (The Soviet Union and the Germanies). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979.

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH. *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany.* Cambridge, MA, and London, MIT Press, 1978.

THE SOVIET invasion of Afghanistan marked a decisive turning point in Soviet foreign policy. For the first time, strategic military considerations were allowed to outweigh all other factors in the setting of Soviet medium- and short-range goals. The clear implication was that the spokesmen for the military and their civilian allies on the Politburo had been able to put through a decision which radically changed the relationship between the Soviet Union and other nations in the international system.

Although it was not overtly directed against Western Europe, the invasion carried grave implications for that part of the world. It put the Soviets in a strong position to dominate Iran and the Persian Gulf and thereby to threaten the vital flow of Middle East oil to West European industry. Less direct but more ominous were the long-term implications. If a majority in the Politiburo now felt free to launch aggression against an independent nation outside the European theater, what might it not be tempted to do in Europe itself, where the stakes were far higher?

For the nations of Western Europe, therefore, the invasion constituted an urgent call for a reassessment of their relations, individual and collective, with the Soviet Union. Conditions which had grown familiar through usage could no longer be depended upon to continue indefinitely; a new and unpredictable element had been added to the calculus of Soviet foreign policy behavior. Thus, the invasion, coming as it did at the end of December 1979, had the effect of transforming the 1970's from an ongoing present into part of the historical past. Analysis of that past might help cast light on the opportunities and dangers of the new phase which was emerging, but it could no longer claim to define them within reasonably precise limits.

The books under review constitute a significant part of the rich and varied literature on Soviet–West European relations which has appeared in recent years. With all their divergences of approach and focus, they present a coherent picture of a relationship which for a time seemed to possess the attributes of long-term stability. Now that that stability can no longer be trusted to endure, one reads these books with sharpened interest, searching for clues to the seismic shift which has taken place in the formulation and execution of Soviet foreign policy.

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TWO OF the books under review—those edited by Richard Pipes and by George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein—are the products of collective research efforts undertaken to explore the Soviet-West European relationship in a variety of aspects. We may begin our survey with the Pipes volume because it predates the other (it reflects research undertaken in 1974, while the Ginsburgs-Rubinstein volume is the outcome of a conference held in October 1977) and because it is broadly conceived and wide-ranging in its coverage. The tone of the volume, set at the outset by the editor, is uncompromisingly harsh in its evaluation of Soviet motives. Not surprisingly for a distinguished historian of prerevolutionary Russia, Pipes finds evidence of a continuity between the foreign policy of the USSR and that of Imperial Russia. In his view, there is an organic link between the internal political base of both policies and their strategic objectives, centering upon an unswerving dedication to continuous expansion.

By far the most disquieting contribution to the Pipes volume is that by the well-known British expert on Soviet military affairs, John Erickson. Differing from Thomas W. Wolfe in the same volume, Erickson finds that Soviet military potential in Europe has grown steadily, to the point where it "seems to defy the strictly rational" (p. 206). Soviet levels of force in Europe, he argues, are "now [i.e., 1974] well past purely defensive requirements" (p. 206). Coupled with Western Europe's increasing tendency "to ignore the military factor," this has created a situation, in Erickson's opinion, where "Europe may well become that 'low-risk' option that will suit the Soviet command perfectly" (p. 207).

Erickson thus raises the specter of the ultimate Soviet threat to Western Europe—direct military action. As the world now knows, however, it was another "low-risk option," namely Afghanistan, that caught the fancy of the Soviet leadership.

The essays in the Ginsburgs-Rubinstein volume help cast light on the background of that decision. The editors of the volume announce at the outset their concurrence in Erickson's estimate of Soviet power in Europe. "The sustained Soviet military buildup and deployment of conventional forces in Europe," they write, "has proceeded far beyond what might be presumed necessary for a secure defense or effective deterrent against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) . . ." (p. 3). Finding scant evidence, however, of an intention on Moscow's part actually to use its preponderant military force to conquer Western Europe, the editors suggest that its purpose is rather to implement "a Soviet strategy of neutralizing Western Europe" (p. 4). Its goal, in other words, may be to produce "the ultimate form of neutralization," i.e., "Finlandization" (p. 5). Helpfully, Ginsburgs and Rubinstein provide a seven-point checklist of attitudes and policies characteristic of a country which has been "Finlandized," the most cogent of which is the first, "responsiveness in foreign policy to Soviet preferences." The implications of this analysis are driven home in the following essay, by Ginsburgs, which dissects the Soviet concept of neutralism and shows how it has come to incorporate "some of the basic principles that determine Finland's status" (p. 36).

Against this background, half a dozen specialists assess the extent to which the concept of "Finlandization" is applicable to individual nations in Western Europe. Perhaps to the surprise of the editors, the answer in almost every case turns out to be "little or none." The closest approximation to the "Finlandization" model is probably Austria, but even here the analyst, Konrad Ginther, reaches the conclusion that Austria's accommodation of its foreign policy to the Soviet concept of neutrality "has not affected the intrinsic substance of the country's independence as a pluralistic democracy nor has it divested Austria's foreign policy of an identity of its own" (p. 82). With regard to France, Robert Legvold contends that "if Finlandization is a steady slide toward neutralism and bondage to the sensitivities of the Soviet Union, France is not a candidate and is even less a victim" (p. 100). In the case of West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany—FRG), Angela Stent Yergin rules out the alteration of FRG policies through fear of Soviet military power "as long as the FRG has American protection" (p. 129). In Britain, according to Elizabeth Young, the tendency toward "neutralism à la Russe" (Ginsburgs' felicitous expression) is concentrated on the left wing of the Labor Party, but Young believes that while it would be a mistake to rule out the possibility of this group's victory in national politics, a development along these lines is by no means inevitable and can be headed off by better understanding and coordination of policies between London and Washington. As to Norway, C.G. Jacobsen finds that the elaborate Soviet military and naval buildup in the Kola Peninsula "has not sapped [Norway's] will nor . . . her determination" (p. 176). Even Finland itself, the prototype for "Finlandization," fails to fit the Ginsburgs-Rubinstein model, according to George Maude, who

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maintains that "Finland's constitutional democratic system has been strengthened" as a result of its wartime defeat by and postwar relations with the Soviet Union (p. 61).

Granted that each of the authors cited finds some degree of accommodation to Soviet wishes in the policies of the West European nations surveyed, the general conclusion is unmistakable: the Soviet Union's enormous military buildup in Europe has not produced a commensurate payoff in the form of adoption by the principal nations of Western Europe of policies tailored to Soviet wishes or demands. This conclusion serves to highlight a methodological weakness in the concept of "Finlandization" which merits attention. If "Finlandization" is a process designed to produce certain effects in the policy of a nation through the application of various forms of pressure, then the perceived merits of particular means will likely affect the choice of means by the nation applying the pressure—the Soviet Union. It is here, in all likelihood, that one should look for the root cause of the increasing Soviet emphasis on military power. More than 60 years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet leaders have seen their hopes for the extension of their system around the globe through nonmilitary means dwindle and die. From the early postrevolutionary expectations of a wave of Marxist-oriented revolutions in Europe to Nikita Khrushchev's unfulfilled prophecies that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States in basic indices of production by 1980, the Soviet leaders have had to defer or abandon their hopes for a decisive breakthrough on a world scale. World War II taught them that military power was an indispensable tool for the enlargement of their system, and the conflicts of the cold war, from the Berlin blockade to the Cuban missile crisis, reinforced the lesson by demonstrating that, lacking supreme military power, the Soviet Union could not achieve its objectives in a test of wills with the United States. Alternate means—for example, pressure through trade or the use of national Communist parties in the West—have proven unsatisfactory.

The Soviet leadership's response to this realization took the form of a dramatic change in personalities and style, with the overthrow of Khrushchev in 1964 and a significant increase in military spending, formalized at the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1966.

WHAT OF the supranational organizations which have been established in Western Europe, especially the Common Market (EEC)? What has been the Soviet attitude toward such groups? Does Moscow regard them as favorable or hostile to its goals?

These questions are considered but not conclusively answered in the survey edited by Eberhard Schulz, a West German scholar. From the Soviet perspective, Schulz finds, the EEC is fairly effective in integrating the economies of its member states but is far from a genuine regional superstate. In the field of security, moreover, the defense of Western Europe continues to depend on the US nuclear shield and the coordination of West European–US military policies in NATO (pp. 259–60). The most concise formulation of the Soviet attitude toward the EEC, NATO, and similar groupings is provided by Pipes:

A persistent feature of Soviet policy toward Western Europe has been the effort to break up all political, economic, and military alliances, the very existence of which obstructs Soviet objectives. (Pipes, p. 30)

TWO OF the books under review survey Soviet–West European relations in historical perspective but reach sharply diverging conclusions. A.W. DePorte, a former member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State and now head of the West European office of the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, sums up his view of the relationship in his book's title, *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance*. For DePorte, the division of Europe, including Germany, into an Eastern and a Western component, each of which is oriented toward one of the two superpowers, is the fortunate result of a historical process which, through no one's deliberate calculation, produced a system possessing stability, internal coherence, and durability. After an able review of the historical process which led to the present division of Europe, DePorte concludes that today's state system reflects "the true balance of power in the Europe that has emerged from the crises of the twentieth century," and he predicts for this system "a strong lease on the future" (p. 244).

A parallel survey by a West German scholar, Christoph Royen, directs its attention primarily to what the author sees as the internal contradictions in Soviet foreign policy, especially in the policy of détente. To Royen, there is a fundamental clash between the goals of that policy and the use of military force by the Soviets to achieve their foreign policy goals. Moscow's failure to reconcile these and other sources of conflict in its policies, in Royen's opinion, prevents it from achieving a truly stable relationship with Western Europe and forces

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the states of that region to organize for their common defense, despite their reluctance to assume military burdens, their internecine disputes, and their occasionally sharp divergence from the policies of the United States. For Royen, therefore, the balance achieved in Europe since 1945 is an inherently unstable one, and he takes a much less sanguine view of its prospects than does DePorte.

About the only point on which DePorte and Royen wholeheartedly agree is that it is the German problem which lies at the heart of the Soviet-West European relationship. Two of the books under review, those by Renata Fritsch-Bournazel and William E. Griffith, address themselves specifically to the historical process whereby Germany, after its defeat in World War II, underwent a process of bifurcation which saw the emergence of two German states, the (West) German Federal Republic (FRG), a member of NATO and the cornerstone of the European Community, and the (East) German Democratic Republic (GDR), a member of the Warsaw Pact and a staunch ally of the Soviet Union. The two books necessarily cover much of the same ground, each devoting particular attention to the series of interlocking treaties which the FRG concluded in 1970–73 with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, and of which the 1971 Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin forms an integral part. These treaties, which marked the opening of a new phase in Soviet–West European relations, stemmed from foreign policy initiatives of both the USSR and West Germany.

Fritsch-Bournazel's treatise, sponsored by the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, is comparatively restrained in its documentation and soberly optimistic in its conclusion, echoing DePorte's view of a basic equilibrium in Soviet policy toward the two German states that yields a fundamental stability in Soviet–West European relations. In his coverage of the same historical data, the American scholar William E. Griffith goes into much greater detail in tracing the successive stages of West German *Ostpolitik* (policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) and makes clear how significant were the concessions granted by the Soviets in order to reach agreement with the FRG. Griffith specifically brings out the political price paid by the Soviets, including the exertion of intense pressure on the GDR leadership and the forced retirement of its strongman, Walter Ulbricht, whom the Soviets saw as an obstacle in the path of reconciliation with West Germany. Also apparent from Griffith's account is the personal stake of Leonid Brezhnev in the accommodation with the FRG. Griffith's careful historical analysis thus serves to underline the conclusion reached by Royen as to the paradoxical and contradictory nature of Soviet policies toward Western Europe, since it was Brezhnev, by his sanction of the enormous Soviet military buildup in Europe, who helped undermine the conditions under which the Soviet-FRG reconciliation could have achieved the kind of quasi-permanent status which DePorte and Fritsch-Bournazel attribute to it.

AT THE Tehran Conference in 1943, Stalin voiced the brutal truth which lies at the heart of the Soviet dilemma in Europe. In the course of the Big Three discussion of the possibility of dismembering Germany after its defeat, Stalin uttered a warning: "There are no means," he said, "which can rule out the possibility of the unification of Germany" (cited by Fritsch-Bournazel, p. 20, from the 1967 Soviet publication *Tegeran — Yalta — Potsdam).* The deceptively solid-looking equilibrium which has been reached in Europe since the emergence of the two German states in 1949 suffers from this fatal flaw. Only continued Soviet military pressure can ensure maintenance of a balance which rests ultimately on a violation of basic political realities, and, paradoxically, the more the Soviets increase their military preponderance in Europe, the more precarious becomes the continuation of détente in that region.

When Brezhnev's November 1979 offer of a token troop withdrawal from the GDR in return for NATO's abandonment of its plans to upgrade its missile strength was unceremoniously brushed aside by NATO policymakers, the Soviets' European détente policy suffered a crippling blow. Was it in part because of this fiasco that the Politburo decided on the Afghanistan adventure? Whatever the connection may have been between the two events, the overall conclusion is unmistakable. As the new decade gets under way, the Soviet leadership has locked itself into a foreign policy strategy in which military force constitutes the preferred modus operandi. Perhaps the recognition of that fact, unpalatable though it may be, will help the West European nations overcome their internecine squabbles as well as their quarrels with their trans-Atlantic allies.

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Soviet-Japanese Relations

By Hans H. Baerwald

RODGER SWEARINGEN. *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

CYRIL E. BLACK et al. *The Modernization of Japan and Russia*. New York, NY, The Free Press, 1975.

DAGMAR AHRENS-THIELE. *Japans Rohstoffpolitik im Kräftefeld Moskau-Peking* (Japan's Raw Materials Policy in the Moscow-Peking Sphere of Influence). Hamburg, Institut für Asienkunde, 1977.

MANFRED POHL. *Die Kommunistische Partei Japans* (The Japan Communist Party). Hamburg, Institut für Asienkunde, 1976.

THE CLOSENESS of Japan and Russia geographically has rarely been reflected in close political relations between the two countries, periodic protestations of mutual admiration and substantial commercial and cultural interaction notwithstanding. Public opinion surveys conducted by Japanese newspapers during the post-World War II era, for example, have consistently reflected the attitude that the Soviet Union rivals Korea as the country "most disliked" in Japan.[1]

Scattered evidence suggests that many Russians share similar feelings for the Japanese. Some years ago, a senior Soviet specialist on "things Japanese" criticized me personally (and, by implication, Americans generally) for being too "soft" in our assessments of the Japanese. He summed up his warning with the well-worn cliché, "give the Japanese a centimeter, and they'll take several kilometers."

The latter comments arose in a discussion of Soviet policy concerning the "northern islands," whose occupation by the USSR since World War II has remained a burr in the saddle for the Japanese. Ever since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1956, the Russians have shunted aside discussion of the issue. Moreover, lest anyone forget, Japan and the Soviet Union have not signed a World War II peace treaty with each other.

Rodger Swearingen's book, *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan*, is useful in providing an overview of the diplomatic and strategic dimensions of this troubled relationship. The author's personal experience in the headquarters of US General Douglas MacArthur in postwar Tokyo and the pioneering research that he and Paul Langer published a quarter of a century ago[2] serve him particularly well in discussion of the early stages of Russo-Japanese relations after World War II.

AT FIRST GLANCE, the gulf between the two states might seem to be rooted in the dissimilarities of the two societies. Indeed, to specialists familiar with either the Soviet Union or Japan, the societies would appear to be so different as to be noncomparable. Japan is insular, ethnically homogeneous, and monolingual, whereas Russia is continental, ethnically heterogeneous, and polyglot—to mention only the most superficial contrasts. Therefore, the findings of *The Modernization of Japan and Russia* come as something of a shock. In this breathtakingly wide-ranging comparative effort, Professor Cyril E. Black and his colleagues (mostly of Princeton University) provide meticulously amassed evidence to support their overall hypothesis that "in most of the ways in which their development can be measured—in education, urbanization, production—[Japan and Russia] have achieved comparable levels" (p. 2).

Both societies were latecomers in embarking on the road to modernization—defined in the Black volume as "the process by

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[1] See Chart 2 in Akio Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1964–1973," in Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977, p. 125.

[2] *Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919–1951*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1952.

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which societies have been and are being transformed under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution" (p. 3). The two began their transformation in the latter half of the 19th century, during which decades they made substantial strides economically and educationally, and more halting changes in political structures.

Their paths of modernization first crossed as a result of their increasing conflict over Korea and northeast China, which generated a dispute that provided the seeds for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. Ostensibly, the Japanese won that contest on land and (possibly more important) on the seas—in the Tsushima Straits that separate southwestern Japan from the tip of the Korean peninsula. At this juncture, Japan's transformation—as exemplified by one of the key slogans of the Meiji era (1868–1912), *fukoku-kyohei,* usually translated as "rich country, strong military"—would seem to have been more successful, especially if Japan's then relatively stable political structure were contrasted with the increasingly unstable Tsarist regime. Nonetheless, the presumably benign intervention by US President Theodore Roosevelt, which brought the combatants to the conference table in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, denied Japan many of the potential territorial fruits of its near victory, even if it saved the Japanese from the dangers of serious overexertion and of a possible undermining of their as yet frail modern economic base.

In many respects, the Russo-Japanese War set a pattern of conflictual relations between the two countries in this century. After the end of World War I, during which both were among the Allied and Associated Powers, Japan participated in the Siberian intervention against the newly established Bolshevik government. At the very end of World War II, during nearly all of which Japan and the USSR had observed the terms of their mutual neutrality pact, the Russians—prodded by the United States—helped to bring about Japan's somewhat conditional "unconditional surrender" (it permitted retention of the institution of the Emperor).

Throughout this period of international trauma, both societies continued their modernizing transformation, and in both cases, considerable domestic violence accompanied the process. This was more noticeable in Russia than in Japan. Black et al. offer in explanation the suggestion that "some of the violence of Japanese life during the years 1860–1941 was not so much quelled as exported through foreign war and colonial exploitation" (p. 57). If valid, this explanation raises an interesting further hypothesis: that the Soviet Union might have been more tranquil domestically in the 1920's and 1930's if only the Russian Revolution had triggered a worldwide—or, at least a Europe-wide—revolution, as Lenin had envisaged and predicted.

SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES began to appear between the two societies as they approached the level of high modernity in the decades after World War II. For Japan, the war "broke the influence of the policies of transition that had become dogmatic articles of faith, whereas in Russia it tended to reinforce them" (Black, p. 339).

Not to be ignored in this divergence of patterns was the role of the United States as the principal agent in the postwar occupation of Japan, which lasted nearly seven years. Increasing amounts of ink are being devoted—especially in Japan—to exploring the substance of the occupation and its impact on Japanese society. One of the central questions—still unresolved on both sides of the Pacific—is the degree to which the many changes in postwar Japan were the products of alien tutelage, and the degree to which they were the outcomes of indigenous socioeconomic and political forces that surfaced as a consequence of internal developments in earlier years and of the defeat of the old order.

What is certain is that Japan embarked on a radically different course from the one it had pursued before World War II. No longer was glory to be sought by military means. Instead, emphasis was to be given to economic growth—at almost any cost. It was not until 1970, for instance, that the Japanese began to pay serious attention to the increasing blight of pollution that was among the less desirable by-products of their zealous creation of new wealth.

For their part Yosif Stalin and most of his successors, both by choice and by necessity (as they defined it), propelled Soviet society in the direction of emphasis on military power and the security that it provides. The Soviet Union is now, and has been for more than two decades, a certified superpower. Nowhere is the contrast between the two societies greater than in their power as defined in military strength alone. At the same time, in achieving "high modernity"—especially in responding to the needs of citizens in their role as consumers—Japan has the better record. As the Black volume observes, Japan's experience "suggests that it is desirable to avoid a highly authoritarian approach to the problem of transformation despite the undeniable need for strict control and coordination" (p. 353).

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DESPITE the almost overwhelming differences in their current national goals and priorities, however, Japan and the Soviet Union do have a number of complementary requirements. For example, both perceive Siberia as a treasure trove of raw materials that urgently calls for development and exploitation. Swearingen devotes one chapter in his book to Soviet-Japanese joint ventures in that region. This overview serves as an outline for Dagmar Ahrens-Thiele's highly detailed monograph regarding Japan's overall raw materials policy. The latter provides a plethora of well-organized and easily comprehensible tables and a good bibliography of research materials in English, German, Japanese, and Russian. It is recommended to anyone seeking a concise rundown of Soviet-Japanese projects, many of which failed. In a very brief summary, the author posits that Japan needs Asia more than vice versa and that "Tokyo" understands this. While perhaps some Japanese officials (say in the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) would probably agree, it is risky to impute such a monolithic outlook to the Japanese government as a whole.

In any case, both Japan and the USSR have periodically given prominence to their respective needs for each other. Japan would like nothing better than to expand its sources of petroleum, natural gas, and timber; the Soviet Union would like to have the assistance of Japanese capital and technology in various Siberian development schemes. Japan wants to expand the market for its manufactured goods and its sophisticated engineering know-how in such fields as building harbors and drydocks; the Soviet Union wants both. A mutuality of interests can easily be envisaged, and is occasionally realized.

Yet the interaction only moves forward by fits and starts. Negotiations progress only ponderously, if at all, largely because political considerations take precedence over "purely" economic matters.

In the 1950's and 1960's, Tokyo kept a wary eye on American reactions to Japan's slowly increasing trade with the Soviet Union. Even the decision to enter into diplomatic relations with the USSR was undertaken with great caution and with the acquiescence, grudgingly given, of the United States.[3] Conversely, the Soviet Union viewed Japan with great suspicion, considering it nothing more than an American satellite.

By the late 1960's or 1970's, the situation had changed sufficiently so that there were active discussions among Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States about possible cooperation in developing Siberian natural gas and petroleum deposits. However, many of the projects remained in abeyance as the 1970's drew to a close. There are several reasons for this state of affairs. First, some of the technical problems posed by the harsh Siberian environment proved to be more of an obstacle than had been anticipated. Second, according to the Japanese negotiators, the Russians kept changing contractual agreements. Third, and possibly most important from the Soviet perspective, the Japanese government, after trying desperately to pursue a policy of equidistance vis-à-vis their large continental neighbors, tilted toward China by concluding a treaty of peace and friendship with it in 1978.

[3]For some indication of US attitudes in this regard, see Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1969, esp. pp. 65–67, 135–42.

What lay behind this decision that so dramatically altered Japan's political priorities? For one, China had its own oil, and the Chinese seemed far more eager for Japanese assistance than the Russians had ever been. Like the Soviet Union, China was interested in Japanese products and technology. Furthermore, some Chinese leaders, most notably Deng Xiaoping, expressed eagerness to adopt the Japanese model of economic development, something that the Russians had never done. One final factor that conceivably influenced the decision by the conservative Liberal-Democrats governing Japan was the poor state of relations between the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By contrast, relations between the JCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were beginning to improve in the later 1970's. Thus, there appeared to be far less danger, after the departure of the "gang of four" from power in Beijing, for Japan to be on friendly terms with China than with the USSR.

The history, ideology, and political role of the JCP are dealt with both in Swearingen and in the monograph by Manfred Pohl, although neither treatment is totally satisfactory. Swearingen's perspective is predominantly from the outside in, and he tends to overlook the JCP's struggle for survival in a largely hostile society. For example, he leaves the impression that the JCP's leaders "disappeared" on the eve of the Korean war, as if they had prior information regarding the North Korean attack. Only in a footnote (fn. 36, p. 315) does one learn that SCAP (Supreme Command Allied Powers, i.e., General MacArthur's headquarters) had previously "purged" 24 members of the JCP Central Committee

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from public office—an action that most Japanese believe was far more consequential in determining the subsequent behavior of senior Japanese Communists.[4] Then, in discussing the years 1970–78, Swearingen chooses to use quotation marks in discussing the JCP's "independence" from the Soviet and Chinese parties. While I would concede the possibility that the JCP might be drawn again into the orbit of Moscow or Beijing, in the period discussed the party unquestionably pursued an autonomous, independent line.

For his part, Pohl concentrates on internal ideological disputes of the JCP. His formidably researched study relies on a vast array of Japanese-language materials, judiciously supplemented by the best available literature in English and German.[5] The approach does have its limitations, however. In particular, the JCP's break with the Chinese Communist Party in 1966 is not fully explained (see pp. 219–23)—by contrast, Pohl's analysis of the JCP's split with its counterpart in Moscow is much more fully developed (cf. pp. 154–76). One suspects that Pohl might have benefited from the opportunity to visit Japan and conduct interviews with JCP leaders, as well as with journalists and with JCP-watchers in the Japanese government.

In the overall scheme of Japanese politics, of course, the JCP never has been more than a minor participant. A brief flurry of substantial popular support in the late 1940's was followed by two decades of wandering in the wilderness. Only in the 1970's did the party gain the allegiance of 10 percent of the nation's electorate, a level of support that in 1979 translated itself into 8 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives.[6] Even at this level, the JCP was hardly significant enough to have a major impact on Soviet-Japanese relations. Moreover, it suffered a sharp reversal in June 1980.[7]

OBJECTIVELY, there are no compelling reasons for Japan and the Soviet Union to be hostile toward each other. Both are among the industrially and technologically advanced countries of the world, even if Japan's search for survival through international trade has given its economy a different cast and shape than that which Moscow's seemingly relentless emphasis on military security has brought about in the USSR. Indeed, this very difference suggests even greater complementarity were both governments inclined to capitalize on it.

In fact, however, the most recent "White Paper" of the Japan Defense Agency specifically mentions the Soviet Union as a potential threat to Japan's security.[8] The growth of the Soviet Union's Pacific fleet, the patrols that it conducts off the coast of Japan's islands, the presence of Soviet military forces on the disputed (by Japan) northern islands—in sharp contrast to Japan's officially stated desire to negotiate the issue of ownership—have contributed to a sense of foreboding in Japan about the intentions of the USSR.

The Soviet Union does not perceive Japan to be a military threat, but the Russians do seem to find the Japanese irritating, especially in light of the manifest unwillingness of the latter to desist from fishing areas which the USSR claims as territorial waters. Furthermore, Japan's close alignment with the United States and growing collaboration with China are affronts to Russian sensibilities. The more the Japanese protest that the "anti-hegemony clause" in the Sino-Japanese treaty was not directed at the Soviet Union, the more their protestations tend to be discounted by the Kremlin.

There is no evidence to suggest that these attitudes of mutual distrust are immutable or frozen in the Siberian tundra. Consultations continue at the private, and even at the governmental, level. Some trade does flow across the Sea of Okhotsk. Some Japanese do read Russian (especially 19th-century) literature; similarly, some Russians do read translations of Japanese novels. Hence, all is not bleak. It is just that relations between the two nations might be so much brighter were the political impediments not so severe.

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[4]For further details, see Hans H. Baerwald, *The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1959.

[5]The Pohl and Ahrens-Thiele volumes, products of the Institute for Asian Studies in Hamburg, attest to the strides made in the last decade in West German research on contemporary Asia. Unfortunately, the publishing technique—photo offset of typed pages—makes the reading of these books difficult.

[6]In October 1979, the JCP elected 39 official party candidates and 2 affiliated independents to the 511-member House of Representatives, and already had an additional 16 members in the House of Councillors. This was the high point in JCP fortunes. (Inexplicably, the Swearingen volume, on page 117, refers to the hopes of the JCP to return "to the day when it controlled 70[!] seats in the Diet.")

[7]In balloting at that time, the number of JCP seats in the Diet fell to 29 Representatives and 4 Councillors. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), June 23, 1980, p. C/1.

[8]Defense Agency of Japan, *Defense of Japan, 1979*, English translation by the Mainichi Daily News, Tokyo, 1980. See, particularly, pp. 13–49.

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Dissident Images of Eastern Europe

By Vlad Georgescu

FRANTISEK SILNITSKY et al., Eds. *Communism and Eastern Europe.* New York, NY, Karz Publishers, 1977.

OTA SIK. *The Third Way.* London, Wildwood House, and White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976.

RUDOLF BAHRO. *The Alternative in Eastern Europe.* London, New Left Books, 1978.

MARC RAKOVSKI. *Towards an East European Marxism.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

PAVEL TIGRID. *Amère révolution* (Bitter Revolution). Paris, Albin Michel, 1977.

PAUL GOMA. *Le tremblement des hommes* (The Quaking of Men). Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1979.

ROMAN RAKHMANNY. *In Defense of the Ukrainian Cause.* North Quincy, MA, The Christopher Publishing House, 1979.

FEW SOVIET and East European dissidents today would admit that their type of society follows the true Marxist pattern, and this view is largely shared by the authors under review. Their judgment is particularly interesting since most of the writers were for many years true believers or fellow travelers, convinced that communism was the only alternative to the evil capitalist system. Some—like Czechoslovaks Ota Sik and Pavel Kohout and East German Robert Havemann—belong to the older guard; they were not only Marxists but also pro-Soviet, identifying their ideal with the pattern of development under Vladimir I. Lenin and Yosif Stalin. Others—like East German Rudolf Bahro, members of the new Hungarian Left, and many Poles—belong to the younger generation. As Marxists but not Stalinists, they were supposed to represent the generation of the future. At some point in their lives, however, all these intellectuals decided to give up a promising future by daring to compare communism's aims with its achievements, its theory with its practice.

The books and collections of articles reviewed here express the results of the painful attempt to understand why the gap widened so far and to explain what went wrong with a theory and a practice considered sacred by generations of believers. They also represent the writers' efforts to salvage some of their faith and to propose their own models for the future.

IT IS striking that all these authors consider today's Communist regimes to be failures and betrayals of true Marxism. For Sik, the East European system is "antisocialist." To Kohout, "the fundamental principles of Marxism have been turned upside down." Bahro thinks that the party, which he once helped to force peasants into collectivization, has "distorted," "betrayed," and "spoiled" Marxism. Even Hungary's "goulash socialism," the most liberal and affluent in the Eastern bloc, is considered by the new Hungarian Left to be a "miserable failure" (Tamas Bauer in Silnitsky et al.), a "deformation of the authentic true Marxist pattern" (Gyorgy Markus in Silnitsky et al.).

Thus, most of the authors distinguish the practical pattern from the ideal model. They question Marxism not as a theory but as a policy; they think that if Marxism had had a chance to evolve naturally, the world would now look different. They consider the unfortunate beginning of this unnatural evolution to be the year 1917, when, contrary to Karl Marx's forecasts, the "imperialist chain" broke at its weakest, least developed link instead of its strongest and most developed one. Eager to justify the original model, they slip into the easiest explanation of its failure: today's communism is not authentic because it was molded (and then imposed on the outside world) by a Russian society which, because of its backwardness, was not ready for socialism. Once this happened, Marxism was perverted, giving birth to unnatural excesses like Stalinism and bringing the whole system to a dead end. These

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writers take obvious satisfaction in proclaiming the Russian background as the main reason for today's situation. Hungarians such as Marc Rakovski, (a pseudonym for two Hungarian dissidents) and all of the East Germans represented here speak extremely harshly and invidiously of Russian history, and even the Russian people, whom they consider traditionally tolerant of bureaucracy and incapable of progress. The "Manifesto" of the illegal League of Democratic Communists of Germany seems to be against everything Russian, from Lenin ("the Holy Ghost") to "sloppy Russian workmanship." Such anti-Russian feelings also permeate Bahro's book. Bahro appears to take particular pleasure not only in destroying many established myths, such as that of an evil Stalinism as opposed to a virtuous Leninism, but also in rejecting the possibility of a humane evolution of Marxism in a country whose history "has never stood under a lucky star."

One could, of course, debate at length this at least partially correct attribution of communism's failures to its Russian setting. But of greater political interest are the answers the books under review provide to the question: What is it that these intellectuals dislike in the "antisocialist" socialism of Eastern Europe?

A NUMBER of essays in the Silnitsky collection, *Communism and Eastern Europe,* reflect the views of members of the new Hungarian Left. This movement, very much in the tradition of Gyorgy Lukacs, is more philosophical than political. It rejects the dogmatic, uncritical approach of today's Marxism-Leninism; it seeks discussions, even confrontations, with its antagonists (Markus); it regrets that communism has neither kept its promises to liberate the individual (Miklos Haraszti), nor even maintained contact with reality (Bauer); and it requests the right to practice a "constructive Marxism" (Gyorgy Bence).

If the young Hungarian Marxists seem to be mainly interested in existential problems and sometimes give the impression that they are as distant from socialist reality as the dogmatism they criticize, veterans like Sik and Bahro are engaged in a more thorough and profound analysis of the essence of Sovietized East European society. Sik's aim is a very ambitious one: to create a social theory which offers a viable alternative to "both the present communist and capitalist systems." His critique of capitalism is matched only by his critique of communism, both considered incapable of solving mankind's problems. If his analysis of the "first world" contains nothing new or original, what he has to say about the "second world" is interesting and innovative. Sik does not completely reject the idea that because of the Soviet experience, communism acquired certain negative, authoritarian traits. But his main explanation of the gulf between the "founding fathers" and today's reality lies in the different course taken by capitalism from the original Marxian forecasts. He does not hesitate to admit that Marx's views in many fields were superficial, and he argues that it is a mistake to use them as the basis of current policy. Two of the main Marxian predictions—the continuous impoverishment of the working class and its transformation into a numerical majority of the population—did not materialize, thus raising serious doubts about the inevitability of capitalism's downfall and about the "historical necessity" of Soviet-style socialism. The new reality, according to Sik, calls into question such concepts as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the supreme role assigned to the Communist party. The blending of outdated Marxian precepts and Leninism, he believes, has led to the blocking of any potential progress and is ultimately responsible for the antisocialist system now prevailing in Eastern Europe.

Sik is extremely critical of the ways the economies of Eastern Europe are handled. His main concern, however, seems to be not the economy but the lack of democracy, understood literally as the power of the people. He no longer believes in the theory of freedom as "recognized necessity"; he pleads instead for the acceptance of the individual's freedom of action. In this respect, he differs strongly from Bahro, whose critique of communism comes from a more typically Marxist point of view.

Bahro considers himself a true Communist, one who is aware of Lenin's negative impact on Marxism and of the necessity of going back to the original sources. Basing his analysis mostly on the young Marx, he makes very clear what he dislikes in Soviet-style socialism. He is against the class character of a society which is supposed to be classless; he is against political dictatorship and the rise of what the Yugoslav Milovan Djilas has called the red bourgeoisie; he is against the bureaucratization of society, which he sees as an instrument for perpetuating a monopoly of power; and he strongly opposes the "subalternity" of individuals, a term which he seems to employ to describe the "rule of man over man," the persistence of inequality between individuals, and their subjection to structures and goals over which they have no control.

THE SUBTLE dissociation of Marx-

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ism from Sovietism leads Sik, Bahro, and most of the other leftist dissidents to condemn the East European versions of socialism but to exonerate socialism itself, which they still consider to be a third way, an alternative to both capitalism and present-day communism. The harder they criticize the actual pattern followed by Communist regimes, the more strongly they urge the renaissance of Marxism, especially in a form suited to East European conditions.

Such a revived socialism, "the socialism of tomorrow" (Robert Havemann), is considered by most of the authors to be not only possible but also necessary and inevitable. But very few have tried to draw a clear picture of what that type of socialism looks like; and when they do, what we get is a rather utopian image of an ideal society which nobody really knows how to build and make workable.

Bahro's alternative is a most elusive one, for where one would expect an answer, one finds instead another quotation from Marx or high-sounding words like freedom, progress, democracy, and economic development. When Bahro seeks to explain what these words really mean, he asserts that the main problem is that "we must rather raise to a high level Marx's own legacy, the most developed theory and method of social science that we have, and transform it into the communism of the present." The "historical task" he has in mind is a general restructuring of society that would reduce social hierarchies and increase individual freedom. But Bahro is against any kind of liberalism, economic or political, and this position leaves him little room for innovative proposals. Instead, he offers vague notions: the one-party system should be reformed but maintained, and the initiatives for change will come from within this new enlightened party, which will be progressive and open because it is based on a real understanding of social laws. Apparently carried away by this cloudy sketch of a reformed Communist party, Bahro envisions it as the instrument of a "true cultural revolution" aimed at imposing (1) a new division of power, (2) a universal form of education for "fully socialized individuals," (3) a new communal life, and (4) a real "socialization (democratization) of the general process of knowledge and decision making." Bahro calls his program "the radical political alternative" to the existing, unnatural system!

When Sik comes to explaining the essence of *his* "third way," he is not much clearer or more concrete. What he wants is a "democratically controlled" government, "macroeconomic overall planning" that is scientific and market-oriented, and collective ownership of the means of production. Like Bahro, Sik seems to favor a society somewhere between the Yugoslav model and Eurocommunism. Again like Bahro, he is able to present a devastating critique of the Soviet-style system without being very specific either about the future or about ways in which the new model could be made to work under present conditions.

But Bahro and Sik are not the only ones to nourish the hope that today's socialism can be revived from within, that there are internal forces capable of changing the Sovietized course. Even Rakovski's extremely intelligent book accepts this view, despite the fact that neither "he" nor the other "new" Marxists can specify what those forces might be. The Hungarian Zoltan Endreffy, for example, is so convinced of the potential materialist perfection of real socialism that his main concern in his contribution to *Communism and Eastern Europe* is how to avoid converting such a society into "one huge Sweden, with a very high standard of living, perfect hygiene, splendidly organized social relations, and a population that resembles the characters of a Bergman film."

UNFORTUNATELY, Eastern Europe does not seem ready to move in a direction which could bring it even close to Sweden, and I have serious doubts that replacing today's communism with the "socialism of tomorrow" would make such a step more likely. Moreover, Rakhmanny's moving "defense of the Ukrainian cause" makes it clear that there are people within the Soviet empire who would prefer the alternative of capitalism to any "third way."

Even those whom Sik likes to call the "thinking Marxists" fail to offer a convincing and realistic image of the future. Sik himself is probably the most interesting of these authors, and he goes only half the way. Extremely technical and profound when he discusses economic matters, he becomes superficial, even naive, when he deals with political problems. His wishes seem to be constantly contradicted by reality, and it is difficult indeed to see how his collective ownership, his economic planning, and his controlled democracy could coexist with a market-oriented society and real freedom. Like many other leaders of the Prague Spring, he shows a disarming ingenuousness when he comes to the Soviet factor. In *Communism and Eastern Europe,* A.J. Liehm, another important Czechoslovak figure in 1968, makes this surprising confession: "What would I have done differently in 1968? Everything, had I known then what I know today about the USSR." Nevertheless Sik's "third way" makes it clear

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that the lesson has still not been learned by all.

The East Germans Havemann and Bahro do not have the theoretical profundity of the Czechoslovaks, but neither do they share their naiveté. They know very well what they want. Yet their back-to-the-sources movement does not mean that their alternative would be much different from present reality. In contrast to the Czechoslovaks, who would like to put a human face on their "third way," the East Germans would be content just to change the mask. Their attitude is as dogmatic as the one they criticize. They are absolutely certain that they alone know the correct answers.

Unlike the Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents, who are "thinking Marxists" well aware of the great diversity of the world we live in, and thus of the existence of many alternatives, the East Germans still use the old Marxist clichés regarding capitalist society and the West. A certain air of outdatedness in their analysis often causes them to fight pointless and useless battles. Despite its many imperfections, the Western world is today quite different from what it used to be, and any "alternative" suggested should take account of this fact.

Both the drama and the limitations of these dissident Marxist movements are clearly exposed to view in Pavel Tigrid's *Amère révolution,* an excellent essay on some of the most important East European and Soviet dissidents, and in the introduction to *Communism and Eastern Europe.* Paul Goma's captivating and well-written story of the short-lived Romanian dissidence, *Le tremblement des hommes,* leaves no doubt that behind such catchwords as "socialism," "Marxism," and "mankind's future," there lies only a cynical, selfish struggle for power. These penetrating critiques indicate that few viable alternatives are likely to emerge from dissident writers who simply ignore the fact that for three quarters of a century any attempts at reforming the system have invariably ended, as Tigrid puts it, "in fiasco."

Nevertheless, it takes a great deal of courage to speak out, even in defense of Marx, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union today, and those who do so, Marxist or non-Marxist, deserve respect. And although the brutal repression that they so much despise and consider alien to their ideal obstructs the pursuit of any alternative ways for the moment, it may not do so forever.

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Dissent in Yugoslavia

By Dennis Reinhartz

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. *Moscow Summer*. New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965.

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. *Russian Themes*. Translated by Marija Mihajlov. New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968.

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. *Underground Notes*. Translated by Marija Mihajlov Ivusic and Christopher Ivusic. Kansas City, KS, Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1976.

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. *Nenauchnyye Mysli* (Nonscientific Thoughts). Translated from Serbo-Croatian by V. Mihajlov. London, Ont., Zaria, 1979.

AS COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA nears the end of the Fourth decade of its often turbulent and precarious existence, there is once again apprehension about tomorrow. Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Partisan struggle and the Yugoslav revolution, the first president of his country, and the great constant of Yugoslav life, is now gone, and his successors face an uncertain future. Moreover, recent events on the world political scene, such as the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have only heightened the apprehension. "After Tito, what?"—a question Yugoslavs asked themselves for many years—now has to be answered.

Yugoslavia may well have a perilous future. But it has survived almost four postwar decades, marked by vitality and a continuing process of legitimation. And Tito and the Yugoslav leadership made elaborate provisions for the continuance of their revolution after Tito's departure from the scene. Perhaps the question of Yugoslavia's future is not really as pressing as it may seem to some Western journalists and social scientists. Yugoslavia may simply follow a pragmatic course along currently indicated lines.[1]

A major source of uneasiness at this time of potential instability, however, is the growth of dissent in Yugoslavia. National diversity and economic underdevelopment remain the spawning grounds for discord within the country. Nationalists from Slovenia and Croatia to Macedonia and Kosovo, Serbian liberals, radical students, religious groups (e.g., Catholics), Praxists (the group formerly associated with the Zagreb philosophical journal *Praxis*, banned in 1972), and prominent individuals like Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo Mihajlov—all persist in speaking out against what they see as the evils of the ideology and system and in offering options that may be as unacceptable to Tito's successors as they were to Tito himself.[2] Traditionally, Yugoslavia's dissidents have achieved little consensus as to alternative policies and the tactics of dissent. More recently, though, Djilas and Mihajlov have moved closer together in viewpoint. This concurrence, along with the stimulus provided by the death of Tito in May 1980, by the death of Tito's longtime close collaborator and heir-apparent, Edvard Kardelj, in February 1979, and by the "pushing aside" of Kardelj's fellow Slovene Stane Dolanc in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in May 1979, seems to point toward the emergence of a community of dissent in Yugoslavia. The dissidents are few in number. But they are courageous and committed. As if through some unspoken agreement and with as yet minimal cooperation among themselves, but building on a native tradition of independence and dissent, they have had a growing impact in this time of transition for Yugoslavia. In this community of dissent, Mihajlo Mihajlov, a writer and critic, occupies a prominent position.

[1] For an excellent study, see Bogdan Denis Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1976.

[2] See Dragan Markovic and Savo Krzavac, *Liberalizam: Od Djilas do danas* (Liberalism: From Djilas to the Present), 2 vols., Belgrade, "Sloboda," 1978.

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IN HIS various works, Mihajlov confronts the problems facing Yugoslavia from the perspective of a political prisoner or, now, a dissident in exile in the West. He began his rise to prominence in 1965, when, upon his return from an exchange program in the Soviet Union during the summer of 1964, he published the first two parts of *Moscow Summer*, his now famous and controversial account of the contemporary Soviet intellectual and cultural scene. In these two parts, which appeared in the January and February 1965 issues of the Belgrade literary magazine *Delo*, and in the rest of his manuscript, he explicitly equated the Soviet Union with Hitler's Germany for establishing death camps near Arkhangel'sk in 1921, more than a decade before the Nazis came to power in Germany. After *Delo* was banned on April 29-30, Mihajlov sent his manuscript to Rome, where it was published under the title *Moscow Summer*. Thereupon, for "damaging the reputation of a foreign state," Mihajlov—an unknown Dostoevsky scholar and minor academician—was publicly chastised by Tito, fired from his teaching position at Zadar University, arrested, tried under Article 175 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code and Article 125 of the Press Law, and eventually given a nine-month suspended sentence (suspended, but upheld by the Supreme Court of Croatia) with two years' probation.

Mihajlov has spent about half the 15 years since the appearance of *Moscow Summer* in prison in Yugoslavia, gaining recognition as a major Yugoslav dissident and gadfly, second in importance only to Djilas. Too young to have been a Partisan like his Russian-émigré father, he has never been a Communist. Today, he sees himself as a "post-Communist" rather than an "anti-Communist":

People who suffered a loss of freedom due to a Communist dictatorship realize that in some sense they too are responsible for this evil, and not only the Communists. Anti-Communists lack this consciousness of their own guilt because they believe that everyone else, in this case the Communists, are to blame for everything.[3]

The fundamental themes broached by Mihajlov in *Moscow Summer* are more fully developed in his later works. *Russian Themes* is composed of 14 essays, dealing in part with Abram Tertz (the pseudonym of Andrey Sinyavskiy), Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Mikhail Sholokhov, Boris Pasternak, and Yevgeniy Zamyatin. It includes three penetrating critiques of Dostoevsky, as well as "Why We Are Silent," which in 1966 led to Mihajlov's second term of imprisonment, and "The Unspoken Defense," which Mihajlov was not permitted to deliver at his 1966 trial. It also includes essays written and published in Yugoslavia before the publication of *Moscow Summer*. In the 14 essays, while reviewing the literary works of others, Mihajlov uses the opportunity to continue his attack on Soviet and other forms of totalitarianism. In discussing Dostoevsky and Solzhenitsyn, for example, he decries the degradation of the individual by the Soviet "cult of work" and forced labor and condemns the Soviet concentration camps. In the process, Mihajlov's own suffering and deep spiritual values are revealed. Thus, *Russian Themes* is not only solid literary criticism but also a resounding statement in the campaign for human rights in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.

The 18 essays of *Underground Notes*—including one on "The Artist as the Enemy," one on Dostoevsky, and two on Djilas—explore a broad array of literary, political, and religious topics. Collectively, they predict a renaissance of the human spirit under the impact of the truths revealed by human suffering. *Nenauchnyye Mysli* (Nonscientific Thoughts) was written mostly during Mihajlov's last term of imprisonment (1975-77) and is made up of loosely knit and loosely grouped impressions. It is more metaphysical than Mihajlov's earlier works but follows the same philosophical lines and pursues the same vision of man and his future as were laid down in *Underground Notes* and other recent works.[4]

IN THESE four volumes and in his other, peripheral writings, Mihajlov gives expression to a tenaciously held world view, which underlies his vision of post-Tito Yugoslavia and the place of dissenters in it. Much of his analysis of the present situation and many of his hopes for the future are shared by his good friend Djilas. Many of Mihajlov's basic themes are endorsed by other Yugoslav dissidents as well. Indeed, a common dissident viewpoint about post-Tito Yugoslavia appears to be taking shape on the basis of a common belief in democratic socialism, pluralism, nonalignment, and, perhaps most fundamental, existential humanism.

Perhaps the broadest theme running through the views of the various dissenting factions in

[3] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Advice from a Post-Communist," *The News World* (New York, NY), Aug. 4, 1978, p. 13.

[4] See, for example, Mihajlo Mihajlov, "What Should Be Fought For," *The New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Feb. 22, 1979, pp. 34-36.

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Yugoslavia is that of democratic socialism, which Djilas describes in the most general terms as the establishment of a more rational society through the achievement of "greater security for the individual, better organized production, and a fairer sharing."[5] In such a society, human rights and freedom will be guaranteed, and totalitarianism (e.g., Stalinism), especially that of a bureaucratic absolutism or a cult of personality, will not be tolerated. Within the context of present-day Yugoslavia, democratic socialism means greater true self-management and sustained federalism. While almost happily conceding that their country is not a dictatorship, some Yugoslav dissidents worry that there is no real authority either. They fear that self-management has become too pragmatic. They also accuse the government of trying to pass off economic progress as political progress.

Another theme, one inherent in the very notion of democratic socialism, is pluralism. Pluralism is not yet advocated by all of the dissidents. It has long been championed by Mihajlov and Djilas, and it is underwritten by various nationalist and religious groups. Only recently, however, has it found acceptance among the Praxists, and then only among the "most revisionist" of them, such as the philosopher Svetozar Stojanovic.[6]

Yet another theme, likewise closely related to democratic socialism, is true nonalignment. Yugoslav dissidents recognize that the Soviet Union's response to the post-Tito regime will be critical to the future of Yugoslavia and that anti-Sovietism will continue to be a significant unifying factor among Yugoslavs. In Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union quite possibly will find itself on the horns of a dilemma of its own making. If it wishes to gain ascendancy over Yugoslavia, it must fan potential nationalities crises and other divisive trends and events in order to foster internal chaos. Yet, the more aggressively and deeply it involves itself in Yugoslavia, the more solidarity it will engender within Yugoslavia and among Yugoslav dissidents. In the short run, therefore, the Soviet Union may be its own worst enemy vis-à-vis post-Tito Yugoslavia. But in the long run, as Mihajlov and other dissidents have often indicated, only the underlying strengths of the Yugoslav system and increased support from the West will help Yugoslavia withstand the threat of Soviet imperialism.

In accord with true nonalignment, the dissidents want Yugoslavia vigorously to oppose totalitarianism and imperialism (the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and great-power involvement in Indochina) as well as violence and terrorism (revolutionary and émigré) at home and abroad. They champion the cause of human rights and affirm the right of national self-determination. They wish to live in peaceful coexistence with all peoples. The dissidents see Yugoslavia as a Western country, and they feel that closer cooperation with the West, especially with the nonaligned European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland), and with the real Eurocommunists is essential to Yugoslavia and the achievement of their broad domestic goals. Mihajlov goes so far as to state that "legal and fruitful" cooperation between the dissidents themselves and the West is essential to the preservation of global democracy.[7]

Perhaps the most fundamental theme common to Yugoslav dissidents, a theme that underlies their views on democratic socialism and nonalignment, is existential humanism—or more simply put, the belief that "man is all-important!" Predictably, Mihajlov's religiosity causes him to differ somewhat with his fellow intellectual outcasts on the sources and nature of human freedom. For Djilas and some others, freedom is a birthright, an integral part of one's humanity. For Mihajlov, in contrast, freedom is a gift of the Creator, a reflection of one's divine nature. Unlike Marxists, many of whom view religious belief as a source of slavery, and unlike other materialists, atheists, and agnostics who consider a supreme being an impossibility or irrelevancy, Mihajlov equates God with immortality and human freedom. For Mihajlov and many other dissidents, existential humanism and democratic socialism offer liberation from all forms of dogma.

EVEN THOUGH differences still exist between the various dissident factions in Yugoslavia and abroad, the future may well bring accelerated cooperation and greater cohesion, fed by official harassment. Meanwhile, some dissidents like Mihajlov and even certain government officials look forward to a "dissident D-Day," a positive "destabilization," "a new 1948 where they will shatter the one-party monopoly and demonstrate the possibility of the transition into pluralistic society."[8] "De-

[5] Milovan Djilas, "Where Is Eurocommunism Leading?" *Playboy Deutschland* (Hamburg), June 1977, p. 181.

[6] Author's interviews with Svetozar Stojanovic, Fort Worth, TX, Apr. 8, 1979, and Belgrade, June 25, 1979.

[7] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Impressions of America," *The New Leader* (New York, NY), Apr. 23, 1979, p. 11; and the author's interviews with Mihajlo Mihajlov, Arlington, VA, July 23, 1978, and Arlington, TX, Sept. 28–30, 1978.

[8] Mihajlov, "Impressions of America," p. 10.

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titoization" is inevitable, they maintain, and if a post-Tito power struggle in the LCY breaks out in which a liberal party faction seeks the support of some of the dissidents, a transition to a "Dubcek-type of democracy" could be triggered. For Yugoslav dissidents, this would indeed be a "historical miracle, rivaling in significance the French Revolution."[9]

While this line of speculation may yet be too optimistic, some noteworthy trends already seem to be emerging. Mihajlov and Djilas have at least laid the groundwork for a confluence of Yugoslav dissidents, and—because of their international reputations, their growing understanding and toleration of the peculiarities of the other factions' outlooks (Mihajlov even advocates free political activity for pro-Soviet dissenters), their continued initiatives, and the broad spectrum of issues that concern them—they will clearly play an increasingly important role if such a confluence actually does take place. As to the possibilities for a confluence, the willingness of some nationalists to explore avenues of cooperation may have portents for the days to come. Now that Tito is dead, new waves of nationalism could sweep across Yugoslavia, leading to more autonomy for the country's Slovenes, Croats, Albanians, and other nationalities and, eventually, to a fairer sharing for all under democratic socialism. In the process, especially in Slovenia and Croatia, the Catholic Church could advance its campaign for tolerance, political as well as religious. And the *Praxis* group, with its "continuous revisionism" and its assertion that Marxism offers but one model, based on specific conditions and not on an iron law,[10] could move toward further cooperation with other dissident factions.

If the dissidents do in fact persist in coordinating their undertakings and at the same time continue to exercise extreme caution, they will probably not create too much instability or produce major rents in the Yugoslav political and social fabric, as long as Yugoslav authorities in turn show restraint toward them. Djilas wrote in early 1980:

The political structure and external situation make difficult any sudden transition to democracy, because suddenness would cause chaos and conflict and make Soviet intervention easier. This is the reason why democratization, at least at the outset, has to be modest and cautious. "Democratizations" that meant maintenance of the monopoly of Communist forms ended with purges and repressions. There is no democracy if it is not democracy for everyone. The storms are already raging: Yugoslavia can survive only if it introduces democracy and attaches itself to countries that effectively oppose the new conqueror.[11]

Certainly, this is a view to which Mihajlov and many other Yugoslav dissidents would subscribe.

[9] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Prospects for the Post-Tito Era," *New America* (New York, NY), January 1980, pp. 6–7; and idem, "Fear and Hope in Yugoslavia," *The New Leader*, Feb. 11, 1980, pp. 6–7.

[10] Mihajlo Markovic, *From Affluence to Praxis*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1974, pp. 67–69.

[11] Milovan Djilas, "Yugoslavia After Tito," *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1980, p. A19.

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Interpreting China's Foreign Policy

By Jonathan D. Pollack

MICHAEL B. YAHUDA. *China's Role in World Affairs.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

ROBERT G. SUTTER. *Chinese Foreign Policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1977.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

KING C. CHEN, Ed. *China and the Three Worlds–A Foreign Policy Reader.* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1979.

WANG GUNGWU. *China and the World Since 1949.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1977.

SAMUEL S. KIM. *China, the United Nations, and World Order.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

DURING THE PAST decade, the field of modern Chinese studies has experienced enormous growth in both the quantity and quality of scholarly effort. However, this intellectual expansion and maturation has been far from uniform. If the books under review here are an accurate indication of the state of knowledge about Chinese foreign policy, then a profound gap exists between the analysis of it and numerous associated fields of research.

With one conspicuous exception, these five volumes provide abundant testimony not so much to a field's loss of its way, but to its lack of a road map in the first place. While much information and intermittent insight can be gleaned from several of these studies, their cumulative weight and contribution is not particularly impressive.

What went wrong? A brief review essay is not the appropriate context for diagnosing this malady, or prescribing a potential cure, in great detail. Nevertheless, I find it both ironic and disquieting that, at a time of China's increasing visibility and activity in both regional and global politics, study of the foreign policy of the People's Republic (PRC) still seems in critical respects such a rudderless endeavor. Indeed, if a single ailment seems to afflict foreign policy studies, it is the disease of particularity. The richness and frequent drama of China's interactions with the outside world over the past century and a half is undeniable. Yet this fact cannot by itself account for the insularity and isolation which continues to afflict most (though not all) students of PRC foreign policy.

A more plausible explanation derives from the sheer enormity of effort required to enter the China field. The time and energy involved in acquiring the requisite skills to conduct research on China leads many practitioners to adopt a protective attitude toward ideas, issues, and approaches. At the same time, international relations specialists, perhaps somewhat intimidated by not knowing China's language, history, or culture, assume a comparably detached attitude. As a consequence of these considerations, many writings on PRC foreign policy are ignorant of the world beyond China, while studies of world politics which seek to include China within their purview demonstrate a simplistic and often ill-informed sense of what can be learned from the Chinese case.

To be sure, one should not minimize the problems in straddling disciplines distinct in orientation, training, and professional outlook. Moreover, the disparate fields comprising the discipline ("indiscipline" seems a more appropriate label) of international relations hardly offer an abundance of compelling concepts and methods. Nor does the analysis of Chinese foreign policy readily lend itself to the abstract, somewhat disembodied description characteristic of much research on world politics.

An additional key factor has discouraged scholars from moving beyond their conventional methods of inquiry—the inherent frustrations of trying to penetrate the dynamics of Chinese behavior. Few areas of Chinese politics are deemed more sensitive by the PRC leadership than those dealing with foreign policy decision-making. As a result, the usual secretiveness of the Chinese political process is accentuated with respect to questions of particular interest to the in-

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ternational relations specialist. It is no surprise that practitioners in the field (and this reviewer is no exception) grow attached to certain styles of research. Why discard a particular approach if it can (at least on occasion) yield the insight which makes analysis worthwhile?

If an answer to this question seems necessary, then these books undoubtedly provide the reasons. Only Samuel Kim's study — clearly the solitary example of conceptual and methodological innovation — yields sufficient benefit in terms of content and insight to justify the cost of the effort. In various ways, each of the other volumes either does not succeed in its stated objectives or (worse yet) prompts the "so what?" retort. While the books obviously vary in their scope and detail, this overall judgment is hardly cause for satisfaction about the current state of knowledge.

THE MOST DISAPPOINTING of these volumes is Michael Yahuda's study, *China's Role in World Affairs*. Because it is the first book to appear that traces the course of Chinese foreign policy during Mao Zedong's entire post-1949 career, one quite possibly expects too much from this volume. Even if one puts aside what may be unreasonable expectations, the book still suffers from the absence of both a consistent, coherent structure and a persuasive intellectual rationale. The author's principal argument (stated rather inelegantly on page 14) is that "China's international position suggests very much a picture of a country whose political system is perhaps one of the most autonomous in the world, and of a country which internationally is untrammelled by the kind of interdependencies and alliance systems which limit the freedom of manoeuvre of other major powers." According to Yahuda, the entire history of China's external conduct since 1949 (for which Mao is given predominant credit) has been an effort to enhance China's capacity for independent action — both politically and militarily — all the while striving to guarantee the PRC its legitimate international standing both as a major power and as a nation with special links to the socialist states, revolutionary movements, the Third World, and the small or medium powers. These multiple concerns are revealed through what Yahuda terms China's international "role definitions" — that is, expressed Chinese views about the PRC's position in an endlessly shifting environment of both enemies and friends. "China's foreign policy," he suggests, "is best understood within China's own frame of reference" (p. 238).

Unfortunately, the findings yielded by such unabashed sinocentrism are neither compelling nor consistent. At a purely descriptive level, it is true, Yahuda's effort is worthy of commendation, for he has pulled together disparate source materials (both official and unofficial) into a chronologically continuous account of the twists and turns of PRC state policy. But what major new insights does his approach yield? The generalization that China has consistently sought to enhance its autonomy in world affairs seems on the one hand unexceptional — what major state, within the confines of its own resources, does not? — and on the other mistaken in critical respects. Over the last several decades, the PRC has clearly sought to insulate itself from many of the political and military conflicts among the great powers, and, more so than most nations, it has succeeded in standing above or apart from the fray while still encouraging others to do its bidding. Yet China's political and diplomatic involvements, both regional and global, are undeniable and growing; moreover, Beijing's international course has not infrequently led China into armed conflict or to the brink of war. To deal with such dangerous circumstances, the PRC has all too often found it necessary to seek external support.

Yahuda, to be sure, would not deny that China is involved with an outside world; rather, he would insist that PRC policy has never been mortgaged to the preferences of others. But his effort to demonstrate an unyielding Chinese commitment to this core principle ultimately assumes a rather forced quality. In central respects, the book becomes less a chronicling of the conceptual basis of Chinese foreign policy strategy — a study which very much needs to be done — and more a discursive rendering of the extraordinary political and diplomatic gymnastics in which China's leaders have recurrently been compelled to engage.

The basic problems with the volume, moreover, are both analytical and methodological. For reasons which are never altogether clear, Yahuda deems it sufficient simply to describe certain key assumptions related to the structure of world politics at any given moment and how China "fits" within the array of global political, economic, and military forces. These assumptions and "fits" derive from various PRC declaratory statements of policy, assessments of the international situation, and leadership speeches, both private and public. Yahuda relies to an exceptional degree on the manifest content of such materials, arguing that the expressed views (in presumed contrast with those of other states) have an immediate operational significance in the Chinese case.

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Thus, openly and without apology, Yahuda has committed the offense of literalism. Communications, however, cannot be detached so mechanically from the political context in which they are conveyed. How a Chinese politician depicts the nature of the outside world has an undeniable impact not only on the theory and practice of PRC diplomacy and foreign policy strategy, but on the possible goals and programs pursued in a domestic context. Yahuda surely recognizes this obvious fact; indeed, intermittently he feels compelled to explore some of its consequences. But we are never told whether Chinese "role definitions" are an independent, dependent, or mediating variable. And, notwithstanding his intention to avoid discussions of Chinese behavior, he frequently puts aside the analysis of "China's role," focusing instead on various concrete political situations and episodes of elite conflict which have affected that role.

It is the author's recurrent insistence on China's uniqueness which ultimately proves most troubling. If Yahuda is to be believed, the PRC is simply unlike all other great powers. However, the same case can be made for others as well. Is France's political and military posture equivalent to that of the United Kingdom? And are the UK's policies a carbon copy of those of West Germany or Japan? Are there no conspicious differences in the global behavior of the USSR and the United States? And (to cite perhaps the most appropriate example) what comparisons can be drawn between India and China? Taken to a logical conclusion, cannot all nations make a legitimate claim to uniqueness?

Yahuda declines to ask this last question. Instead, he contends that "the Chinese people have developed a unique political system which is self-generating and which is deliberately kept apart from penetration from outside factors" (p. 275). In addition, he asserts that the "three worlds" doctrine[1] will serve as a "grand strategy" by which China will continue to "set itself apart from the interdependencies of others" (p. 284). Conclusive verdicts on these and related questions surely seem premature.

By casting his argument exclusively within what he acknowledges as a Chinese frame of reference, Yahuda loses the perspective and detachment for which scholars, unlike nations, can strive and which they can occasionally achieve. In view of the very substantial research efforts involved in preparing this study, the book's shortcomings are all the more regrettable.

THE SCOPE of Robert Sutter's book is much narrower than that of Yahuda's volume, but this work too must be faulted as a study which achieves considerably less than one might have hoped. Sutter's intention is to survey Chinese foreign policy with respect to key events and specific bilateral issues from the onset of the Cultural Revolution until the months following the death of Mao. Somehow, the history of this tumultuous and remarkable decade is reduced to 160 pages of rather lifeless prose. Perhaps it is unfair to fault an author for not attempting more. Yet so much cries out to be done in this study. By being unduly restrictive in both approach and objective, Sutter misses the opportunity to explore the complicated and fascinating foreign policy issues that have preoccupied Chinese decision-makers since the mid-1960's.

Indeed, in critical respects this is not so much a book-length work as a compilation of largely unedited intelligence materials. The monitoring and interpretation of Chinese state behavior is a very necessary task in the context of day-to-day intelligence analysis; however, the value of issuing these studies (some more than a decade old) in book form can be seriously questioned. By merely describing Chinese statements and actions with no effort to place them in a meaningful policy context, Sutter often produces more confusion than clarification. Thematically, analytically, and chronologically, he fails to capture the intricacies of the Chinese political process which so centrally affected the formulation and exercise of foreign policy during this period. His entire focus is on the output of the decision process, with virtually no attention to (or even sustained speculation about) how and why such decisions might have been made. It is a disappointing book, because it could have significantly enhanced our understanding of the complex politics submerged under the facade of unitary state behavior.

Chen's volume is intended to fill a niche in courses in PRC foreign policy, and at that level it probably succeeds. By compiling primary source materials (predominantly PRC official statements and editorials) on various key foreign policy themes, Chen has provided a reasonable introduction to both the style and substance of Chinese documentation. Far less clear is how these various documents "fit" in any scheme of PRC behavior or policy objectives. A long introductory essay should have provided such clarification; instead, Chen's

[1] According to this doctrine, the world contains three major subdivisions: the superpowers, other industrialized countries, and the developing countries.

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essay hopscotches across the historical record of three decades of Chinese foreign policy, and to no apparent end. Chen exhibits little or no sensitivity to (1) differences within the Chinese elite over foreign policy strategy, even when some of his documentation makes reference to these differences; (2) the obvious tensions between a "pure" conception of the "three worlds" doctrine as opposed to the practical use of this idea in Chinese diplomacy and strategy; and (3) the major shifts over time in the emphasis and operational significance attributed to various official policy formulations. His inattention to these and related issues diminishes the worth of what is otherwise a necessary and welcome compilation of documents. The value of contemporary political history is in illuminating how and why ideas and issues have assumed significance for a given set of leaders; unfortunately, this quality is conspiciously absent from Chen's volume.

Wang Gungwu's study is intended to demonstrate the continuing relevance of a broader historical approach to understanding Chinese perspectives on contemporary international relations. The belief that various historical associations serve as an enduring and even pivotal "filter" for elite values is a sensible and necessary idea. Toward proving this point, Wang argues that China's foreign relations since 1949 are best understood within the context of three recurring themes: "the desire to assert independence, the problems of modernity, and the determination to make revolution" (p. 1).

For two chapters, Wang elucidates these themes with considerable clarity. Unfortunately, these two chapters bring the reader only up to 1949, at which point the author then offers a conventional historical narrative of events, rather than the interpretive essay which he had earlier promised.

Not only that, he immediately puts aside his chosen framework, and asserts that other issues took precedence. For example, in the immediate "post-liberation" period, preservation of China's sovereignty and security was purportedly "more urgent and vital" than the goals of revolution; thus, "in terms of independence, modernisation, and revolution, China's achievements by 1953 were modest" (pp. 43, 45). Even if one ignores the very considerable aid that the PRC proffered to both Korean and Vietnamese Communists during these years, the contention suggests a rather severe limitation (or omission) in his framework. Unfortunately, it is an analytical problem which he never addresses.

Equally troublesome, Wang deems it sufficient simply to note how one or another historical episode illustrates the validity of his three key themes. When events deviate from these premises, he suggests without much elaboration that the Chinese were merely revealing their concerns about one of the issues in altered form. For example, Wang asserts that during the Cultural Revolution, "the deep [Chinese] desire to be independent and to grow independently . . . took a very aggressive form in China's international relations" (p. 116). Whether China's external behavior during this period was in fact aggressive or not, why should events yet again depart from a revolutionary course whose "driving spirit is wholly rational" (p. 141)? For this and other questions, Wang has no answers. The study which demonstrates systematically where, when, and how China's past serves its present remains unwritten.

FORTUNATELY, in *China, the United Nations, and World Order,* Samuel Kim demonstrates most impressively what can be achieved by thoughtful, creative inquiry. This is a meticulously researched volume, whose length and detail alone may regrettably deny it the attention it richly deserves.

The idea that a study of Chinese behavior in various international organizations can provide singular insights into both the style and the substance of PRC foreign policy is not widely held, yet Kim has very much succeeded in doing just that, first by asking the right questions and then by knowing how to investigate them. The conventional lament that the absence of sufficient data prevents serious work on Chinese foreign policy is considerably less compelling in light of his findings. By studying Chinese behavior, he has shown that much can be learned from evidence removed both from the decision-making process and conventional documentary analysis. Without question, this is among the most important works yet published on Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, it clearly merits the attention of international relations specialists in general.

While it is not easy to reduce a long and complicated book to a single proposition, Kim's study has a consistent, recurring concern: What is the relationship between expressed Chinese values about world politics and China's actual diplomatic practice? To investigate this issue, Kim undertook an exhaustive study of PRC behavior in the United Nations (including Chinese involvement in various conferences and participation in specialized agencies) from the time of Beijing's initial entry into the world body in October 1971 until August 1977. His approach is decidedly empirical: What did those acting in the name of China do,

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say, and seek to accomplish in various international forums? How does this behavior accord with expressed or implicit Chinese values? How does it compare with the behavior of other nations? What inferences can be drawn about the relationship of the PRC's global policy to emergent Chinese conceptions of a future world order?

Kim concludes that there is a discernible, relatively consistent orientation in Chinese diplomatic practice, and that this orientation represents more than expedient lip service to current international fashion. By lending support to the efforts of various less developed states to enhance national sovereignty, control natural resources, and pursue the development of a new international economic order—all under the general rubric of "opposing the hegemonism of the superpowers"—the PRC has staked its claim as an articulator of Third World concerns. However, this support has always been restrained and undemonstrative — a curious mixture of what Kim terms "symbolic activism and substantive passivism" (p. 493). As Kim observes, "China's support for the Third World is generally that of a partisan spectator who cheers, moralizes, and votes, when necessary, rather than an active, not to say leading, player in the game of global politics" (p. 262). Such "low-keyed and self-effacing behavior has enhanced both [China's] political legitimacy and [the UN's] political stability at one and the same time" (p. 199). Nevertheless, Kim also notes that the Chinese have demonstrated an impressive ability "to disguise their interests in terms of principles" (p. 264). By pursuing these interests with conscious understatement, the PRC has succeeded as "a major power commanding respect and influence without really trying" (p. 161).

The cumulative impact of Chinese participation in the UN, then, has been one of "mutual legitimation" for both the People's Republic and the world body. Over a period of time, Beijing's representatives have learned a considerable amount about the prevailing norms of international law and organization, and how China can best function within them. At the same time, the PRC has deliberately if unobtrusively cultivated a principled image in pursuit of its long-term strategy of world order. As Kim concludes,

The Chinese strength lies in symbolic capability—ideological, political, and behavioral. Chinese multilateral diplomacy has concentrated more on the making of new rules, new norms, and new structures . . . than on commanding the capabilities that would assure implementation of a new order. (p. 492)

In the past three years, it should be noted, the PRC has departed in significant ways from the value-oriented approach that Mao favored and Kim describes at length. Specifically, it has adopted a more power-oriented view. Chinese references to the "three worlds" theory have become far less frequent and at times almost perfunctory. Various international involvements unthinkable in the era of Mao have now come into existence, thereby undermining the presumed immutable Chinese commitment to at least some of the values which Kim identifies. To this extent, the author can be faulted (along with all other China specialists) for overstating the extent to which past "principled commitments" would stand in the way of responses to new imperatives and opportunities.

This shortcoming aside, however, Kim's book is a pioneering effort. Unlike so many other analysts, he did not succumb to the temptation of treating China in isolation. The lasting value of his study is that it places the PRC within an existing legal and institutional context, to which China, like every other international actor, must adapt, if not conform. Whatever one's view of the value of studies of world order or international organization, Kim's work would have been rendered largely meaningless in the absence of his obvious command of these fields. China's emergence as a world power is no less of a fascinating issue from either of these alternative frames of reference. For specialist and generalist alike, Kim has shown what can and must be done to link China to the larger field of international studies. If these five studies offer a reasonable estimation of the current "state of the art," then this effort has only just begun.

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